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 While corporate social responsibility (CSR) has garnered the attention of 
scholars over the past three decades, most attention has been focused on a link to 
financial performance.  Grounded in stakeholder theory and a resource-based 
view of the firm considering the cospecialized intangible assets of CSR and 
reputation, this research explores the evolution of corporate social actions and 
firm reputation over time. We draw on data from the KLD database on corporate 
social actions and concerns, and on the Fortune most-admired company database 
to examine the relationship between corporate social behaviour and reputation 
over time.   
 In the thesis, we argue that starting with the broad premise that any 
corporate social action or gesture can initially enhance corporate reputation, the 
firm is then both encouraged and also expected to go further.  Accordingly, we 
propose subsequent actions are needed to meet stakeholder expectations to be 
able to improve or at least sustain firm reputation.  We find that over the 
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timeframe of our study that corporate social actions do experience the predicted  
positive linear growth. 
 Drawing on a sample of 285 major US firms and a 2002-2006 time frame 
to provide a 1425 firm  year panel, we find corporate social actions to be strongly 
related to corporate reputation, while the change in corporate social actions also 
predicts a change in corporate reputation.  We also found support for the 
hypothesis that corporate social actions directed to technical stakeholders have 
the most significant impact on firm reputation.  We do not however find the 
expected influence of  concerns over corporate social actions directed to 
institutional stakeholders on firm reputation, leading to the intriguing question:  
why not? 
 We provide detailed illustrations with five of the sampled firms and 
interpret their CSR-reputation relationships.  These findings expand our 
understanding of the effect of the change over time in corporate social actions 
and the ensuing effect on corporate reputation.  We extend the applicability of 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 Some might view corporate social responsibility (CSR) as an oxymoron 
akin to military intelligence, as CSR describes business’ discretionary 
relationship with stakeholders, going well beyond the traditional model 
concerned only with shareholders and that required by law.  Firms in the 
developed world have widely embraced the need to cohabit with the society 
around them, so much so that a most recent article by Orlitzky and colleagues 
(2011:  9) calls for a shift away from research directed to “whether CSR pays, but 
instead when or under what circumstances”.   This underlines that we no longer 
need to justify CSR, however there is still much to learn about CSR to address 
limitations in the literature. 
 For more than three decades CSR research has primarily focused on a CSR 
link to financial performance (Lockett, Moon & Visser, 2006; Margolis & Walsh, 
2001).    The results of the largely cross sectional studies may however be viewed 
as inconclusive (Waddock & Graves, 1997; Orlitzky, Schmidt & Rynes, 2003) with 
critics pointing out misspecifications (McWilliams & Siegel, 2000) and even 
pondering whether it is the lack of a dominant paradigm of CSR that has 
hampered CSR research progress (Godfrey & Hatch, 2007; Lockett et al., 2006; 
McWilliams, Siegel & Wright, 2006; Orlitzky, Siegel & Waldman, 2011).   
 Recognizing the multi-faceted complexity of today’s firms and the longer-
term impact of CSR, it is not surprising that a direct relationship to financial 
performance has been hard to substantiate.  However, the link from CSR to firm 
reputation has greater conceptual alignment (Fombrun, Gardberg & Barnett, 
2000), consistent with Fombrun and Van Riel’s (2004:  105) suggestion that 
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“perceptions of social responsibility enhance reputation”.  Prior research on this 
link is somewhat limited and has focused on the effect of particular types of CSR 
actions on corporate reputation, such as accidents (Zyglidopoulos, 2001), 
downsizing or layoffs (Kraatz & Love, 2006; Love & Kraatz, 2009;  Zyglidopoulos, 
2004, 2005) and quality (Straw & Epstein, 2000).   The value of a good 
reputation (Fombrun & Shanley, 1990; Podolny, 1993) was examined by Roberts 
and Dowling (2002) to find support for the persistence over time of reputation 
and financial performance, however they did not consider CSR in building 
reputation.   
 More recently, McWilliams and Siegel (2010) have proposed that CSR can 
be synergistic with other assets, of which they highlight corporate reputation, 
labeling them as cospecialized assets.  They integrate a resource based view as a 
theoretical foundation for the competitive advantage these intangible assets can 
confer, but remain at a conceptual level. 
 As noted earlier, another critique has been that of the cross-sectional 
design of most CSR research.  From the earliest reviews of Aldag and Bartol 
(1978) and Ulmann (1985), the need for longitudinal studies of CSR has been 
suggested, echoing Cochran and Wood's (1984) call to investigate causality.  
Given CSR and reputation evolve in a dynamic corporate environment; capturing 
the change over time is highly pertinent to understanding the interaction that 
may add to the value of these intangible assets.   
 The need for a more precise definition of CSR and better adapted CSR 
measures was stressed by McWilliams and colleagues (2006) as well as Godfrey 
and Hatch (2007) in discussing a future research agenda on the strategic 
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implications of CSR, while Mattingly and Berman (2006) advocate that CSR 
strengths and concerns are not a continuum when interpreting CSR measures.  
Orlitzky and colleagues (2011) repeat these issues and introduce the need for 
multi-theoretic grounding of CSR research.  Given the inherent ambiguity of how 
CSR is interpreted and translated into perceptions of reputation, it is logical that 
no single management theory can provide adequate foundation.  While past CSR 
studies have been overwhelmingly grounded in stakeholder theory, the addition 
of other theoretical lenses can reinforce the potential for integrating CSR into 
firm strategy. 
 Responding to these shortcomings, this dissertation uses a multi-theoretic 
lens to capture the dynamic relationship of CSR over time on the evolution of 
corporate reputation.  Based on stakeholder theory (Freeman, 1984) and a 
resource-based view (Barney, 1991 & 2001) of the firm,  we explore how corporate 
social actions (distinguished between strengths and concerns) change over time 
to influence the change in  stakeholder assessments of firm reputation.   Using 
longitudinal data and structural equation modeling, we search for evidence of a 
causal relationship between corporate social actions and corporate reputation.  
Starting with the broad premise that any corporate social action or gesture, 
including merely a symbolic one, can initially enhance corporate reputation, we 
suggest that the firm is then both encouraged and also expected to go further.  
Furthermore, “when expectations of CSR increase, the value of the status quo 
necessarily declines” (Barnett, 2007:  807).   Accordingly, we argue in this thesis 
that subsequent CSR actions will need to expand in order meet stakeholder 
expectations to be able to improve or at least sustain firm reputation.  The 
4 
 
importance to society at large of firms acting responsibly is undeniable, however 
little is known of how social performance evolves over time, nor the longer-term 
impact on the favourable consequence of an enhanced firm reputation, a most 
valuable, albeit intangible, competitive resource. 
 While we have proposed that firms must engage in further corporate social 
actions than the status quo to maintain or enhance reputation, the stakeholder 
perception of the firm’s underlying rationale is an additional input to their 
reputation assessment.  Remembering that the distinction of whether a CSR 
initiative is symbolic or substantive is in the eye of the stakeholder, it is the 
stakeholder’s access to sufficient information to develop expectations as well as to 
evaluate the outcomes that informs their interpretation of the corporate social 
action.  For example, in situations where stakeholders’ CSR expectations are 
adequately met one interpretation may be that the corporate social actions were 
substantive or alternatively, that stakeholders expected lip-service and given the 
context were satisfied with symbolic actions.  Furthermore, where “in symbol-
intensive industries there is a very fine line between image and substance” 
(Cappetta & Gioia, 2006:  217), stakeholder interpretations of firm CSR initiatives 
may be further blurred.  Another consideration that may affect the stakeholders’ 
access to information is in the interaction they have with the firm.  When 
stakeholders contract or transact with a firm they enter into an exchange with 
formulated expectations, while when a stakeholder is peripheral or involuntary 
they may not have formulated such expectations.  Furthermore, the access to 
information on the firm’s corporate social actions is most likely available to those 
stakeholders transacting with the firm than those affected by the firm’s actions.  
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In other words, stakeholders such as employees or suppliers who regularly 
exchange services/goods with the firm are likely to know more about  the firm’s 
CSR than would more distant stakeholders such as neighbours to one of the 
firm’s plants.  Accordingly, the type of interaction the stakeholder holds with the 
firm will be influential to information asymmetry as well as establishing 
expectations.  As the same initiative may be viewed as substantive by one 
stakeholder and symbolic by another, it is not the objective of this research to 
measure or classify CSR initiatives as symbolic or substantive.  
 The overarching foundation of the resource-based view is used to frame 
the relationship of corporate social actions and corporate reputation as viewed 
through institutional, resource dependence and stakeholder theoretical lenses.    
This research focuses on the corporate social actions of major US firms directed 
to a broad array of stakeholders to identify the impact on corporate reputation 
over time.  The research question we pose is:  How do corporate social actions 
affect corporate reputation and how do changes over time in corporate social 
actions affect a change in firm reputation?   
 This dissertation will examine the evolution of firm reputation with CSR 
over time, considering the stickiness of reputation and other temporal effects in a 
resource-based view of the firm where the synergy between CSR and reputation 
creates cospecialized intangible assets (McWilliams & Siegel, 2010).   The 
challenge in interpreting these relationships lies in the “unpredictable and 
sometimes immeasurable elements that come into play as time unfolds” 
(Ketchen, Jr., Boyd & Bergh, 2008).   The impact of the external environment 
(i.e. natural disasters of earthquakes, warfare or civil unrest, global recession, 
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etc.) as well as firm or industry-specific events (i.e. sale/purchase of major lines 
of business, judicial inquiries, destructive innovation, etc.) are factors that may 
distort annual comparisons on a case-by-case basis across the years.  Through 
select illustration we delve into some of these possibilities in interpreting the 
relationship of five individual firms’ corporate social actions with the evolution of 
their reputations.  
 A resource-based view of the firm considering the value of CSR and 
reputation, underpins this research, drawing on stakeholder, institutional and 
resource dependence theories.  CSR creates a synergy with reputation, something 
that “makes other assets more valuable than they other-wise would be.  The 
clearest example of this is firm reputation” (McWilliams & Siegel, 2010:  12).   
This research expands our understanding of the effect of the change over time in 
corporate social actions and the ensuing effect on corporate reputation over time, 
contributing to resource-based view research on intangible assets.   
 We establish that corporate social actions have a positive linear growth 
over the period of our study as a starting point to then consider how the change 
in corporate social actions affects corporate reputation.  We find a change in 
corporate social actions predicts a change in corporate reputation, supporting our 
hypothesis that improvements in corporate social actions are positively related to 
an improvement in corporate reputation.  We also find corporate social actions 
directed to technical stakeholders to have an impact on firm reputation beyond 
those directed to institutional stakeholders. 
 In recognition that a model may not “be simultaneously general, accurate, 
and simple” (Weick, 1979: 35, c.f. Miller & Dess, 1993), often referred to as the 
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GAS trade-off, this research utilizes a generic model which may be applied to all 
manner of firms and draws on a sample of major US public corporations.  While 
much existing research is based on a pre-2000 time frame, this study is based on 
a post Sarbanes-Oxley time period from 2002 to 2006 where markets were 
generally improving.  This has the advantage of avoiding the technology bubble 
and crash; however, stakeholder awareness and access to information have been 
accelerated with the internet and globalization.  Skepticism and distrust of 
corporate America has also been fuelled, as captured in accusations of green-
washing.  The advent of social media and the barrage of blogs, twitter posts and 
other instantaneous stakeholder feedback have significantly altered the 
information horizon to reduce the often advocated influence of firm advertising 
to communicate CSR activities (McWilliams & Siegel, 2010).     
  The literature review in Chapter 2 will start with a retrospective on the 
origins of CSR, we will then distinguish the various CSR and reputational 
constructs to establish clear definitions as a rigorous foundation for the theory 
development and provide the theoretic and conceptual frameworks.  The 
proposed model and hypothesized relationships will also be discussed.  The 
methodology presented in Chapter 3 will identify the dependent and independent 
variables, describe the data sources, as well as support the choice of control 
variables in the model and the rational for the sample selection.  The analysis of 
the empirical tests and results is presented in Chapter 4, with a discussion of 
results and limitations following in Chapter 5.  The concluding Chapter 6 reviews 
the direction for future research and the applicability to management in assessing 
CSR and reputation strategies.   
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2.  THEORY DEVELOPMENT 
2.1  Preamble 
 We set the stage for our theoretical model with a retrospective on the 
origins attributed to corporate social responsibility (CSR).  Taking this very long 
horizon accentuates how gradual the shift toward CSR had been during the past 
century, particularly in North America.  This sets the stage for understanding 
how slowly the origins of CSR were to take root, but which today have been so 
broadly embraced that there is no longer a debate as to whether CSR pays 
(Orlitzky et al., 2011). 
 A discussion of the definitional landscape follows for the broadly related 
CSR and reputation concepts.  A synopsis of various interpretations concludes 
with the working definitions that have been chosen for this research.  This is a 
key building block to avoid any confusion as to what interpretations are intended 
of the focal concepts before proceeding to develop the theoretical model. 
 We will then assess drivers and motivations behind corporate social 
actions and corporate reputation to ground these key constructs.  Then, 
encompassed in the resource-based view we will elaborate on the interaction of 
stakeholder, institutional and resource dependence theories shaping the 
relationship between corporate social actions and corporate reputation.   
 This will complete the theoretical framework upon which the proposed 
model will reside.  Building upon the theoretical and conceptual models the 
anticipated relationships will be formulated in the hypotheses that will be 




2.2  A retrospective on the history of corporate social responsibility1  
 While corporate social responsibility (CSR) is now a widely accepted 
domain, it was almost sixty years ago that Peter Drucker's conclusion entitled 
"The Responsibilities of Management", included the captions "the social impact 
of business decision, making a profit the first social responsibility and the 
ultimate responsibility:  to make what is for the public good the enterprises' own 
self-interest" (Drucker, 1954:  381). 
 In this chapter we will explore the antecedent and subsequent business 
classic works that influenced and embodied the concept of CSR.  We will draw on 
these authors, largely using their own words, to develop the foundation of what 
we now term CSR, recognizing that “business and society are interwoven rather 
than distinct entities” (Wood, 1991:  695).  Before expanding on our more 
contemporary view of CSR, examining how the firm’s focus on shareholders is 
extended to consider other internal and external actors today known as 
stakeholders provides an appreciation for the roots of CSR.  To recognize the 
temporal context the retrospective is subdivided by decades which are 
categorized for their primary influence on business and society.  The voice of 
these early scholars is largely maintained to provide insights into the 
interpretation at the time of business’ actions, thus capturing the temporal 
context against which the perspectives are framed. 
 
 
                                                            
1
 This first chapter is an extract of portions of the author’s article published in the Journal of  
Management History (2009) and reflects the thinking of the time of influential business and 
academic leaders.    
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2.2.1  1930's – The Great Depression 
 The corporate revolution described by Berle and Means in The Modern 
Corporation and Private Property (1932) is chosen as the starting point for this 
review.  Epstein (1999) argues that strategy was founded on their intellectual 
base, while Novicevic and colleagues (2006) identify the limited liability 
corporation as giving birth to corporate responsibility.  It is Berle and Means' 
recognition of the transformation from the traditional owner-managed firm to 
widely held stock ownership, where a new class of managers exercises 
considerable control that frames new expectations of corporations and their 
executives.  Berle's original preface (1932:  xli) lamented, "Accepting the 
institution of the large corporation (as we must), and studying it as a human 
institution, we have to consider the effect on property, the effect on workers, and 
the effect upon individuals who consume or use the goods or services which the 
corporation produces or renders".  The new concept of the corporation is viewed 
to have "placed the community in a position to demand that the modern 
corporation serve not alone the owners or the control but all society" (Berle & 
Means, 1932:  312, revised 1968 edition).   This vision is essentially today's 
stakeholder theory. 
 In a 1967 revision Means noted the lack of a corporate performance 
measure, other than profits.  He then posed the following questions:  "Should the 
problems of bad performance be worked on piecemeal, as has been done by the 
laws concerning theft and breach of contract, drug distribution, and auto safety?  
Or can criteria for good performance be developed to guide corporate 
management and inducements be provided to encourage the good?  What 
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changes would be needed to make it true that action by corporate management in 
its own self-interest serves the public interest?" (Berle & Means, 1932:   xxxv, 
revised 1968 edition).  More than forty years after Means’ revision these 
questions are still being debated. 
 Concurrent with Berle and Means' reflections on the corporate revolution, 
Elton Mayo, a highly influential researcher perhaps best noted for the Hawthorne 
Experiment, was also very conscious of the interaction of business with society as 
described in The Human Problems of an Industrial Civilization (1933).  As his 
name is often noted as a source of inspiration by scholars such as Barnard (1938), 
Homans (1950) and Roethlisberger (1977), an insight into his view of social 
responsibility provides an additional perspective on some of the influences of the 
day.  In Mayo's (1933) description of worker morale at the Western Electric 
Company, Hawthorne plant, he notes the high esteem with which the employees 
hold the Company and how much they appreciate the considerate hours, 
affordable restaurant and good hospital, as well as vacation entitlements and 
company sponsored investment plans.     
 The generous employee benefits are perhaps even more impressive in the 
context of the Great Depression and could serve as an example of highly 
responsible corporate behaviour, even today.  In 1936 the Western Electric 
Company applied the experiment findings by adding an employee-counseling 
program with the help of another of the experiment researchers, Fritz 
Roethlisberger.  Roethlisberger credits Mayo's interaction with the executives 
and unrelenting inquisitiveness as the driving force in having the results fully 
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understood, calling them the "double-whammy Hawthorne effect.  Today the 
condition is called synergy, that is, when 2 + 2 = 5" (Roethlisberger, 1977:  51).    
 While these academics were helping the Western Electric Company to 
implement socially responsible improvements, Chester Barnard, a thirty-year 
veteran corporate executive was writing about cooperation and leadership.  His 
The Functions of the Executive (1938) seminal work is one of the most quoted 
business perspectives on the organization's top managers.  He notes the complex 
morality accompanying executive positions, given the executive is also defining 
morals for others within the firm.  Similarly, as the executive's rank increases so 
does the moral complexity in addressing conflicts of codes.   
 Relating the impact of the executive's morals to the organization, Barnard 
(1938: 282) goes on to say, "Organizations endure, however, in proportion to the 
breadth of the morality by which they are governed.  Thus the endurance of 
organization depends upon the quality of leadership; and that quality derives 
from the breadth of the morality upon which it rests."  The onus is clearly on the 
executive to not only establish the corporate values, but to ensure these values 
form the foundation of corporate actions throughout the organization.  In the 
spirit of today's stakeholder management, Barnard argues (1938:  255), "This 
philosophy of giving as little as possible and getting as much as possible in the 
other man's values is the root of bad customer relations, bad labor relations, bad 
credit relations, bad supply relations, bad technology".  Barnard has been 





2.2.2  1940's & 1950’s– World War II through to the Cold War 
 Building on the work of Barnard whose influence he acknowledges, 
Herbert Simon's Administrative Behavior (1945) also recognizes the social values 
to which organizations must respond.  With organizations assuming broader 
roles, Simon notes however, that traditional institutions, like religion or the 
family, are at the origin of fundamental values against which corporate actions 
will be judged.   
 Roethlisberger (1977:  111) recounts the attitude toward responsibility in 
the mid 1940's "that responsibility was a property of an executive in the same 
sense that wisdom was a property of a sage.  That is to say, an irresponsible 
executive was a contradiction in terms; he could not exist".  Clearly the executive 
was held in high esteem with unquestioned authority based on the position 
occupied within the organization.  The acceptance of this authority was however 
somewhat mitigated since "unless an executive's function reported directly to the 
president, he could not get people to do what they were supposed to" 
(Roethlisberger, 1977:  171).  This observation that the chief executive officer’s 
authority extended to immediate subordinates recognizes the influence of the 
executive group, currently referred to as the top management team (TMT). 
 Relating his experiences in a post war retraining program, Roethlisberger 
(1977:  112) decided his "goal was not to make persons into better executives but 
instead to make executives into better persons", focusing on "a class of 
phenomena - the interactions between persons – that I called social space" (1977:  
115).  Surprised at a context that appeared to be missing in the case studies 
taught, Roethlisberger (1977:  130) noted "these societal and cultural factors had 
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ruled them out of existence", furnishing the students with a narrow view of the 
world.  Roethlisberger (1977: 147) went on to note "what an organization needed 
in order to realize its purposes was something entirely different from what a 
person needed in order to be satisfied", however he identified a gap in how 
management and workers looked at each other's behaviour which Roethlisberger 
(1977:  167) identified as the "man-in-the-middle syndrome".  Only decades later 
did upper echelons theory recognize the cognitive biases of executives 
(Hambrick, 2007) which influenced perceptions and subsequent actions. 
 Peter Drucker's The Practice of Management (1954) is the birth of what 
will be coined as corporate social responsibility, directing managers' attention to 
ensure the corporation does "not undermine our social beliefs and cohesion" 
(Drucker, 1954:  387).  He clearly assigns leadership to managers in establishing 
objectives and meeting performance commitments, with the bottom-line that 
when "an enterprise fails to perform, we rightly hire not different workers but a 
new president" (Drucker, 1954:  13).  Managers are told it is their "public 
responsibility to make what-ever is genuinely in the public good become the 
enterprise's own self-interest" (Drucker, 1954:  390).   
 The responsibility to shareholders, often used by managers as justification 
for profit maximization, is responded to by the fact shareholders of public 
companies can sell their stock, "society, however is stuck with the enterprise" 
(Drucker, 1954:  387).  As to the goal of profit maximization, Drucker (1954:  36) 
asserts that the goal of business is "the achievement of sufficient profit to cover 
the risks of economic activity and thus to avoid loss", going on to say "the profit 
motive and its offspring, maximization of profits, are just as irrelevant to the 
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function of a business, the purpose of a business and the job of managing a 
business".    
 Drucker's (1954:  388) concluding arguments remind management to 
"realize that it must consider the impact of every business policy and business 
action upon society.  It has to consider whether the action is likely to promote the 
public good, to advance the basic beliefs of our society, to contribute to its 
stability, strength and harmony".  This recognition of the social power granted to 
the corporation corresponds to expectations of additional corporate 
responsibilities (Schwartz, 2007).   
 Going beyond just the role of the chief executive officer, or the president, it 
is the "job of a team of several men acting together" dubbed the "chief-executive 
team" upon whom the responsibility for the corporation's attention to social 
responsibility lies (Drucker, 1954: 169).  This reflects the growing importance of 
the corporation in America, where the task exceeds that of one person alone to be 
able to manage all of the stakeholder interests.  It also recognizes that “leadership 
of a complex organization is a shared activity, and the collective cognitions, 
capabilities, and interactions of the entire TMT enter into strategic behaviours” 
(Hambrick, 2007:  334). 
 While Drucker promotes the management team approach to leadership, 
Philip Selznick's Leadership in Administration (1957:  4) focuses on the 
argument, "The executive becomes a statesman as he makes the transition from 
administrative management to institutional leadership."   He highlights how the 
treatment of others comes from the administrator's "code of ethics" which "is as 
significant a part of his equipment as an administrator as is his knowledge of 
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administrative behavior", quoting from a 1950 collaboration of Simon's Public 
Administration (Selznick, 1957:  80).  He then goes on to note that the challenge 
to leadership is "to choose key values and to create a social structure that 
embodies them" (Selznick, 1957:  60), reinforcing the role of the executives in 
"building special values" (1957:  27) into the organization to ensure its stability. 
 With respect to organizations, Selznick notes they "do not so much create 
values as embody them" (1957:  20) while "from the standpoint of social systems 
rather than persons, organizations become infused with value as they come to 
symbolize the community's aspirations, its sense of identity" (1957:  19).  This 
firmly places a social responsibility of purpose and responsiveness on the 
organization.  Selznick (1957:  121) also defines social values as "objects of desire 
that are capable of sustaining group identity", while "the maintenance of social 
values depends on the autonomy of elites", where elites could be matched to 
Drucker's management teams.  Selznick's criteria of autonomy reflects the 
importance he attaches to protecting values from being compromised, as noted in 
one of his concluding arguments that the "characteristics of the responsible 
leader can be summarized under two headings:  the avoidance of opportunism 
and the avoidance of utopianism" (Selznick, 1957:  143). 
  
2.2.3  1960's – Cold War & civil rights 
 Roethlisberger's (1977:  259) teaching of business policy provoked a 
reflection on the CEO's position and the realization that the challenge was to "get 
people not in this position to practice the administrative point of view" and the 
importance of "group rather than individual performance” (1977:  313).    
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 Chandler's Strategy and Structure (1962) reflects on corporate structure 
development of major American firms to 1960 in relationship to their 
environment and chosen strategies, where structure follows strategy is often 
repeated.    In addressing the role of senior executives, Chandler (1962:  382) 
stressed the importance of the longer-term planning aspect and the need to 
remove the executives from the day-to-day activities, balancing management's 
attention to echo Selznick's emphasis on critical decision making.  The 
complexity of integrating often ambiguous or conflicting stakeholders’ concerns 
when evaluating strategic choices underlines the need for comprehensive 
executive review of the longer-term consequences of corporate decisions.  This 
focus on future stakeholder needs has been integrated into current definitions of 
corporate sustainability (Zink, 2007).    
 David Braybrooke and Charles Lindblom's A Strategy of Decision (1963) 
relate ethics, morals and values within public policy formulation, which could 
also be applied to corporations.  Warning "ethical theory cannot make bad 
actions impossible" Braybrooke and Lindblom (1963:  209) point out that some 
moral judgments can contradict other equally moral decisions.  Considerable 
emphasis is placed on the ethical and moral underpinning of public policy 
decisions to achieve a concept of justice.  However, as "values change with time 
and experience" (Braybrooke & Lindblom, 1963:  26) the difficulty of public 
policy setting or strategy determination for the firm is accentuated.  The 
divergent public interests to be considered by governments may be seen as an 




 Richard Cyert and James March's A Behavioral Theory of the Firm (1963) 
viewed the organization as "a coalition of individuals" (1963:  27) where the 
coalition would establish objectives through bargaining, controlling and adjusting 
to respond to changes, including those within the environment of the firm.   This 
suggested that both internal and external stakeholders, beyond just shareholders, 
would influence the firm’s choice of direction.  They also go on to note that within 
the goal setting "side payments, far from being the incidental distribution of a 
fixed, transferable body, represent the central process of goal specification.  That 
is, a significant number of these payments are in the form of policy 
commitments" (Cyert & March:  30).  This has interpreted firm objectives to be 
"in reality a negotiated consensus of objectives of the influential participants" 
(Ansoff, 1965:  35), leading Ansoff to credit Cyert and March with "the ring of the 
stakeholder theory" as his inspiration.  Cyert and March viewed business 
decisions to be taken based on economics but in consideration of social behaviour 
and noted (1963:  237) "the modern business firm is an impressive social 
creation", suggesting the role of social networks in influencing decisions.  
 An illustration of a large corporation's goal to have a better safety record 
than other plants in the industry stressed the importance to safety engineers of 
eliminating fatal accidents and time lost due to injuries (Cyert & March, 1963:   
35), recognizing a social responsibility to the workers as well as an economic 
benefit to the corporation. 
 Igor Ansoff's Corporate Strategy (1965:  34) combined responsibilities 
and objectives into a "stakeholder theory of objectives.  This theory maintains 
that the objectives of the firm should be derived balancing the conflicting claims 
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of the various stakeholders in the firm:  managers, workers, stockholders, 
suppliers, vendors.  The firm has a responsibility to all of these and must 
configure its objectives so as to give each a measure of satisfaction" going on to 
say, "profit which is a return on the investment to the stockholders is one of such 
satisfactions, but does not necessarily receive special predominance in the 
objective structure".  Ethical criticism of the profit objective prompt other 
doctrines such as "equal responsibility to stock-holders, long-term survival, or a 
negotiated consensus among various participants of the firm" to be suggested, 
noting that, "some have branded profit as immoral and socially unacceptable" 
(Ansoff, 1965:  31).  
 In identifying major influences on the firm, Ansoff (1965:  64) notes two 
categories of social responsibility, "philanthropy and enlightened self-interest" 
where "a sense of personal obligation by management or owner to serve larger 
purposes of society is sometimes expressed".  He recognizes that the social 
objectives "are the result of interaction among individual objectives of the firm's 
participants", however that they "exert a secondary modifying and constraining 
influence on management behavior", where "constraints are decision rules which 
exclude certain options from the firm's freedom actions" (Ansoff, 1965:  38).   
While Ansoff has been credited as the origin of the term stakeholder (Freeman, 
1984:  49), his view of stakeholders included the above noted constraints, as 
opposed to today's view that stakeholders are integral to strategy development. 
 James Thompson's Organizations in Action (1967:  11) places the 
organization as "part of a wider social system which is the source of the meaning, 
legitimation, or higher-level support which makes the implementation of the 
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organization's goals possible" where in "its rights to command resources and to 
subject its customers to discipline, it is never wholly independent".   
 
2.2.4  1970's – Technology 
 Russell Ackoff's A Concept of Corporate Planning (1970) provides general 
planning insights, which may be applied to social responsibility issues.  Ackoff 
(1970:  21) notes "adaptive planning also requires understanding of the dynamics 
of values:  the way values relate to needs and their satisfaction, how changes in 
needs produce changes in values, and what produces changes in needs", 
highlighting the importance of "building responsiveness and flexibility into an 
organization" (1970:  17).  The need to understand stakeholders’ concerns and 
priorities was never more evident as media reporting shrunk the information gap, 
fuelling stakeholders’ expectations and enabling stakeholders to assess firm 
behaviours.  In addressing one stakeholder, the consumer, Ackoff (1970:  53) 
quotes a marketing executive's advice to view the consumer as rational, while the 
marketer may be irrational, to conclude "dramatic changes in a business can be 
suggested by an understanding of why people consume what they do, when they 
do, where they do".  Reflecting the old adage that the customer is always right, 
responsiveness can only be achieved when stakeholder motivation is fully 
understood.  This search for the underlying rationality is a key feature in today's 
stakeholder management. 
 Joseph Bower's Managing the Resource Allocation Process (1970:  302) 
identifies all projects to be "organizationally interdependent", so that the 
definition and conception of a project should take into account the entire 
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structural context.  He points out "the choice of business goals must reflect 
management's aspirations, attitudes toward risk, and sense of social 
responsibility" (Bower, 1970:  285), the sole reference to other than economic 
responsibilities.  
 Graham Allison's The Essence of Decision (1971:  145) describes 
organizations as creating "capabilities for achieving humanly-chosen purposes 
and performing tasks that would otherwise be impossible"; constraining 
"behavior, namely, they address it already oriented toward doing whatever they 
do"; and developing a culture "to shape the behavior of individuals within the 
organization" where (1971:  153) "organizational culture is thus the set of beliefs 
the members of an organization hold about their organization, beliefs they have 
inherited and pass on to their successors".  These beliefs can also be seen as 
framing social responsibility.  Echoing Cyert and March's (1963) role of 
negotiations, Allison (1971:  170) explains "by arranging a negotiated 
environment, organizations try to maximize autonomy and regularize the 
reactions of other actors with whom they must deal", once again alluding to 
stakeholders. 
 In developing the stakeholder management concept, Freeman's (1984:   
81) analyses levels of "rational, process, and transactional parallels Graham 
Allison's (1971) three levels of organizational analysis.  However, the three levels 
are not mutually exclusive as is often interpreted from Allison's account.  Each 
level of analysis offers a different lens for viewing the organization and offers 
different kinds of explanation for some underlying phenomena broadly called 
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organization behavior.  While the explanations at each level need not be 
identical, they do need to be consistent". 
 Kenneth Andrews' The Concept of Corporate Strategy (1971) is essentially 
an executive handbook of values, ethics, morality and social responsibility.  He 
very clearly attributes heavy responsibilities to the chief executive officer to be 
fully accountable for results and fully aware of all corporate activities.  Andrews 
(1971:  8) notes "enthusiasm for meeting ethical problems head on and avoiding 
shoddy solutions comes not so much from a system of rewards and punishments 
as from the sentiments of loyalty or courage stimulated by the personal 
deportment of the chief executive.  By the persons they are, as much as by what 
they say and do, presidents influence their organizations and affect the 
development of the individuals" and that "ethics, like preference, may be 
considered a product of values" (1971:  88). 
 With respect to the formulation of corporate strategy, including its 
objectives and goals, Andrews (1971:  18) emphasizes that it also defines "the kind 
of economic and human organization it is or intends to be, and the nature of the 
economic and noneconomic contribution it intends to make to its shareholders, 
employees, customers, and communities", reflecting an awareness of the diversity 
of stakeholder interests to be addressed by the firm.  When considering strategic 
decisions, coherent with the firm's environment, he links firm success to the 
ability to capitalize on firm strengths, including its identity.  Andrews (1971:  26) 
goes on to explain the examination of ethics within strategic choices is made 
"against the standards of responsiveness to the expectations of society that the 
strategist elects.  Some alternatives may seem to the executive considering them 
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more attractive than others when the public good or service to society is 
considered" and that "coming to terms with the morality of choice may be the 
most strenuous undertaking in strategic decisions" (1971:  89).  He puts strategy 
into context by stressing:  "strategy is a human construction; it must in the long 
run be responsive to human needs" (Andrews, 1971:  85). 
 Like Drucker (1954) and Ansoff (1965), Andrews (1971) saw the firm as 
having distinct responsibilities to society.  Andrews (1971:  99) also recognized 
the "personal values of the managers making the decision" would orient a choice 
of strategic alternatives, and in cautioning "a company should not venture into 
good works that are not strategically related to its present and prospective 
economic functions" (1971:  100) recognized the lack of necessary resources.  The 
integration of ethical, moral and stakeholder considerations into strategy 
decisions is the essence of today's CSR. 
 
2.2.5  A contemporary view of CSR:  1980's and beyond   
 Edward Freeman's seminal 1984 Strategic Management:  A Stakeholder 
Approach, is the basis for stakeholder theory and stakeholder management.  His 
research (Freeman, 1984:  33) found the word "stakeholder" first used by 
"Stanford Research Institute in 1963", who defined it as a survival mechanism as 
"those groups without whose support the organization would cease to exist", 
and next appeared in Ansoff's Corporate Strategy (1965).  Freeman (1984:  46) 
defined stakeholders to include "any group or individual who can affect or is 
affected by the achievement of the organization's objectives", with his stakeholder 
concept embracing corporate planning, systems theory, corporate social 
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responsibility and organization theory to form strategic stakeholder management 
(1984:  32).   
 With respect to the aspect of CSR, Freeman (1984:  40) laments the 
popular view of "corporate social responsibility is fine, if you can afford it", 
while noting the potential to "redefine the notion of enterprise level strategy to 
more closely align social and ethical concerns with traditional business concerns" 
(1984:  90).   Drucker (1984:  62) also modernized his advice to managers that 
"the proper social responsibility of business is to tame the dragon, that is to turn 
a social problem into economic opportunity and economic benefit, into 
productive capacity, into human competence, into well-paid jobs, and into 
wealth", making the link explicit and echoing Andrews (1971).  
 
2.2.6  Current stakeholder themes 
 Some subsequent refinements to stakeholder theory focus on requiring 
legitimacy to be considered a stakeholder (Rowley, 1997); on segregating primary 
from secondary stakeholders based on their necessity to firm survival (Clarkson, 
1995); and in utilizing urgency, power and legitimacy to determine stakeholder 
salience (Mitchell, Agle & Wood, 1997).   
 While it would be altruistic for firms to be intrinsically committed to 
stakeholder interests because it is the right thing to do, a more instrumental 
approach views stakeholder management as a strategic tool to improve financial 
performance and provide a sustainable competitive advantage over the long term 
(Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Harrison & Freeman, 1999; Wood, 1991). 
25 
 
 The institutional view of the corporation's legitimacy is developed in 
relationship to how a corporation manages its stakeholders (Wood, 1991), with 
any loss of legitimacy seen as a withdrawal of stakeholder support.  While 
"legitimacy is a perception or assumption in that it represents a reaction of 
observers to the organization as they see it; thus legitimacy is possessed 
objectively, yet created subjectively" (Suchman, 1995:  574), making it both the 
Achilles' heel and cornerstone of the stakeholder relationship. 
 Even today, while linked to sustainability, stakeholders and ethics, there is 
no single, universal definition of corporate social responsibility.  One that 
exemplifies the underlying partnership is The World Business Council for 
Sustainable Development's definition of corporate social responsibility as "the 
commitment of business to contribute to sustainable economic development, 
working with employees, their families, the local community and society at large 
to improve their quality of life" (WBCSD, 2000:  10).   
 The diversity and breadth of the elements included in CSR range from 
marketing dangerous or harmful products to uninformed customers and unfair 
labour practices to environmental degradation and pollution (Harrison & 
Freeman, 1999).  While corporate social performance has often been linked to 
financial performance, findings remain inconclusive (Griffin & Mahon, 1997; 
Margolis & Walsh, 2001; Waddock & Graves, 1997), however the longer-term 
profitability of environmental and social initiatives has been recognized by many 
major corporations (Epstein & Roy, 2003). 
 With respect to management attitudes, "today's captains of industry place 
no greater importance on social responsibilities than the individuals who 
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occupied their positions thirty years ago" (Kinard, Smith & Kinard, 2003:  89), a 
finding the researchers described as "unexpected" given the more widespread 
acceptance of CSR. 
 Philip Selznick's The Communitarian Persuasion" (2002) draws upon the 
author's later reflections on many of the topics of his earlier works, as well as 
exploring new avenues.  On the theme of accountability, Selznick (2002:  29) 
offers a broader view of responsibility where the question is "whether and how 
much you care about your duties", looking to "ideals as well as obligations, to 
values as well as rules".  In questioning whether a corporation has a conscience, 
Selznick (2002:  101) notes, "a corporate conscience is created when values that 
transcend narrow self-interest are built into the practice and structure of the 
enterprise", becoming an "organizational culture" and accepting the "realities of 
interdependence". 
 
2.2.7  Summary on 75 years of lessons learned 
 Most of the business classics reviewed have provided the underpinnings of 
what has become stakeholder management and CSR.   The notion of authentic 
leadership essentially sets out the need for executives to balance their 
responsibilities to stakeholders to obtain the cooperation necessary for corporate 
and personal success (Novicevic et al., 2006).  The determination of stakeholder 
salience has been attributed to power, legitimacy and urgency (Mitchell et al., 
1997), while Wood (1991) proposed corporate social responsiveness to be 
processes of assessing the environment, identifying the issues and managing 
stakeholders.   
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 This exploration of the contributions from the business classics integrates 
the antecedents to stakeholder theory and CSR.  The institutional and population 
ecology views of isomorphism and the minimal impact of corporate executives on 
the evolution of firm processes and outcomes offer alternative interpretations for 
the direction of CSR initiatives.  From the classic works of Barnard and Drucker, 
we are reminded that to achieve firm goals leadership that rallies the full 
cooperation of internal and external stakeholders is required.  With the increased 
complexity of the often conflicting perspectives of diverse stakeholders on the 
global stage, current CSR decisions cannot be taken lightly.     
 While some of today’s thriving companies such as Apple and Google may 
be renowned for unique employee perks, harkening back to the Western Electric 
Company’s employee-friendly policies is a reminder of the distinctiveness that 
some firms carved out for themselves three-quarters of a century ago in a bleak 
economic context.  In certain industrial sectors, such as the high tech of Apple 
and Google, today’s challenge may come in attracting and retaining the best 
employees, while in others it is in strategically downsizing without destroying 
employee morale.  We will consider how corporate social actions may achieve 
these diverse objectives, as well as how perceptions of CSR influence the 
reputation of the firm in the marketplace.  Accordingly, we will next review the 
definitional landscape of CSR and reputation, as well as the management theories 






2. 3 Definitional landscape of key constructs 
2.3.1  Corporate social actions and related constructs 
 While the terms CSR, corporate social performance, corporate social 
responsiveness, corporate social actions, corporate social initiatives, corporate 
social gestures and corporate citizenship are often used interchangeably; there 
are subtle differences that merit discussion.  Each of these corporate constructs 
applies to a firm level of analysis (Griffin, 2000), however the actions, initiatives 
or gestures may also represent individual transactions.  Whether they are viewed 
as policies, principles, programs or processes (Carroll, 1999) also influences 
interpretation.  Fuelling some of the confusion and lack of agreement is the 
absence of a single recognized definition (Carroll, 1999 & 2000; McWilliams et 
al., 2006), leading some scholars to question the absence of a dominant paradigm 
in the " ill and incompletely defined " (Baron, 2001:  9) or embryonic 
conceptualization of CSR (Lockett et al., 2006; McWilliams et al., 2006; Orlitzky 
et al., 2011; Windsor, 2006).   The following table outlines a selection of some of 
the definitions that have been attributed to CSR constructs.  These will be 
compared and contrasted in the discussions that follow to lead to the working 









Figure 1.  Selected definitions of CSR constructs 
 Author(s) quoted 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR):  
“a discretionary allocation of corporate resources toward 
improving social welfare that serves as means of enhancing 
relationships with key stakeholders” 
Barnett (2007:  801); 
also adopted by Bertels 
& Peloza (2008:  58) 
“meeting the economic, legal, ethical, and discretionary 
expectations that society has of organizations at a given point 
in time” 
Carroll (1979:  500) 
“obligation to evaluate in its decision-making process the 
effects of its decisions on the external social system.... social 
responsibility begins where the law ends” 
Davis (1973:  312) 
“actions that appear to further some social good, beyond the 
interests of the firm and that which is required by law” 
McWilliams & Siegel 
(2001:  117); also 
adopted by Janney & 
Gove (2011:  3) 
“the private provision of public goods”.... “any “responsible” 
activity that allows a firm to achieve sustainable competitive 
advantage, regardless of motive” 
McWilliams & Siegel  
(2010:  2) 
“business and society are interwoven rather than distinct 
entities” 
Wood (1991:  695) 
Corporate Social Performance (CSP):  
A firm’s actions in the promotion and configuration of social 
responsibility processes, policies, programs, and observable 
outcomes that are beyond the immediate interests of the firm 
and beyond that which is required by law 
Chiu & Sharfman (2009:  
6) 
broad construct comprised of stakeholder management and 
social issues management 
Hillman and Keim 
(2001:  126) 
broad array of strategies and operating practices that a 
company develops in its efforts to deal with and create 
relationships with its numerous stakeholders and the natural 
environment 
Surroca, Tribo & 
Waddock (2010:  464) 
configuration of principles of social responsibility, processes 
of social responsiveness, and policies, programs, and 
observable outcomes as they relate to the firm's societal 
relationships 
Wood (1991:  693) 
Corporate Social Responsiveness:  
the capacity of a corporation to respond to social pressures, 
complements but does not replace responsibility 
Frederick (1978:  6) 
Corporate Social Actions:  
behaviours and practices that extend beyond immediate 
profit maximization goals and are intended to increase social 
benefits or mitigate social problems for constituencies 
external to the firm 
Marquis, Glynn  & Davis 





 CSR may be viewed as an umbrella term that recognizes "business and 
society are interwoven rather than distinct entities" (Wood, 1991:  695), 
representing policies or principles, while the corporate social actions, initiatives 
or gestures are the vehicles through which CSR is enacted.  Another 
characterization of CSR is “the private provision of public goods” (McWilliams & 
Siegel, 2010:  2), rooted in I/O economics yet highly pertinent to strategy 
(Bagnoli & Watts, 2003; Orlitzky et al., 20111).  Corporate social responsiveness 
as "the capacity of a corporation to respond to social pressures, complements but 
does not replace responsibility" (Frederick, 1978:6, c.f. Wood, 1991:  703).  
Responsiveness may also be viewed as subsumed within corporate social 
performance (CSP) which Wood (1991:  693) defines as a "configuration of 
principles of social responsibility, processes of social responsiveness, and 
policies, programs, and observable outcomes as they relate to the firm's societal 
relationships".  However Mitnick's (2000) extensive discussion on the 
measurement of CSP notes the important distinction between outputs and 
outcomes, questioning the underlying metric for performance.  Chiu and 
Sharfman’s (2009) CSP definition includes a specific reference to observable 
outcomes, while Surroca and colleagues (2010) distinguish CSP as constituting 
stakeholder relation strategies.   Hillman and Keim (2001) also note the lack of a 
definitional consensus; however their construction of CSP links the management 
of social issues and stakeholders.  The extension to corporate citizenship includes 
a yet broader role of the firm in "administering citizenship rights for individuals" 
(Matten & Crane, 2005:  173) or in treating its stakeholders (Heugens, Lamertz & 
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Calmet, 2003), while the World Economic Forum adds involvement in public 
policy in its definition (Gardberg & Fombrun, 2006).  
 Davis' "classic definition of CSR" (Wood, 1991:  694) centers on business' 
"obligation to evaluate in its decision-making process the effects of its decisions 
on the external social system.... social responsibility begins where the law ends"  
(Davis, 1973:  312).  Carroll's (1979:  500) definition of CSR expands to meeting 
"the economic, legal, ethical, and discretionary expectations that society has of 
organizations at a given point in time".  McWilliams and Siegel (2001:  117) 
"define CSR as actions that appear to further some social good, beyond the 
interests of the firm and that which is required by law", clearly attaching 
voluntarism to CSR as well as actions.  Burke and Logsdon (1996) linked 
voluntarism to proactivity, management discretion and non-imposed compliance 
as characteristics of strategic CSR.  One of the noteworthy characteristics of CSR 
is that it is at the discretion of the firm (Barnett, 2007). 
 Some of the more narrow definitions include Barnett’s (2007:  801) 
formulation of CSR’s focus on “improving social welfare that serves as means of 
enhancing relationships with key stakeholders”, while Marquis and colleagues’ 
(2007:  926) corporate social actions are defined as “behaviours and practices 
that extend beyond immediate profit maximization goals and are intended to 
increase social benefits or mitigate social problems for constituencies external to 
the firm”.  These restrictions to social aspects ignore the importance of 
environmental considerations, as well as the multiple stakeholder dimensions 
whereby employees or shareholders may also be consumers of firm products, 
neighbours or suppliers.  
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 Linking Wood's (1991) CSP with McWilliams and Siegel's (2001) CSR, we 
conceptualize corporate social actions to be the expression of the organization's 
discretionary relationships with stakeholders.  When from the perspective of the 
stakeholder these actions are viewed negatively they constitute detrimental 
corporate social actions and will be identified as concerns.  This is the working 
definition we use when referring to corporate social actions; remembering that 
CSR is an umbrella term that encompasses the business and society relationship 
(Wood, 1991) and thus the corporate social actions of business directed to society.  
 
2.3.2  CSR and corporate social irresponsibility 
 CSR research by Strike, Gao and Bansal (2006) is premised on the 
separate constructs of CSR and corporate social irresponsibility (CSiR), arguing 
that in certain activities firms act responsibly while in others they may be 
irresponsible, echoing McGuire, Dow and Argheyd’s (2003) suggestion that a 
firm may be both strong and weak within a single dimension or across 
dimensions of CSR.  Strike and colleagues (2006:  852) define CSiR as "the set of 
corporate actions that negatively affects an identifiable social stakeholder's 
legitimate claims (in the long run)".  Schuler and Cording (2006:  550) propose 
that CSiR firms “will be evaluated negatively by all stakeholders, whereas support 
for positive CSP will depend on the consumer’s moral values”, building on Sen 
and Bhattacharya’s (2001) experimental study of consumer purchasing behaviour 
which found no difference in CSiR by omission or commission.  This underlines 
CSiR’s broad stakeholder alienation and resultant hazards.  While there is no 
conceptual foundation to support any offset of desirable corporate social actions 
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directed to particular stakeholders against undesirable actions directed to the 
same or other stakeholders,  prior research has largely treated CSR as a 
continuum from responsible to irresponsible (Mattingly & Berman, 2006; 
Orlitzky et al., 2003).  Recognizing firm deficiencies in the relationship with 
particular stakeholders are "not simply the converse of social strength" 
(Mattingly & Berman, 2006:  38), further underlines the lack of conceptual basis 
for a CSR continuum. 
Strike and colleagues (2006) allude to, but have not tested, the 
relationship of reputation and organizational learning on both CSR and CSiR, in 
their link with international diversification.  Following their logic, Doh and 
colleagues (2010) considered CSiR in their event study of deletions from social 
responsible indexes however did not find any statistically significant relationship 
of CSiR with market returns.  Mattingly and Berman (2006:  20) have cautioned 
"that positive and negative social action are both empirically and conceptually 
distinct constructs and should not be combined in future research".  They also 
propose a taxonomy further segregating the strengths (CSR) and weaknesses 
(CSiR) between institutional and technical stakeholders in pursuit of more 
accurate CSR measures to assess other valuable outcomes, such as enhanced 
corporate image or reputation.   
McGuire and colleagues’ (2003) examination of executive compensation  
incentives (a governance mechanism) used separate constructs of desirable and 
undesirable CSR.  While their research found different dynamics in the distinct 
constructs, they show generous CEO salary and incentives more likely to be 
associated with poor CSR.  Godfrey and Hatch's (2007:  95) reflection on how 
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"investment among one group of stakeholders to overcome deficiencies with 
another" may influence strategy, further brings into question “the marginal utility 
of various CSRs by firms", offering another perspective for an over-investment. 
Campbell (2007) notes the difficulty in ascribing the characteristics which 
will give rise to a firm being judged as socially irresponsible as they vary over 
time and depending on the stakeholders’ perspectives.  He postulates that only by 
failing to meet a minimum behavioral standard does a firm’s social behaviour 
become irresponsible.  This may explain why Brammer and Millington (2008:  
1341) found “unusually poor social performers doing best in the short run”, as 
they benefit from information asymmetry making stakeholder assessment 
difficult, compounded by not publicizing their under-performance to their 
stakeholders, to conceal their poor performance (Doh, Howton, Howton & Siegel, 
2010).  Recent research on corporate disaster donations following Hurricane 
Katrina (Muller & Kräussl, 2011) also segregated CSiR in determining the 
likelihood that irresponsible firms would suffer market share losses, while also 
making subsequent donations as a possible reputation management strategy.  
 Widely publicized corporate irresponsibility, such as the BP oil spill in the 
Gulf of Mexico, informs stakeholders who categorize the environmental disaster 
as CSiR, resulting in a significant deterioration in BP’s corporate reputation.  
However, many lesser known irresponsible actions may not capture broad 
stakeholder attention, particularly when firms suppress or deny their 
involvement in CSiR.  While firms seek immediate visibility for their good deeds, 
they largely delay acknowledging irresponsible actions to distance themselves in 
the hopes that stakeholder interests will have shifted.  For the purposes of this 
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research we will consider detrimental corporate social actions which we have 
termed as concerns to not be a continuum from corporate social actions, but 
rather a distinct construct.  
 
2.3.3  Symbolic versus substantive CSR 
 No discussion of corporate social actions would be complete without 
recognizing that depending on the stakeholder perspective, a firm’s CSR may be 
perceived to be genuine or merely window-dressing.  “Goodness is in the eye of 
the beholder” (Godfrey, 2005:  784) is a phrase that aptly describes stakeholder 
views of all aspects of CSR, going beyond Godfrey’s (2005) theoretical posturing 
on philanthropy’s ability to generate a resultant intangible asset.   His contention 
that “good deeds earn chits” (p.777) is founded on the long-standing view held in 
management scholarship (Barnard, 1938; Selznick, 1957) that stakeholders 
reward firms held in high esteem.  Godfrey proposes to anthropomorphize the 
firm’s actions as ingratiating or genuine, in a suggestion that stakeholders 
question whether a firm action represents “a genuine manifestation of the firm’s 
underlying intentions, vision and character, or is the activity designed to 
ingratiate the firm among the impacted community?” (2005:  784.).  He adopts 
Jones’ (1964:  4) definition of ingratiating as “a class of strategic behaviors 
designed to influence a particular other person (or group) concerning the 
attractiveness of one’s personal qualities”.  This ascribes a tone of deception to 
ingratiation, highlighting the underlying motive as one to purposefully deceive 
the stakeholder (Godfrey, 2005).  Godfrey and colleagues (2007) also caution 
that CSR may be seen as ingratiating when firms with negative social impact by 
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virtue of their industry (i.e. pornography, tobacco, nuclear, etc.) or their own 
actions (i.e. BP) attempt an offset by engaging in CSR such as philanthropic 
contributions.  Similarly, Muller and Kräussl (2011) found that investors viewed 
the minimizing of a firm’s CSiR as a more genuine indicator of trustworthiness  
than any disaster response philanthropy.  To repair damaged reputations Rhee 
and Valdez (2009:  165) suggest “crisis managers can also benefit from many 
other symbolic communication strategies”, however these may risk further 
alienating stakeholders.  Likened to a “shotgun wedding between marketing 
communications and CSR” (Jahdi & Acikdilli, 2009:  111), public skepticism is 
commonly voiced in social media (McWilliams & Siegel, 2010).   Campbell (2007) 
notes the rhetoric or lip service given to CSR that firms build into their corporate 
image or advertising, suggesting the difficulties in distinguishing hollow claims 
from substantive actions in considering different cultural contexts.   
 Aguilera and colleagues (2007) suggest firm response to evolving CSR 
expectations leads to “decoupling effects so that some companies introduce CSR 
practices at a superficial level for window-dressing purposes, whereas other 
companies embed CSR into their core company strategy” (p. 838).  In 
considering the risk of a strategy of symbolic corporate social actions Barnett 
(2007) postulates the destruction of stakeholder trust to detract from the desired 
impact of the CSR.  However, extending his model of stakeholder influence 
capacity which proposes past experiences with the firm fuel expectations, then 
consistently symbolic CSR actions could temper expectations to, for example, 
maintain green-washing rather than substantive environmental initiatives.  
However, should the actions be CSiR transgressions, any repeat offenses are 
37 
 
likely to fuel stakeholder skepticism as to the sincerity of the firm to reintegrate 
stakeholder relations or whether they constitute mere window-dressing (Pfarrer, 
DeCelles, Smith & Taylor, 2008).   
 Westphal  and Zajac (1994: 382) lamented, "while institutional and 
symbolic action theorists commonly invoke the separation of substance and 
symbol in organizational activity, large-scale empirical observation of this 
phenomenon is relatively rare".  Their empirical governance research on CEO's 
long-term incentive plans (Westphal & Zajac 1994, 1995 & 1998) found both 
symbolic and substantive explanations of these plans, where even symbolic 
actions were favourably received by the stock markets.  They also found firms 
that followed later than earlier movers to be more likely to seek legitimacy by 
implementing, but not utilizing, these plans.  Based on event history analysis they 
identified the adoption of the plans distinct from their application, then used 
multiple regression analysis to find support for their hypotheses of the 
symbolism of these plans separate from their substance. 
 In interpreting why symbolic actions were adopted, they suggest   
"signalling to stakeholders" was adequate as just by appearing to be aligned with 
stakeholder interests "CEOs are better able to manage their reputation"(Westphal 
& Zajac, 1994:  370).  Similar to the individual level of CEOs, organizations use 
impression management, which Schlenker (1980:  6) defined as "the conscious or 
unconscious attempt to control images that are projected in real or imagined 
social interactions", such as symbolic corporate social actions to influence firm 
reputation.   
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 David and colleagues (2007) found symbolic management responses to 
shareholder activism led to deterioration in subsequent CSP.  This contradicts the 
generally held expectation that management’s acceptance of a shareholder 
proposal on enhancing CSP indicates their willingness to improve their CSR.  
They thus concluded that when shareholder proposals were settled while the CSR 
performance deteriorated, that a symbolic response had been demonstrated.  
They do however also recognize limitations related to "aggregation of these 
(KLD) data into an overall corporate social performance measure could be 
obfuscating behavioral responses to activism" (David et al., 2007:  98), as they 
used a composite measure netting CSiR against CSR, combining all stakeholder 
dimensions.  This also reinforces our decision to not consider CSR to be a 
continuum from positive to negative social actions.  
Using quality management standards as a proxy for CSR, Christmann and 
Taylor (2006) used survey data from ISO 9000 certified firms in China to 
examine the conditions under which the application of the certification would be 
substantive.  They found "supplier certification programs contribute to symbolic 
standard implementation by suppliers" (Christmann & Taylor, 2006:  873) based 
on firm survey responses that they did not integrate into their daily operations 
the certified management system, relying on last-minute efforts to pass required 
audits.  This decoupling of obtaining certification from actually implementing the 
procedures permits a symbolic management.  They also found that only frequent 
monitoring by those customers in whom the supplier had made specific 
investments resulted in a substantive implementation.  They thus highlight the 
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importance of building a relationship with the stakeholder as a key ingredient to 
a substantive application of quality standards.   
On a similar theme, Hillman and Keim (2001:  127) note "transactional 
interactions can be easily duplicated and thus offer little potential for competitive 
advantage", going on to emphasize the importance of reputation in relationships 
and the time that must be invested.  While catastrophes and scandals have often 
forced a reaction to CSiR, but whether the response has maintained substantive 
CSR as suggested by Aguilera and colleagues’ (2007) illustration of Shell is 
debatable.  Similarly they point to the successful achievement of social change 
with proactive CSR gestures built on the implementation of reporting structures, 
adoption of standards and attribution of senior executives to lead CSR, however 
these may also be viewed as trappings which are only initiated to follow the 
leaders (Bertels & Peloza, 2008). 
While it is not our intention to measure or classify corporate social actions 
as symbolic or substantive, understanding the stakeholder information 
asymmetries in building expectations is a foundation to interpret the likelihood 
of how an initiative will be perceived, depending on the interaction between the 
firm and the stakeholder.  In addressing the influence of stakeholder theory on 
the relationship between corporate social actions and corporate reputation, we 
will expand on how stakeholders with a relation with the focal firm differ from 
those who have exchange transactions with the firm, identifying the former as 
institutional stakeholders and the latter as technical stakeholders.  We will build 
on the previously discussed research in looking at transactional (i.e. technical) 
and relational (i.e. institutional) stakeholders (see Chapter 2.4.3.2  for details on 
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these stakeholders) to anticipate whether they will view a focal firm’s corporate 
social action as symbolic or substantive.  The perception of the stakeholder is the 
key to classifying the corporate social action as symbolic or substantive, such that 
the same action may be viewed differently depending on the stakeholder and the 
context with which they frame their assessment.  For example, two employees 
may view their firm’s support of employee volunteering very differently, 
depending on their individual attitudes on volunteering and their perception of 
the impact of this CSR on themselves.  A hypothetical situation is that of two 
coworkers:  one with a commitment to a student mentoring program who is able 
to leave two hours early once a month to supervisor a homework program in a 
neighbouring school and another who doesn’t have an interest in volunteering, 
but who will be required cover for the two hours that their coworker is absent.  
Multiple interpretations are possible:  the first worker may view the initiative as 
substantive, while the coworker may consider it to be that their firm is just 
looking good or engaged in a symbolic gesture; or alternatively, the first worker 
views it to be symbolic since they expect to be able to volunteer weekly so that 
only once a month is inadequate, but makes their employer look good.  The 
coworker who does not participate may be impressed that the firm facilitates 
employee volunteering at a reasonable pace (i.e. two hours a month is not much 
to cover for a coworker), perceiving the firm to be engaged in a substantive 






2.3.4 Corporate reputation and related constructs 
 Corporate reputation is often referred to interchangeably with corporate 
identity, corporate image, corporate legitimacy or corporate status.  However, the 
distinctions tend to be better nuanced than those surrounding CSR.  Corporate 
identity is internal to the firm (Logsdon & Wood, 2002; Scott & Lane, 2000) and 
is a self-definition, while image is externally projected (Whetten & Mackey, 
2002).   Legitimacy comes from conforming to societal expectations thereby 
justifying the firm's right to exist (Rindova, P0llock & Hayward, 2006; Suchman, 
1995), while status is relative to a peer group (Rindova et al., 2006) and “captures 
differences in social rank that generate privilege or discrimination” (Washington 
& Zajac, 2005:  283).  
 Although Lange, Lee and Dai (2011:  155) suggest there is no “definite 
definition of the construct” of reputation, the most widely used management 
definition of reputation (Wartick, 2002) is "a perceptual representation of a 
company's past actions and future prospects that describes the firm's overall 
appeal to all of its key constituents when compared with other leading rivals" 
(Fombrun, 1996:  72), and is the definition we adopt in this dissertation.  The 
suitability is further supported by a recent reputation literature review (Walker, 
2010:  369) confirming “the predominance of Fombrun’s (1996) definition is 
consistent with Wartick’s (2002) narrative assessment of the corporate 
reputation literature”.  Other disciplines such as marketing, sociology and 
economics use a variety of definitions.  However, the focus on perception is 
universal,  as categorized by Rindova and colleagues (2005:  1036) to be equated 
with either "assessments of a relevant attribute(s)" or "collective knowledge and 
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recognition".   Reputation is rooted in stakeholders' comparisons of firms, rather 
than against the societal standard of legitimacy (Deephouse & Carter, 2005; 
Wartick, 2002).  Reputation is enhanced in the eyes of stakeholders when they 
perceive the firm's actions to be consistent with their expectations and compare 
favourably against those of other firms (Logsdon & Wood, 2002; Mahon, 2002; 
Wartick, 2002; Whetten & Mackey, 2002).  Miller noted, "capability and 
reputation cycles reinforced one another", underlining the value of creating these 
"reputation resources" (2003:  970) over time.  Like capabilities, reputation is an 
intangible asset embedded in the firm (Roberts & Dowling, 2002; Granovetter, 
1985). 
 Thus a firm's reputation is the "overall estimation in which a company is 
held by its constituents" (Fombrun, 1996:  37), and will evolve over time (Hall, 
1992 & 1993; Mahon, 2002).  While the short-term influence of advertising may 
enhance recognition in the marketplace, the esteem component of reputation 
with which a firm is held may only be built over the longer term (Hall, 1992 & 
1993).  However, a firm's individual reputation is also nested in that of the 
industries within which it is associated (Shamsie, 2003).  The relative influence 
of an excellent industry reputation on that of an average firm may infer free-
riding reputation advantages, while a good firm may be held back, captive by a 
poor industry reputation (Mahon, 2002).    
 While Barnett, Jermier and Lafferty (2006) analyzed definitions of 
reputation segregating them into three clusters (asset, assessment and 
awareness), we identify firm reputation as an intangible asset that within a 
resource-based view can provide a sustainable competitive advantage (Barney, 
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1991; Carter & Ruefli, 2006; Frombrun, 1996; Lange et al., 2011; Roberts & 
Dowling, 2002).  While reputation is built over time, it is highly vulnerable to 
being tarnished and risks being lost in no time at all (Carter & Ruefli, 2006; 
Davies, Chun, Vinhas da Silva & Roper, 2003; Hall, 1992 & 1993).   For firms 
whose stakeholders accord them a strong reputation, any CSR breach may incite 
a serious backlash since expectations are high (Dawkins & Lewis, 2003; Lewellyn, 
2002; Mahon, 2002; Rhee & Haunschild, 2006).  When considering how firm 
reputation may benefit the firm over time, the various advantages of a good 
reputation include being able to charge premium prices to generate superior 
margins, cost savings as suppliers and employees seek to be associated with the 
firm, as well as favourable access to capital given the perception of lower risk 
(Carter & Ruefli, 2006; Frombrun, 1996, 2001; Fombrun & Shanley, 1990; Lange 
et al., 2011; Roberts & Dowling, 2002).  An extensive review of indicators and 
antecedents of reputation across disciplines highlighting reputation’s 
multidimensionality is documented by Rhee and Valdez (2009:  147-150), while 
Lange and colleagues (2011) present a similar review drawing only from the 
management literature.   
 Attributed as key to firm success (Hall, 1992 & 1993), but only durable to 
the few (Carter & Ruefli, 2006) and rarely over a long time-frame (Wiggins & 
Ruefli, 2002), understanding the evolution of reputation with corporate social 






2.4  Theoretical foundations 
2.4.1  Overview of theoretical model 
 Freeman's (1984:  46) classic definition of stakeholders as "any group or 
individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the organization's 
objectives" underpins stakeholder theory which is the foundation for stakeholder 
management.  However the inherent complexity in stakeholder management 
draws on multiple theoretic lenses to understand how organizations interact with 
their stakeholders, so that stakeholder theory is but the starting point.    We will 
also draw upon Pfeffer & Salancik's (1978) resource dependence theory for the 
firm's reliance on stakeholders for access to resources and institutional theory’s 
isomorphism  (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983)  as firms mimic each other in their 
stakeholder relations, embedding them within firm processes (Granovetter, 
1985), as well as within industry practices.  These are linked together with the 
resource-based view (Barney, 1991) of a firm’s bundle of unique capabilities that 
provide competitive advantage, adopting McWilliams and Siegel’s (2010) 
identification of the synergy of CSR and reputation as cospecialized assets.  The 
bundling of capabilities in CSR and reputation reinforces their value beyond what 
they contribute independently to add further ambiguity, creating a resource 
bundle that can be rare, valuable, inimitable and non-substitutable (Barney, 
1991).  As CSR improves or deteriorates, the impact on corporate reputation 
creates a dynamic model of change over time this being the primary focus of this 
research.  We recognize that no model of stakeholder interaction can be stagnant, 
as time, context and stakeholder salience influence stakeholder perceptions 
which translate to their assessment of firm reputation. 
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 Before examining the drivers of corporate social actions and corporate 
reputation the following figure situates the theoretical relationship that will be 
the foundation for the proposed conceptual model.  The outer circle represents 
the firm as seen from a resource-based view, with the other theories captured 
within the inner circle.  At the core diamond are the cospecialized intangible 
assets of reputation and corporate social actions.  CSR is both focused on and 
influenced by stakeholders as defined by stakeholder theory.  As discussed in 
greater detail in Chapter 2.4.3.2, technical stakeholders are those who transact or 
hold exchange relations with the firm, while institutional stakeholders  are those 
affected by the firm.   It is then institutional theory that frames the interaction 
with institutional stakeholders and resource dependence theory that explains the 
interaction with technical stakeholders.  Each theory will be subsequently 



















2.4.2  Perspectives on corporate social action and reputation drivers  
 Before elaborating on the theoretical framework depicted in Figure 2, 
alternative interpretations of the drivers of corporate social actions and corporate 
reputation will be explored.  There are multiple theories underlying the motives 
for engaging in corporate social actions, aligned with Brammer and Millington’s 
(2008) observation that “fundamentally different aspects of CSP may be expected 
to be differently motivated”, which we extend to those actions giving rise to CSP.  
Multiple dimensions of reputation are proposed by Lange and colleagues (2011:  
163) reflecting:  “being known, being known for something, and generalized 
favorability”.   The following table summarizes the underlying theories that 
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explain the motives that incite investments in corporate social actions and the 
mechanisms that explain corporate reputation.  These theories provide insights 
into why firms engage in CSR as well as how the resultant reputation may be 
interpreted by stakeholders. 
 
Figure 3.  Underlying theories for corporate social actions and reputation 
 












2.4.2.1  Theories of motives behind corporate social actions 
 Signalling theory is often evoked in that a firm’s discretionary choice of 
corporate social actions sends a message to stakeholders, indicating that the 
firm’s behaviour will be aligned with expectations (Brammer & Pavelin, 2006; 
Surroca et al, 2010).   Godfrey, Merrill and Hansen (2009:  427) argue “CSR 
signals a willingness to act altruistically (other considering) as opposed to purely 
agonistically (self considering)”, while Bergh and colleagues (2010) note the role 
of signalling to assist stakeholders to distinguish between high and low quality 
firms.   Inclusion in or deletion from benchmark CSR indices were found to signal 
to investors a competitive advantage to create shareholder value over the long-
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term (Ramchander, Schwebach & Staking, 2011).     The visibility of the corporate 
social action (Chiu & Sharfman, 2009; Tetrault Sirsly & Lamertz, 2008) as well as 
the informational source reporting the action (Godfrey et al., 2009) contribute to 
how the signal will be interpreted (Barnett,2007).  Mackey and colleagues (2007:  
829) caution that a too frequent change in CSR strategy may signal “a firm’s 
commitment to social responsibility is not genuine”, while Wang and Choi (2010) 
found consistent CSP or CSR over time to benefit financial performance.   
 For example, the recession’s devastation of retirement savings has focused 
attention on the issue of employer sponsored pension plans, particularly those 
where employee benefits are guaranteed (i.e. generally a formula of years of 
service and age).  Firms offering such pension plans signal to stakeholders their 
engagement to their employees, as well as in a broader sense to the communities 
in which they operate as they provide for their retirees’ financial independence.  
Conversely, those firms not funding actuarial deficits or otherwise jeopardizing 
current and future pensions do signal a breach of trust to stakeholders.  This 
signal (be it positive or negative) may directly influence employee recruitment 
and retention, while may indirectly be extrapolated by stakeholders as a signal of 
the firm’s commitment in other areas, such as product warranty guarantees.  In 
choosing CSR initiatives, understanding that what the organization signals to 
stakeholders may be more far-reaching underscores the need to thoroughly 
consider possible interpretations as well as the coherence of the signals sent by 
multiple CSR initiatives.     
Insurance considerations may be attached to corporate social actions, as 
CSR is aligned with a risk-management strategy.  Godfrey and colleagues (2009: 
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428) note “firms accrue positive attributions or moral capital to the extent these 
outsiders see the firm engaging in activities they deem socially or morally 
desirable”, so that engaging in CSR may be seen as key to creating this moral 
capital.   This imputation of moral value by stakeholders has a long-standing 
history (ref:  Barnard, 1938; Selznick, 1957) as stakeholders judge the  intentions 
and motivation of organizations.  The value of this moral capital may be 
considered to have an insurance-like quality, as stakeholders are likely to be more 
forgiving of firms with strong CSR histories, particularly where motives are 
ambiguous (Chiu & Sharfman, 2009; Godfrey, 2005; Godfrey et al., 2009; 
McWilliams & Siegel, 2010), and may pardon CSR missteps.   Choi and Wang 
(2009) find that CSP helps under-performing firms recover, suggesting the 
importance of a prior engagement in CSR to stockpile this social insurance, while 
Doh and colleagues (2010) find it shelters firms from deletions from social 
indexes.   The focus of a corporate social action may be segregated between social 
issues and stakeholder management (Barnett, 2007; Hillman & Keim, 2001), 
while Aguilera and colleagues (2007:  838) distinguish between “reactive and 
proactive CSR initiatives”.   Campbell (2007) takes an alternative perspective in 
setting a minimal threshold where no harm is done by the firm, with anything 
less considered to be social irresponsibility.  While endorsing the possible benefit 
of CSR as an insurance against “bad deeds”, we do not integrate this motivation 
into our model of corporate social actions. 
Returning to our example of corporate pension plans, this employee 
benefit may provide a form of insurance against future concessions.  This has 
been widely used in the airline industry where pilots have agreed to operational 
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changes to their work requirements to guard against modifications to their 
pension plans.  The insurance provided by a corporate pension plan may also be 
key to retaining valuable human resources, thus fending off competitor targeted 
recruitment. 
 Over-investment offers an alternative perspective on the insurance 
rationale for CSR in that firms may also over-invest in CSR to achieve anticipated 
financial (Barnea & Rubin, 2010; Harrison, Bosse & Phillips, 2010; Orlitzky et al., 
2011) or reputational benefits (Bertels & Peloza, 2008;  Rehbein, Waddock & 
Graves, 2004).   This over-allocation of resources to satisfy particular 
stakeholders may also serve to create dissatisfaction on the part of other 
stakeholders (Barnett,2007).  While not a motivation in itself, firms may place 
themselves in this situation due to imperfect environmental scanning or a flawed 
assessment of issues or identification of salient stakeholder concerns leading to 
an excessive investment in corporate social actions. 
 In the pension plan arena, the high cost of generous defined benefit plans 
has garnered considerable attention as firms struggle to viably fund their 
obligations.  The legacy pensions of the US auto industry are one example of an 
over-investment in a social action of benefit to employee stakeholders.   While 
these US manufacturers provided comparable benefits, the arrival of global 
competition changed the competitive landscape so that in retrospect these 
employee benefits appear to be an over-investment. 
 Conformity to social expectations is another motivator to corporate 
social actions as increasing stakeholder expectations place pressure on firm 
managers to keep up with similar firms, as well as firms within the same 
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geographic community (Bertels & Peloza, 2008; Marquis et al., 2007).  Post 
(1978:  23; c.f. Zyglidopoulos, 2003:  72) notes “a gap develops between the 
actual performance of a corporation and public expectations about what that 
performance should be” so that corporate behaviour must be modified to align 
with the expectations of its stakeholders.   
 Returning to our example of pension plans, it was traditionally expected 
that major corporations would provide for their retired employees, who most 
probably devoted their entire working lives to a single employer.  This was the 
20th century pattern in many industries such as automotive, banking, 
transportation, telecommunications, etc.  For this reason defined benefit plans 
prevailed, with very similar conditions within a given industry (i.e. early 
retirement penalties, maintenance of ancillary benefits).  However, stakeholder 
expectations have been shifting as employee mobility has replaced the single 
employer and competitive pressures come from developing nations devoid of 
employee benefits.  The expectations of employees may be less than 
homogeneous (i.e. depending on length of service, employability, union 
affiliation), while the diverse context of other stakeholders generally reduces their 
support of such pension plans.  This shift in expectations, coupled with the 
economic environment and increased longevity, may explain the reviews and 
revisions many firms are instigating to conform to their perceptions of where 
their industry peers will orient themselves.   However, returning to the signal the 
firm provides via its pension plan, while any changes may draw on its insurance 
value or be viewed as correcting an over-investment, it is the conformity to 
expectations that will determine the stakeholder’s interpretation of the signal.  
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 As we have seen, CSR may signal motivations to stakeholders or may 
provide insurance with the attribution of moral capital, while it may also be an 
over-investment or conform to what similar firms are doing to meet stakeholder 
expectations; all possible motivations for engaging in CSR which will influence 
stakeholder perceptions of how well corporate social actions meet expectations.  
These perspectives lay the groundwork for firms’ motives for engaging in CSR 
which stakeholders will interpret when they attribute reputation to the firm in the 
mechanisms to be discussed in the following chapter.    Additional discussion of 
specific stakeholder relationships will continue in the section on stakeholder 
theory that follows, as well as an expansion of mimicry and isomorphism in the 
following discussion on institutional theory. 
 
2.4.2.2  Theoretical mechanisms explaining reputation 
 According to Kraatz and Love, three distinct insights on the mechanisms 
guiding stakeholders in attributing reputation to a firm are that firm’s character 
traits, conformity to social norms or technical efficiency (Kraatz & Love, 2006; 
Love & Kraatz, 2009).  A further mechanism focused on the relational profile of 
the focal firm with central high status firms or individuals is an additional 
network perspective of how a firm can enhance its reputation by association 
(Kraatz & Love, 2006).  In considering a firm’s reputation, stakeholders’ 
evaluations may be based on any combination of these perspectives, recognizing 
that information asymmetries and imperfect knowledge of the firm will influence 
their evaluative logic and interpretation of firm actions (Washington & Zajac, 
2005).   
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 Lange and colleagues (2011:  163) propose reputation to be three 
dimensional:  “being known, being known for something, and generalized 
favorability”, however they map their being known for something as Love and 
Kraatz’s (2009) technical efficiency and their generalized favorability as the 
character traits and conformity identified by Love and Kraatz.   
  Character traits of a favourable nature undoubtedly enhance personal 
reputation.  Extending this explanation to corporations is based on the tendency 
for individuals to attribute human traits to organizations, known as 
anthropomorphization (Davies et al., 2003; Love & Kraatz, 2009).  Accordingly 
much of the literature on corporate reputation promotes the reputational benefits 
gained by firms based on their desirable character traits, most notably integrity, 
reliability and trustworthiness (Davies et al., 2003; Fombrun, 1996; Kraatz & 
Love, 2006; Love & Kraatz, 2009). 
 The coherence over time of a firm’s valued character traits with its 
demonstrated actions, such as corporate social actions, can be seen as enhancing 
firm reputation, while inconsistencies are most likely to damage firm reputation 
(Davies et al., 2003; Kraatz & Love, 2006; Love & Kraatz, 2009).  Beyond CSR or 
philanthropy, character traits may also be imputed from product quality, 
innovation and creativity (Godfrey, 2005).  Davies and colleagues (2003) extend 
human personality traits, often described by the Big Five dimensions, to 
corporate personality traits to consider in managing firm reputation.  The 
character trait perspective suggests stakeholders will interpret signals from firm 
actions to make judgments on how these actions correspond to those firm 
attributed characteristics, “as if they were indicative of organizational character 
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traits, whether or not this is actually the case” (Kraatz & Love, 2006:  348).  
Furthermore, based on limited information stakeholders rely on these signals to 
impute intentions and predict future firm behaviour (Fombrun & Shanley, 1990; 
Rao, 1994).  For example, the green movement has gained momentum in 
defining trustworthiness as a reduced environmental footprint, reflecting 
reliability and accountability for the use and disposal of resources.  Accordingly, a 
recycling initiative would reflect positively as a desirable trait of environmental 
stewardship. 
  Technical efficiency essentially bases reputation on superior results, 
be they financial, product or service quality, focusing on the outputs, rather than 
the firm itself (Kraatz & Love, 2006; Love & Kraatz, 2009).  This approach echoes 
the financial halo effect criticized by researchers such as Fryxell & Wang (1994) 
and Washington and Zajac (2005) and others who claim financial performance is 
a predictor of reputation (Brown & Perry, 1994; Fombrun & Shanley, 1990).  This 
reflects a utilitarian view that firm reputation is dependent on how well a firm 
delivers valued outputs or is technically efficient in the eyes of its stakeholders. 
 Returning to the previous example of the green movement, stakeholders 
may interpret recycling as going beyond trustworthiness to provide a more 
efficient input to a production process for a cost saving that can be redirected to 
further green initiatives.  Offering a parallel to the signalling of CSR, such 
corporate social actions may also be interpreted by stakeholders as a signal of the 
firm’s engagement with the green movement and commitment to pursue further 
beneficial initiatives.  This technical efficiency viewpoint also balances the firm’s 
investment in corporate social actions with anticipated returns so that reputation 
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is enhanced for wisely investing, while diminished for tangential or over-
investment which fail to meet stakeholder expectations.    
 Status by association (relational status) explains the assessment of 
reputation to go beyond the focal firm to be based on the status of the firm’s 
external partners or network of clients and suppliers, and is grounded in social 
network research (Kraatz & Love, 2006; Podolny, 1993 & 1994; Stuart, Hoang & 
Hybels, 1999).  Effectively, this perspective envisions reputation to be gained by 
association with high status actors, or to be lost when associated with low status 
actors, where “status refers to a more global assessment of the prestige, 
desirability, or esteem of the firm itself” (Bergh, Ketchen, Boyd & Bergh, 2010:  
629).  Rindova and colleagues (2006) invoke status as an instigator of 
stakeholder attribution of quality as they interpret other firms’ association to be 
an endorsement.  This situation is most likely to arise when the quality of the firm 
or the nature of its business is sufficiently ambiguous as to make reputational 
assessments difficult for stakeholders (Kraatz & Love, 2006).    
 Washington and Zajac (2005) however note the sociological foundation of 
status in ascribing a social rank that does not have to be earned, distinguishing 
status from reputation which they consider to be a “fundamentally economic 
concept that captures differences in perceived or actual quality or merit that 
generate earned, performance-based rewards” (p. 283).  They recognize the role 
of historical legacy and audience perception in attributing both reputation and 
status to an organization, although they claim to be able to explain the evolution 
of status without referring to merit, but to social class.  Accordingly the prestige 
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of high status actors in a firm’s network aids the focal firm’s reputation by 
inference as to the firm’s quality (Kraatz & Love, 2006).   
 In an event study around the addition and deletion of firms to prestigious 
social indexes, Doh and colleagues (2010) found only a removal had negative 
effects, speculating that market anticipation was already factored in for well 
performing firms.  Conversely, Ramchander and colleagues (2010) found that not 
only did inclusions benefit the focal firm share price, but that it also detracted 
from rivals, with the reverse being true when deleted from the index  (i.e.  a 
negative share price reaction for the focal firm, to the benefit of rivals).  They also 
found these responses most pronounced for industries where intangible assets 
dominated, such as services and R&D focused firms.   
 Returning to the example of the green movement, affiliation with firms 
included in the Dow Jones Sustainability Index (high status actors recognized for 
their environmental record) can confer reputational benefits beyond those 
directly attributable to the recycling initiative.    
 Conformity to social norms is grounded in neo-institutionalism where 
conformity, including symbolic conformity, garners stakeholder approval (Kraatz 
& Love, 2006; Love & Kraatz, 2009; Meyer & Rowan, 1977).  Conforming to 
industry norms establishes similarities between industry actors, lending 
credibility to stakeholders (Basdeo, Smith, Grimm, Rindova & Derfus, 2006).  
“Institutional perspectives generally emphasize the role of social factors rather 
than economic or efficiency factors in driving organizational action” (Westphal, 
Gulati & Shortell, 1997:  366), a reflection of how stakeholders attribute 
reputation according to their perceptions of how well the firm conforms to their 
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expectations (Rao, 1994; Straw & Epstein, 2000).  This confirmation of fit with 
their cultural beliefs is expressed in stakeholders’ approval through the esteem 
they attribute to a firm’s reputation (Love & Kraatz, 2009).  
 In studying the effect of popular management techniques, such as total 
quality management (TQM), Straw and Epstein (2000) found that announcing 
adhesion to TQM or actually implementing TQM enhanced firm reputation, in 
spite of the fact that such management techniques were not proven to enhance 
financial performance.  They interpreted their findings to support “both rhetoric 
and reality” (Straw & Epstein, 2000:  548) in conforming to the beliefs and 
normative values of the surveyed audience (Love & Kraatz, 2009).  Completing 
the green movement example, societal values and beliefs have evolved to 
embrace environmental sustainability.  Beyond technical efficiency, or the status 
of being associated with firms recognized by a prestigious index, the recycling 
initiative would be seen as conforming to social values, and thus incur 
reputational benefits. 
 In summary, the theoretical mechanisms explaining corporate reputation 
as imputed character traits or signals of technical efficiency, status or conformity 
to social norms, link firm actions (with corporate social actions being our focus) 
to stakeholder perceptions upon which reputation is attributed.  As will be seen 
in the following discussion on stakeholders, conformity will largely guide 
institutional stakeholders’ assessments, with technical efficiency influencing 





2.4.3   Stakeholder theory and stakeholder management  
 Returning to the theoretical foundation depicted earlier in Figure 2, 
stakeholders have been generalized as primary, secondary, voluntary and 
involuntary (Clarkson, 1995), while stakeholder categories include employees, 
customers, community, suppliers, shareholders and the environment, with 
stakeholders possibly belonging to multiple groups, such as employees owning 
company shares, purchasing firm products and living in the same community as 
the firm.  
 Clarkson (1995:  106) defines primary stakeholders as those “without 
whose continuing participation the corporation cannot survive as a going 
concern”, while (1995: 107) “secondary stakeholder groups are defined as those 
who influence or affect, or are influenced or affected by, the corporation”,  going 
on to note that a firm is not dependent on them for survival.   
 There are multiple categorizations possible of stakeholders based on  
whether stakeholders are related (internal) or unrelated (external) to the firm, as 
well as distinctions between those stakeholders that affect the firm (technical) 
and those that are affected by firm actions (institutional).  Underlying these 
distinctions are information asymmetries inherent in developing expectations 
and assessing the impact of firm actions relative to those of their peers.
 Rindova and colleagues (2005) note where customers have difficulty to 
evaluate product quality they rely on strategic signals to formulate their 
expectations, consistent with the role of signalling discussed earlier. 
 It is the stakeholders' perceptions of the quality of past interactions that 
forms future expectations and frames the stakeholders' images of the firm 
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(Lewellyn, 2002; Logsdon & Wood, 2002; Mahon, 2002; Scott & Lane, 2000; 
Wartick, 2002).  The firm's legitimacy as an institution comes from how it is 
perceived to manage its stakeholders, with any withdrawal of stakeholder support 
signifying a loss of legitimacy (Suchman, 1995; Wood, 1991).  This withdrawal 
signifies a distinct dynamic with a message to the firm from the stakeholder, as 
communicated in the form of reputation  (Lewellyn, 2002).   
 Inevitably there are trade-offs required between stakeholders as social 
conditions change and good causes emerge (Godfrey, 2005).  Also consistent with 
the theory of over-investment in social actions is the need for firms to recognize 
when stakeholder interests have shifted to align their attention to meet issues 
pertinent to their stakeholders.   However, engaging this social responsiveness 
must be balanced against demonstrating consistency in CSP to avoid alienating 
stakeholders.  Godfrey (2005) suggests adapting philanthropic activities to focus 
on pressing societal needs, a practice that has been evident in firm social actions 
directed to recovery after hurricanes, earthquakes and other natural and man-
made disasters.  However, Muller and Kräussl’s (2011) research on corporate 
responses to Hurricane Katrina suggests that disaster response giving may also 
be seen as ingratiating, particularly for organizations viewed as irresponsible 
where such philanthropy is viewed to be inconsistent. 
 
2.4.3.1   Stakeholder salience 
Stakeholder attributes such as legitimacy, power and urgency (Mitchell et 
al., 1997) determine the salience to management and ultimately whether 
management will ignore stakeholder pressures and maintain the status quo, offer 
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a compromise or comply with the stakeholders' request (Rowley, 1997).  Peloza 
and Papania (2008) propose that these salient stakeholders will follow and be 
more aware of corporate social actions than stakeholders lacking the Mitchell and 
colleagues’ (1997) attributes.  Accordingly salient stakeholders will likely engage 
in more exchanges with the firm to generate exchange capital, defined by Godfrey 
and colleagues (2009: 429) as “the potential to create more advantageous 
exchanges between the firm and its primary stakeholders”. 
Considering primary stakeholders to be legitimate, when they have power 
and urgency the ensuing corporate social actions are likely to produce exchange 
capital rather than moral capital building on a lens of power-exchange (Godfrey 
et al., 2009).  Alternatively, secondary stakeholders while legitimate may have 
urgency, but lack any power, so that corporate social actions on their behalf are 
likely to create moral capital (Godfrey et al, 2009).   
Stakeholders seeking to influence firm policies or actions may operate 
independently, within a group (Rowley & Moldoveanu, 2003) or in a network 
(Rowley, 1997), to directly or indirectly withhold resources from the firm as 
predicted by both exchange theory and resource dependence (Frooman, 1999).  
As the primary stakeholders have power in the exchange relationship, the firm is 
dependent on these stakeholders for resources critical to accomplishing their 
objectives (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).  
 
2.4.3.2 Technical and institutional stakeholders 
 Building on stakeholder salience, we will characterize primary 
stakeholders as technical, and secondary as institutional, considering the 
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following  distinguishing features.  Technical stakeholders are viewed to hold 
exchange relations with the firm and consistent with resource dependency theory 
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) the firm requires inputs from these stakeholders to 
achieve its objectives.  These are generally viewed as employees, suppliers, 
shareholders and customers who furnish labour, input goods, capital and 
purchasers, respectively.  However with respect to institutional stakeholders it is 
the firm that can affect these stakeholders’ interests, albeit while mimicking 
others within their industry or geographic domain as predicted by institutional 
theory.  These stakeholders include the community, environment and regulatory 
bodies.  These terms generalize the firm’s interactions with its stakeholders, 
which depending on context and issues may be both transactional and relational 
at a point in time, recognizing that stakeholders may simultaneously have 
multiple interests (i.e. an environmental activist employed by the firm, holding 
company shares and also a customer living in the community within which the 
firm operates).  In other words, while generally technical stakeholders transact 
with the firm they may also have relational interactions.  Similarly, while 
institutional stakeholders’ interactions with the firm may be largely relational, 
this does not exclude the possibility of transactions with the firm.   
 Furthermore, relating primary stakeholders to Mattingly and Berman’s 
(2006) technical stakeholders and secondary stakeholders to their institutional 
stakeholders, Godfrey and colleagues (2009) found a CSR insurance value after a 
negative event (i.e. a legal or regulatory action against a firm) for institutionally 
directed CSR but not for technically directed CSR, consistent with the creation of 
moral capital.  This underlines the different paths to influence technical and 
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institutional stakeholders with technical transactions creating exchange capital, 
while institutional relations create moral capital.  The choice of stakeholder to 
which a social action is directed will influence the creation of exchange or moral 
capital.  Similarly, the target of a detrimental social action may accept that 
exchange capital is bartered or traded off against other actions, this being the 
case of the technical stakeholder, with their ability to withhold essential goods or 
services from the firm.  However, when directed to the institutional stakeholder 
the buffering anticipated by the insurance value may only slow the erosion of 
moral capital, as these stakeholders have no other recourse to show their 
displeasure with the detrimental social actions.  With more avenues to influence 
the firm, the exchange capital built with technical stakeholders is thus interpreted 
to be less influenced by CSiR than is the moral capital held by institutional 
stakeholders.   
 In summary, the firm’s exchanges with technical stakeholders creates 
exchange capital which builds with corporate social actions, while a similar 
mechanism with institutional stakeholders creates moral capital, however acting 
as an insurance moral capital is depleted in the case of  CSiR. 
 
2.4.3.3  Reactive to proactive stakeholder management 
Carroll's (1979) RDAP scale (reactive, defensive, accommodative, 
proactive) predicts firm processes to position themselves from doing less than 
required to anticipating beyond actual requirements.  Firm management may use 
Mitchell and colleagues’ (1997) criteria of salience in assessing how to manage 
technical and institutional stakeholders, thus creating exchange and moral 
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capital, respectively.  As discussed previously, these stakeholders will perceive the 
firm’s corporate social actions to be symbolic or substantive as a result of how 
they are treated by management, thus influencing the quality of the exchange or 
moral capital created.   Relating this characterization of firm stakeholder 
management to the above discussed stakeholder salience of technical and 
institutional stakeholders, the following interpretations may be drawn as 
depicted in Figure 4 below.   
  









 Depending on the stakeholder type and access to the characteristics that 
garner attention from management, the firm may choose to be reactive/defensive 
which may represent mainly symbolic actions or accommodative/proactive which 
are more likely to be substantive social actions.   These are however 
generalizations for which there may be actual or perceived contradictions, 
remembering that the perception of whether CSR is symbolic or substantive is in 
the eye of the stakeholder.  Should the firm’s social actions correspond to 
technical stakeholder expectations exchange capital will be created, while 
conforming to institutional stakeholder expectations moral capital that provides 
insurance value will be generated.  However failure to respond to technical 
stakeholder expectations of social actions will only fail to create further exchange 
capital, and not deplete the accrued value of this exchange capital.  Technical 
stakeholders are able to withhold essential resources so that they do not need to 
draw down on the exchange capital to send a message to the firm of their 
displeasure with CSiR.  On the other hand, institutional stakeholders have no 
option other than to fall back on the insurance value of the moral capital.  
Accordingly, a failure to meet institutional stakeholder expectations has them 
draw down on the insurance value of the moral capital to deplete its accrued 
value.  This is consistent with Godfrey and colleagues’ (2009) findings that 
institutional stakeholders’ moral capital acted as an insurance against CSiR, but 
was not the case for technical stakeholders.  Thus institutional stakeholders 
express their concern in the only way open to them by reducing moral capital.   In 
other words, although moral capital has an insurance value there is a cost of 
drawing down on it in terms of the remaining value of this intangible asset after a 
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CSiR misstep.  The stock of exchange and moral capital as valuable firm 
resources is generated by stakeholder perceptions of CSR.  We will now briefly 
relate resource-dependence theory to technical stakeholders, followed by an 
examination of institutional theory related to institutional stakeholders. 
 
2.4.4  Resource dependence theory 
 Returning to the theoretical foundation depicted in Figure 2, technical 
stakeholders have exchange transactions with the firm to provide resources 
essential to the firm to enable it to achieve its objectives.  Pfeffer and Salancik’s 
(1978) resource dependence theory explains how organizations are dependent on 
resource providers over which they have limited control, but upon which their 
survival depends.  It is this asymmetry between the exchange of resources and 
the relative power of the exchange partners that are the focus of resource 
dependence theory (Pfeffer, 1981).  Bode and colleagues (2011:  835) summarize 
the major thrust of resource dependence as “a firm’s need for scarce external 
resources creates a dependence on its exchange partners and, hence, a potential 
source of adversity for the firm, and that firms strive to minimize this 
dependence, which is tantamount to maximizing power”.   
 As was seen earlier, power is a key consideration in determining 
stakeholder salience, such that when a firm is vulnerable to the power of a 
stakeholder it predicts management’s attention will be turned toward the 
stakeholder, with a strong likelihood that the actions taken will be 
accommodative or proactive.  Maignan and McAlister (2003:  83) note “the 
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ability of stakeholder communities to withdraw needed organizational resources 
gives them power over the firm”.    
 Taking the example of employer-employee relations, when there are 
powerful unions representing essential employees the organization may have to 
acquiesce to labour demands for above market conditions, thus over-investing in 
this particular stakeholder group to ensure its survival by avoiding an even more 
costly labour disruption.  Resource dependence emphasizes competing, often 
incompatible demands, for which management must allocate scarce resources 
(Oliver, 1991) in selecting among the choice of corporate social actions.  As these 
allocations vary over time, so too will stakeholder assessments of CSR. 
 Furthermore, technical stakeholders’ exchange transactions with the firm 
provide them with information upon which their expectations are based so they 
are less likely to be taken in by reactive or defensive actions resembling lip-
service.   Given the social construction of reality upon which stakeholders base 
their interpretation of corporate actions as symbolic or substantive (Pfeffer, 
1981), "resource dependencies are probably more useful for understanding 
substantive outcomes in organizations" (Pfeffer, 1981:  8).   
 This grounding of technical stakeholders in resource dependence theory 
integrates the essential exchange transactions they engage in with the firm, 
leading to accommodative and proactive actions by management to meet their 
expectations for substantive corporate social actions.  We will now contrast this 





2.4.5  Institutional theory 
 The relationship of the firm with its institutional stakeholders seen earlier 
in Figure 2 is built on institutional theory.  Early foundations are attributed to 
Selznick’s (1957) reflections on transforming organizations into institutions, 
focusing on routines, roles, beliefs and the processes by which value is infused.  
His discussions on institutional leadership are described in greater detail in 
Chapter 2.2.2.   
 Institutional rules as myths and isomorphic structures to garner 
legitimacy (Meyer& Rowan, 1977) are interpreted by DiMaggio and Powell (1991) 
as providing a symbolic role to organizational structures.  Three pillars of 
institutions are described by Scott (1995) as regulative, normative and cultural-
cognitive, with their respective sources of legitimacy attributed as legal, moral 
and cultural.   From a cultural-cognitive perspective, institutionalism is based on 
scripts built on taken-for-granted understandings that mimic those in the 
environment and also places a value on symbolism (Scott, 1995).  Institutional 
activities are viewed as multilevel interrelated processes which define behavioral 
expectations, so that conforming gains legitimacy for the firm, however at the 
same time has firms resembling each other. 
 When there is no evident technical or financial reason for an institutional 
activity, such as how corporate social actions might be viewed, the absence of a 
rational choice explanation makes institutional theory particularly interesting 
(Oliver, 1997).  Although corporate social actions are entirely at the discretion of 
the firm, from an institutional theory perspective it is societal expectations that 
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place pressure on firms to behave in a socially acceptable manner, leading to 
isomorphism (Oliver, 1997).    
 Interactions of institutional stakeholders with the firm are viewed to be 
based on relationships that are built over time and create moral capital.  Their 
assessment of CSR evolves over time as perceived urgent issues are replaced by 
those perceived to be yet more urgent.  As these stakeholders are primarily 
affected by the firm’s actions while they may have legitimacy and urgency, a lack 
of power may prevent them from capturing management attention (Mitchell et 
al., 1997).   Furthermore, a firm’s strategy to respond to institutional stakeholders 
may be to seek a compromise by balancing or bargaining (Oliver, 1991), so that 
only partially meeting expectations suffices.   Oliver (1991:  155) also notes that 
“the appearance rather than the fact of conformity is often presumed to be 
sufficient for the attainment of legitimacy”.  Extending this perspective to when 
there is ambiguity in stakeholder preferences, as seen in the broader 
categorization of institutional stakeholders, their inability to discern the value of 
organizational outcomes allows firms "to get by with symbolic action" (Pfeffer, 
1981:  29).   
 Oliver (1991) also proposes two conditions that may incite a defiance 
strategy whereby a firm dismisses, challenges or attacks the institutional norms 
or stakeholder expectations.   She notes “when dependence is low, both defiance 
and manipulation represent minimal risks to organizational interests” (Oliver, 
1991:  164), as well as when the cost to conform is significantly more than the 
expected benefits that would accrue from conforming.  The results of such a 
defiance strategy could be interpreted to be the corporate social concerns 
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addressed to institutional stakeholders.  Given their power and economic 
asymmetry with the firm, the only affordable response available to institutional 
stakeholders is in the devaluation of their assessment of firm reputation, 
depleting moral capital.  
 This grounding of institutional stakeholders in institutional theory 
integrates the relationship these stakeholders hold with the firm, suggesting that 
reactive and defensive actions by management may be adequate to meet their 
expectations and that symbolic corporate social actions may suffice.   However, 
detrimental social actions directed to institutional stakeholders are likely to have 
negative consequences .  We will now examine the resource-based view to 
complete the theoretical foundation. 
 
2.4.6  Resource-based view  
 The resource-based view's answer to why performance varies between 
firms contends that it is a firm's unique bundle of valuable, rare, non-
substitutable and costly to imitate resources and capabilities that provides 
competitive advantage (Barney, 1991 & 2001).  Capabilities become embedded in 
the firm's processes (Madhok, 1996), and unlike resources may not be distinctly 
valued or traded (Hoopes, Madsen & Walker, 2003; Makadok, 2001; Teece, 
Pisano & Schuen, 1997).   A firm’s CSR practices may represent such a capability  
when the value is recognized by the firm’s stakeholders, as attested to in their 
affirmation of firm reputation, and becomes a dynamic capability (Teece et al., 
1997) as it is reinforced over time. 
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 McWilliams and Siegel (2010:  12) integrate the resource-based view of 
CSR and reputation to identify CSR as “a cospecialized asset that makes other 
assets more valuable than they other-wise would be.  The clearest example of this 
is firm reputation”.  They go on to speculate that CSR best qualifies as this 
cospecialized asset at those firms producing experience goods or where the cost 
of irresponsible social behaviour may be significant.  The potential for value 
creation in an intangible asset such as corporate reputation is inherent in the 
difficulty to replicate a competitor’s reputation due to the ambiguity as to how it 
was derived (Roberts & Dowling, 2002), and more so how it changes over time.  
 Bergh and colleagues (2010) also note the social complexity in building 
reputation, as well as the need to have in place appropriate support to exploit the 
value of reputation.  This is of particular importance in innovation-based 
industries or knowledge-based services where intellectual property is the 
intangible competitive advantage (Ang & Wright, 2009; McWilliams & Siegel, 
2010), confirmed by Ramchander and colleagues’ (2011) findings of more 
pronounced share price responses to index reconstitutions for industries they 
labeled as informationally opaque.  
 Similarly, Janney and Gove (2011) note firms operating in industries with 
perceived poor CSR have greater reputation benefits when their CSR can signal 
good quality, however governance lapses such as stock options back-dating were 
found to have more severe negative impacts on firms with strong governance-
related CSR. 
 A firm's CSR practices may represent such a capability to generate a 
sustainable competitive advantage when the value is recognized by the firm's 
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stakeholders, as attested to in their affirmation of firm reputation.  In considering 
shareholder reaction to a firm’s recognition for exemplary CSR when it is added 
to a benchmark index, Ramchander and colleagues (2011) found not only did the 
added firm’s share price benefit from significant improvement, but the share 
price of their competitors was negatively impacted, providing a competitive 
advantage in enhancing the relative desirability of their shares. 
Examining CSR through the resource-based lens may find the corporate 
social actions to be vulnerable to imitation due to the inherent visibility if they 
are to convey positive reputational advantage (McWilliams & Siegel, 2010).  It is 
however the linkage between the intangible assets of CSR and reputation that 
causal ambiguity is created, with the public visibility of the corporate social 
action having the potential to provide priceless advertising.  This is however a 
double edged sword, as media and social-media attention is drawn to both good 
and bad corporate deeds (McWilliams & Siegel, 2010).    
Branco and Rodrigues’ (2006) resource-based view proposes voluntary 
CSR disclosure as a leverage of corporate social actions to enhance reputation, 
however Cho and colleagues (2010) found biased environmental disclosure, with 
poor environmental performers utilizing highly optimistic language to deflect 
blame.  When stakeholders’ primary source of information on corporate social 
actions was from the corporate annual report, no contradictory information was 
available for stakeholders to obtain external validation.  However, as disclosure 
has been significantly facilitated by the Internet and social media, these tools 
provide multiple alternative informational sources for stakeholders, placing 
greater importance on the accuracy of management claims (Scott & Lane, 2000) 
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to avoid accusations of half-truths or data manipulation.  As controversy over 
impression management which exaggerates corporate social actions gives rise to 
public skepticism, the proposed advantages of CSR disclosure are considerably 
devalued (Jahdi & Acikdilli, 2009). 
As noted previously with a resource-based view,  firm reputation is likely 
to provide sustainable competitive advantage when the firm's business processes 
exploit distinct reputation characteristics (Ray, Barney & Muhanna, 2004), 
maintaining or improving them based on stakeholder feedback (Mahon, 2002).  
A resource-based view for CSR research links the firm's abilities with the 
opportunities offered (Russo & Fouts, 1997).  This is also reflected in Podolny’s 
(1993) image of a virtuous cycle between salient actions and firm reputation, to 
constantly reinforce each other in a dynamic fashion.  This logic of continual 
advancement by taking advantage of opportunities is built on by Roberts & 
Dowling (2002:  1079) to support their findings that “reputation differences 
should demonstrate a relatively high degree of persistence over time”.   
An alternative interpretation of CSR within the resource-based framework 
cautions that the evolution of CSR has made it less rare while more readily 
imitated (Orlitzky et al., 2011).  The ability of firms to differentiate their corporate 
social actions is limited, when essentially all major firms are engaged in a broad 
array of CSR initiatives, which some researchers have found to lead to an 
overinvestment in CSR (Bertels & Peloza, 2008; Rehbein et al., 2004).  Orlitzky 
and colleagues (2011) suggest that 21st century CSR may in fact no longer bestow 
a reputational advantage due to the public distrust of CSR manipulations.  They 
point out the British Petroleum (BP) horrific 2010 Deepwater Horizon 
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environmental disaster, despite universally high CSR recognition of BP as one 
such example.  Similar violations of public trust may be seen in Toyota’s product 
recalls (Diermeier, 2010; Lange et al., 2011), the financial melt-down of sub-
prime lending and board scandals over stock option backdating at Apple and 
other major corporations (Janney & Gove, 2011), all affecting firms with 
otherwise strong CSR records.  However, the attention that these relatively 
isolated detrimental corporate actions attract may also be interpreted as 
reinforcing the importance stakeholders attach to being a good corporate citizen.   
Furthermore, a firm “may act responsibly not because of any direct link to 
a positive organizational outcome (e.g. greater prestige or more resources) but 
merely because it would be unthinkable to do otherwise” (Oliver, 1991:  149).  By 
conforming to stakeholder expectations of acceptable corporate behaviour, firms 
distinguish themselves to acquire social capital, which Oliver (1996:  177) defines 
as “a strategic resource distributed by the institutional environment that signifies 
a firm’s credibility and legitimacy”.  She also proposes that the value of social 
capital “exists whenever a firm’s ability to implement its strategies successfully is 
affected by its reputation” (Oliver, 1996:  177), while Adler and Kwon (2002:  21) 
qualify social capital as “a long-lived asset”, going on to note the “expectation of a 
future (albeit uncertain) flow of benefits”.   This social capital constitutes a 
dynamic resource that accrues value over time to contribute to competitive 
advantage.  We consider social capital to encompass exchange capital earned with 
technical stakeholders and moral capital of institutional stakeholders.  As pointed 
out earlier, a key distinction is the cumulative nature of exchange capital while 
the insurance value of moral capital introduces the risk of depletion over CSiR. 
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Returning to the basic premise of the resource-based view; rare, valuable, 
inimitable, idiosyncratic resources are the source of a sustainable competitive 
advantage (Barney, 1991; Oliver, 1997).  The cospecialized assets of corporate 
social actions and corporate reputation (McWilliams & Siegel, 2010) offer the 
potential to provide such a resource bundle when they demonstrate persistence 
over time as “socially endorsed routines that become ratified by their longevity” 
(Oliver, 1997:  703).  In other words, when over time CSR and reputation are 
consistently strong they can provide a greater value to the firm than should their 
performance be more sporadic.   
This now leads us into a discussion on the temporal dynamics to be 
considered as a backdrop to the theoretical model depicted in Figure 2. 
 
2.4.7  Temporal dynamics 
 The enduring quality of reputation that has been referred to as sticky 
(Kraatz & Love, 2006; Roberts & D0wling, 2002; Schultz, Mouritsen & 
Gabrielsen, 2001) highlights the importance of studying the change over time in a 
firm’s reputation (Muller & Kräussl, 2011). The resilience of reputation, 
particularly where a strong reputation has been cultivated (Fombrun et al., 
2000), indicates that a lag effect may exist before changes in corporate social 
actions are translated into reputation revisions.  Godfrey (2005) also proposes 
the insurance-like quality of previously acquired positive stakeholder goodwill in 
dampening the ill effects of CSR missteps.  However, where a firm has a 
reputation for irresponsibility the reduction in those bad deeds is more likely to 
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matter more than a good deed such as corporate philanthropy (Muller & Kräussl, 
2011). 
 Fombrun (2001:  294) refers to the “winner-take-all” nature of the 
reputational markets, where attention is given to the most noticeable firms, 
making it more difficult for competitors to challenge and to improve their 
reputations.  However he also notes how corporate reputation may plunge when a 
crisis strikes and how recovery will depend on both the pre-crisis reputation and 
how well the firm is perceived to deal with the situation.  This may be viewed as a 
long uphill battle to build reputation with well received deeds, but a slippery 
slope to destroy reputation with a misstep.  
 Also to be considered as evolving over time are corporate social actions for 
which Harrison and colleagues (2010) caution the need for the firm to have been 
engaged in the CSR for sufficient time for the stakeholders to understand the 
actions to be able to then reciprocate with for example, a positive reputational 
assessment.  However, from a practical perspective “it is likely impossible to 
come up with a set of objective and commonly agreed on time lags to examine the 
causal relationships in the CSP research because isolating the potential 
confounding factors becomes more challenging as the time lag increases between 
variables” (Chiu & Sharfman,2009:  21).   Godfrey (2005) proposes the strategic 
value of a consistent pattern of philanthropy as signalling a genuine commitment.  
In examining the relationship of corporate philanthropy on financial 
performance, Brammer and Millington’s (2008) ten year time period (1990 to 
1999) found financial returns to be significantly better for consistently 
philanthropic major U.K. firms.   
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 As suggested by Ployhard and Vandenberg (2010), to capture the 
dynamics of expected reputation changes over time, more than three repeated 
observations are necessary, with the key considerations being the adequacy of the 
number of repeated measurements and the likelihood of change occurring over 
the time period selected.   Recognizing that both reputation and corporate social 
actions evolve over time in an idiosyncratic manner, it is necessary to understand 
the relative positioning of each of these constructs at the beginning of the period 
under study as well as their movement with the ensuing years.  This now leads to 
our proposed model of corporate social actions and reputation. 
  
2.5  Model of corporate social actions and corporate reputation 
 Now that the theoretical foundation has been laid, the proposed dynamic 
interaction of corporate social actions on firm reputation will be developed.  
Remembering that stakeholders’ perception of corporate social actions influences 
their perception of corporate reputation, it is this dynamic interaction that will 
take place over time where previous reputation will be revised by interpreting the 
ensuing corporate social actions in an ongoing feedback loop.  Now, building on 
Godfrey’s (2005) conceptual model of good deeds benefiting reputation and 
Mattingly and Berman’s (2006) categorization of stakeholders as institutional or 







Figure 5.  Corporate social actions and corporate reputation overview 
 
 
Our model proposes that when stakeholders’ perception of corporate 
social actions is favourable they will reward the firm with positive reputation 
assessments.  Likewise, stakeholder concerns over shortcomings in corporate 
social actions will be reflected in negative reputation assessments.  This dynamic 
cycle will continue over time.  The category of stakeholder as institutional or 
technical will contribute to whether it is strengths or concerns which will 
primarily influence the change in reputation as a result of the change in CSR. 
Refining the distinction between CSR strengths and concerns, there are 
differences in the relative importance of assessments by technical and 
institutional stakeholders.  We have already identified the power in exchange 
transactions as providing technical stakeholders with greater ability to establish 
expectations as well as more accessible CSR information to assess how well the 
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firm’s corporate social actions meet with their expectations to establish their 
perception of the firm’s reputation.  For institutional stakeholders their 
dependence on the firm provides neither power nor ready access to information, 
however in the case of concerns over CSR it is institutional stakeholders who 
sanction the firm with a diminished reputation assessment as they draw down on 
the moral capital held with the firm.  While both stakeholder groups contribute to 
firm reputation, technical stakeholders will more strongly influence the 
perception of corporate social strengths, while institutional stakeholders will 
more strongly influence the perception of concerns over corporate social actions.  
In Figure 5 above, this is portrayed by the plus sign next to technical stakeholders 
for strengths and to institutional stakeholders for concerns.    
In summary, as per institutional and resource dependence theories, 
institutional stakeholders will have a stronger impact on the relationship between 
corporate social concerns and reputation, while technical stakeholders will 
dominate the relationship between corporate social actions and reputation.  This 
is highlighted above in Figure 5.  The overall dynamics of changing corporate 
social actions’ influence on changing corporate reputation is depicted below in 







Figure 6.  Model of corporate social actions and reputation dynamics
 
This  builds on the premise that stakeholder expectations increase over 
time, prompting the firm to do more to sustain or improve its corporate 
reputation.  As pointed out earlier, there is a decline in the status quo of CSR 
when expectations have risen (Barnett, 2007).  This need to continue adding to 
corporate social actions to improve the status quo implies an increase in CSR 
over time.  We have no reason to believe that either CSR or reputation are time 
invariant, but rather that to meet stakeholder expectations CSR will grow over 
time as the status quo becomes acquired so that more responsive CSR is needed 
to maintain reputation. 
 In other words, after a firm’s stakeholders assess its initial CSR efforts 
these stakeholders perceive the firm’s reputation at an initial level and then for 
the subsequent years are expecting the corporate social actions to be extended.  
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In year two, the firm has a choice to make with respect to whether it will 
maintain, diminish or increase its CSR.  Recognizing that stakeholder 
expectations are for the firm to go beyond what was done the previous year, a 
responsive firm will choose to do more to thus maintain or improve its 
reputation.  This cycle continues on year after year as the firm assesses its CSR 
efforts and the implications these choices have on their corporate reputation.  
This is not to suggest that CSR spending grows without limit, but rather the firm 
makes choices in its CSR initiatives that go beyond the status quo for those 
elements that are of importance to its stakeholders while perhaps previous or 
older CSR efforts become less relevant or are regulated, and thus no longer 
considered to be discretionary CSR.  An example of this would be a country’s 
legislation for mandatory company pensions which today are a CSR choice made 
by some firms, but if required by law would no longer be CSR.   
 As identified by Orlitzky and colleagues (2011), with CSR having become 
widely accepted it is no longer a question of whether a firm will engage in 
corporate social actions.  Consistent with stakeholder theory (Freeman, 1984) 
and identifying the stakeholder salience (Mitchell et al., 1997), the choice of 
stakeholder to which corporate social actions are directed will however change 
over time (Godfrey, 2005).  Building on the need to go beyond the status quo 
(Barnett, 2007), a firm will enhance its corporate social actions to meet salient 
stakeholder expectations (Peloza & Papania, 208) since standing still would 
effectively be falling behind. 
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 In considering the synergy generated by the cospecialized assets of 
corporate social actions and corporate reputation (McWilliams & Siegel, 2010), 
each of these intangible resources are enhanced from a perspective of the RBV 
(Barney, 1991) so that they contribute to a sustainable competitive advantage.  
The good deeds performed by corporate social actions within a particular sphere 
extend beyond that domain to embellish other components considered by 
stakeholders in assessing overall corporate reputation.  For example,  when a 
consumer happy with the good value for money of their purchases is aware of the 
favourable working conditions a retailer provides its employees, their estimation 
of firm reputation may be enhanced while they may also attribute greater quality 
to the services provided by the firm.  This compounds the benefits of good 
customer value and attention to employees to distinguish the firm via a strong 
reputation which constitutes a competitive advantage.  As noted earlier, 
stakeholder expectations of what have you done for me lately effectively 
discount the status quo, as subsequent corporate social actions are expected to 
take on additional weight.  Accordingly, to maintain or enhance corporate 
reputation the synergy of these intangibles must escalate so that more responsive 
corporate social actions are enacted over time.  In considering the changes that 
occur in corporate social actions, our initial hypothesis is:  
 
 Hypothesis 1:  During the time period of this study, positive change 




 Building on having established that changes do occur over time in 
corporate social actions, we now consider the direct relation of the change in 
social actions predicting a change in corporate reputation.  This is derived from 
our earlier explanation of stakeholders’ expectations of better than status quo 
CSR to maintain or enhance reputation.  Returning to our initial premise, firms 
are encouraged to increase their corporate social actions to improve corporate 
reputation, thus implying a continuing improvement in CSR to maintain or 
continue to enhance reputation.   After having established  the changes over time 
in CSR , we now expect the following relationship with reputation: 
 
 Hypothesis 2: During the time period of this study, the greater the 
 positive change in corporate social actions, the greater the positive 
 change in reputation.  In other words, improvements in corporate social 
 actions are positively related to an improvement in corporate reputation. 
  
Now that we have established the relationship of the change of corporate 
social actions improving corporate reputation over the five years of our study, we 
will now consider the stakeholders to whom CSR is directed.  Mattingly and 
Berman's inductive research on a taxonomy of social actions at the firm level 
found corporate social actions to depend "on whether stakeholder groups provide 
institutional or technical resources" (2006:  37).  They interpret institutional 
social actions as built on normative expectations, while resource exchange comes 
from the technical foundation.  Expanding this we further refine institutional 
social actions as fundamentally relationship based and technical as more 
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transaction based, adopting Mattingly and Berman's (2006) segmentation of 
institutional from technical stakeholders in researching corporate social actions.  
As noted previously, institutional stakeholders are deemed to hold normative 
expectations of firm behavior and generate moral capital, while technical 
stakeholders have economic exchange relations with the firm and create 
exchange capital.  Accordingly, the institutional stakeholders may also be viewed 
as predominantly non-market to include the community and the environment, 
while technical stakeholders aligned with markets include employees, suppliers, 
customers and shareholders.    
 As discussed earlier, stakeholders may be categorized in a variety of ways 
relative to the firms which influence or may be influenced by stakeholders 
(Freeman, 1984).  We have chosen to expand upon Mattingly and Berman’s 
(2006) view of technical and institutional stakeholders, which may alternatively 
be categorized as voluntary and involuntary stakeholders or primary and 
secondary stakeholders (Clarkson, 1995).   
 While the terminology used to segment stakeholders may be 
interchangeable, it is the underlying relationship with the focal firm that is 
paramount to determining the theoretical foundation which may explain the 
interaction.  Building on stakeholder salience (Mitchell, et al., 1997) with a 
particular emphasis on the element of power that the stakeholder exercises, it is 
those stakeholders who provide essential goods/services to the firm that are 
likely to command significantly greater management attention than those 
stakeholders who are dependent on the firm.  Resource dependency theory 
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(Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) highlights the importance of critical resource providers 
in capturing management attention and influencing transactions with the focal 
firm.  As technical stakeholders engage in exchange transactions (which may or 
may not be in addition to developing relationships with the focal firm), they have 
first-hand knowledge to build expectations as well as to assess how well they are 
met.  Accordingly, when corporate social actions are directed at technical 
stakeholders their appreciation may be translated into an enhanced corporate 
reputation.  Conversely, should technical stakeholders be the object of any 
corporate social concerns their ability to withhold valuable goods/services 
provides them an option other than merely diminishing corporate reputation of 
the focal firm.  With resource dependency theory explaining the relationship 
between technical stakeholders and the focal firm, this balance of power enables 
technical stakeholders to positively improve corporate reputation over corporate 
social actions, while they may engage in a withholding strategy over corporate 
social concerns as an alternative to merely decreasing reputation.  The firm's 
resource dependency on technical stakeholders thus suggests: 
 
Hypothesis 3:   Strengths in corporate social actions directed to 
 technical stakeholders more strongly influence corporate reputation 
 than those directed to institutional stakeholders. 
   
 However, when considering "one of the important ways of generating 
external support for a given organization is to make that organization's 
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operations and outcomes appear to be consonant with prevailing social values 
and useful to the larger social system" (Pfeffer, 1981:  21), any failure to meet 
such normative expectations would be found in institutional stakeholder directed 
concerns and their negative effects on firm reputation.  Furthermore, the 
insurance value of  institutional stakeholders’ moral capital is eroded, with the 
result that technical stakeholders are less influenced by CSiR than are 
institutional stakeholders.   
 Institutional stakeholders are largely involuntary or secondary, and as 
such at are at a power imbalance.  As discussed earlier, while institutional 
stakeholders have relationships with focal firms (which may or may not be in 
addition to transacting with the focal firm) for which they hold normative 
expectations (Oliver, 1997), they often lack direct knowledge of firm behaviour 
and must rely on second-hand reports.  According to institutional theory (Scott, 
1995), conforming to stakeholder expectations provides legitimacy, or society’s 
moral license to operate.  However, given the disparity of institutional 
stakeholder perspectives, in the event the focal firm fails to meet some normative 
expectations the only avenue available to institutional stakeholders is to draw 
down on moral capital (Godfrey et al., 2009) by devaluing corporate reputation.    
 Institutional stakeholders’ (comprising the community, environment, 
media and NGOs) response to a focal firm’s corporate social misdeed is likely to 
be more homogeneous as shared norms are violated (Oliver, 1991), than to a 
corporate social action where expectations are ambiguous (Pfeffer, 1981).  As 
noted previously, technical stakeholders’ power to withhold essential resources 
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provides insulation against corporate social concerns.  Accordingly, institutional 
stakeholders’ reactions to concerns over corporate missteps will translate to a 
diminished corporate reputation, leading us to propose: 
Hypothesis 4:   Concerns over corporate social actions directed to 
 institutional stakeholders more strongly influence corporate 
 reputation than those directed to technical stakeholders. 
 
2.6  Summary of theory development 
 Drawing on stakeholder, resource dependence and institutional theories, 
as well as the mechanisms explaining CSR and corporate reputation, we have 
hypothesized the relationship of corporate social actions and corporate 
reputation within a resource-based view of the firm.  Remembering that 
reputation is a perception, it is in the technical and institutional stakeholder 
perceptions of a focal firm that assessments of reputation are formulated.   As 
such, information asymmetry may account for differences in the development of 
stakeholder expectations and subsequently in the perception of corporate social 
actions as well as firm reputation.  Building on resource dependence, technical 
stakeholders’ exchange transactions provide them greater information to both 
formulate expectations of and then assess the corporate social actions.  
Substantive corporate social actions are more likely to be exchanged to obtain 
favourable reputation assessments.  However institutional stakeholders’ 
relationships with the firm may provide more ambiguous information on which 
they may formulate expectations and subsequently assess conformity.   The firm’s 
87 
 
relationship with institutional stakeholders may thus allow their corporate social 
actions to be symbolic yet still be well received.  However, should a firm defy 
institutionally expected social behaviour it jeopardizes the moral capital it has 
earned from institutional stakeholders, expressed by a devaluation of their 
reputation assessments. 
 Returning to the fundamental characteristic that CSR and reputation are 
perceptions in the eye of the beholder reminds us that the same corporate social 
gesture may invoke different perceptions related to context (i.e. time, location, 
etc.), as well as stakeholder interest and knowledge, to influence a variety of 
assessments of firm reputation.   Similarly, various firm stakeholders will value as 
more important certain types of corporate social actions in formulating their 
assessment of the focal firm’s reputation, so that not all corporate social actions 
will attract the attention of certain stakeholders.  Furthermore, we view corporate 
social actions to not be a continuum from strengths to concerns, but rather as 
distinct constructs. 
 As stakeholders form their opinions and expectations based on previous 
exchange transactions (technical stakeholders) or previous relationships 
(institutional stakeholders), corporate social actions will build over time to 
enhance corporate reputation.  The preceding hypothesis suggests such changes 
in corporate social actions, segregated by the intended recipient, can predict the 
evolution of corporate reputation.  We have also identified the synergies that CSR 
may yield with corporate reputation, as stakeholders express their satisfaction 
with CSR with a better perception of the firm as expressed in their assessment of 
corporate reputation.  
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 Remembering that the perception of reputation compares overall firm 
appeal (Fombrun, 1996), not all stakeholders have access to the same 
comparatives against which to assess relative appeal, however industry experts 
do share a common background of competitor knowledge.   While assessing 
reputation from representative stakeholders corresponds to capturing the eye of 
the beholder, the perception of industry experts assesses competing firms 
knowledgably, but from only a single stakeholder perspective.  In this trade-off 
for assessing reputation we have chosen the perception of industry experts who 
also broadly assess firm performance across multiple domains in considering 
relative firm reputation.  The methods by which these hypotheses will now be 

















3.  Methods 
 
3.1  Overview of methods 
 The hypothesized relationships between corporate social actions and 
corporate reputation will be tested on a sample of major US corporations over a 
five year period from 2002 to 2006.  The data sources include the proprietary 
database of KLD, Inc.2 for the corporate responsibility measures, Fortune’s 
America’s Most Admired Companies (MAC) annual rating of reputation compiled 
from published information available from Fortune and from the OSIRIS 
database from Bureau van Djik Electronic Publishing available from JMSB, 
Concordia University for financial data used for control purposes.  The control 
variables will include industry, profitability, asset size, risk and slack.  They are 
drawn from past research and will later be described in greater detail. 
 Before elaborating on each aspect of the methods adopted a brief 
explanation of the measurement of the focal constructs of corporate social actions 
and corporate reputation follow to frame the description of methods.  The 
predictor, corporate social actions, is measured from the historical statistical 
spreadsheets purchased from KLD.  Since 1991, starting with only 600 firms, 
KLD’s annual coverage increased to 1100 firms by 2001 and then to 3300 by 
2003;  drawn from the S&P 500 and Russell 3000 index of major US public 
firms.  There is relatively little attrition from year to year with coverage 
terminating due to bankruptcy, corporate restructuring or no longer being 
publicly listed.  KLD analysts using corporate self-reported answers and publicly 
                                                            
2
 The PhD. Thesis grant accorded by John Molson School of Business was the source of funding 
to acquire access to the KLD historical stats up to 2006.  Appreciation for this financial support is 
extended to Concordia University. 
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available reports review a series of considerations which have remained largely 
unchanged over the years to examine aspects of the firms social responsibility 
strengths and weaknesses, which they term as concerns.  These are grouped 
under the categories of community, diversity, employee, environment, 
governance, human rights and product.  According to the aspects under review 
(see Appendix A for KLD ratings criteria), they assign a one (1) for meeting the 
criteria or otherwise a zero (0).  These are reported on the historical 
spreadsheets, with the any modification or addition to the criteria clearly 
explained to allow researchers to ensure the comparability of data across years. 
 The dependent variable, corporate reputation, is measured by Fortune’s 
MAC rating, published annually in a spring edition of the magazine to rate and 
rank within industries the corporate reputation at the end of the preceding year 
on a scale of 1 to 10.  The raters are industry knowledgeable analysts and insiders 
who rate only firms within their industry sector on eight attributes (quality of 
management, quality of products and services, innovation, long-term investment 
value, financial soundness, people management, use of corporate assets and 
social responsibility).  Fortune does not make available all component scores, 
reporting only the simple average MAC rating from 1 to 10 (see Appendix B for 
Fortune methodology).  Only the top ten or so firms within each industry 
category are reported upon.  Accordingly, from year to year not all firms will 




 As will be described in greater detail, both the KLD and Fortune MAC are 
established measures which have been extensively used in previous research, 
having their critics but nonetheless are precious sources of longitudinal data. 
 
3.2  Sample 
 With a firm level of analysis, we focus on major US firms for our sample.  
The period under study was chosen as 2002 to 2006.  The universe from which 
the selection was drawn is those firms included in Standard and Poor’s S & P 500 
and those firms included in the Fortune 1000 index.  Standard and Poor's ranks 
the top 500 US firms based on market capitalization.  However, Standard and 
Poor's also screens to ensure a majority public float and adequate stock price, as 
well as financial viability indicated by four consecutive positive quarterly 
earnings.  To compensate for this performance bias, we also included those firms 
appearing on Fortune's 1000, a ranking of US firms by revenues.  Given the 
objective of a representative sample of the largest US firms, once a firm appeared 
on either the S & P 500 or Fortune 1000 ranking in any of these years they were 
considered for the entire period.   
 We started with all the largest U.S. firms from the S & P 500 and Fortune 
1000 for which evaluations of social actions were available from KLD (see section 
3.4.1 for a detailed explanation of the KLD measures) for 2001 to 2006.  While 
the KLD ratings also include firms in the Domini 400 Social Index and the 
Russell 1000 (the Russell 3000 since 2003), these represent the highest social 
performers and specifically exclude all firms significantly involved in tobacco, 
alcohol, gambling, firearms, military weapons and nuclear power (KLD, 2009).  
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Similar to Mattingly and Berman (2006), to avoid prejudicing the sample's 
generalizability we included those firms identified by KLD as S & P 500 firms.  
From the remaining KLD firms we identified those included in the Fortune index 
and eliminated those not recognized on either the S & P or Fortune indexes. 
 Accordingly, the sample was drawn from the 1107 firms rated by KLD in 
2001, reduced by the non-qualification of 460 firms for the previously noted 
reasons, leaving a sample universe of 647 firms which represent the 500 S & P 
and the additional 147 Fortune ranked firms. 
 While KLD increased its coverage of firms over time, for a variety of 
reasons some of the firms rated in 2001 were dropped from subsequent ratings in 
any of the years from 2002 to 2006.  Corporate reorganizations (mergers or 
acquisitions), bankruptcies and privatization were some of the reasons for which 
the sample universe suffered from a slight attrition over time.   
 From the 647 firms for which KLD ratings of CSR were available 
throughout the period, not all were consistently included in the reputation 
measure from Fortune America's Most Admired Companies ratings.  Reasons 
similar to those noted for KLD attrition were compounded by the limited number 
of firms whose annual reputation ratings were published (see section 3.4.3 for a 
detailed explanation of the Fortune reputation ratings).  Attrition over time is a 
common feature affecting all longitudinal studies and was compensated for by 
the large number of firms in the initial sample universe (Ployhard & Vandenberg, 
2010).   The final sample of firms for which all data was available was 285 firms, 
and constitutes the number of cases with no missing data across the time frame 
(2002-2006 for CSR and controls; 2002-2007 for reputation). 
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3.3  Data sources  
 The KLD academic spreadsheets covering 1991-2006 (as of December 31st 
of each year) are the source of the strengths and concerns ratings indicated by a 
"1", where the absence of a rating, signified by a "0" indicates that the firm did 
not meet the criteria for a strength or a concern.  For example, in assessing 
strengths related to the environment KLD has six criteria, therefore strength 
ratings for this category range from 0 to 6, while the product strengths are 
assessed on four criteria for a range in strength ratings from 0 to 4.  (For details 
on the specific criteria used by KLD see Appendix A.)    
 KLD describes their research evaluations to come from five distinct data 
sources which include direct communications with firm officers, global media 
sources reviewed on a daily basis, public documents as filed with the SEC, input 
from ten global socially responsible investment research firms and information 
gathered from various branches of the U.S. government and non-governmental 
organizations.  Their research process has analysts who specialize by sector, are 
mentored by senior analysts who also perform quality reviews and a KLD Ratings 
Review Committee to critically evaluate methodology and assessment criteria.  
The KLD ratings are also “among the oldest and most influential, and, by far, the 
most widely analyzed by academics” (Chatterji, Levine & Toffel, 2009:  125) and 
as such are a well-recognized data source characterized by Deckop and colleagues 
(2006:  334) as “the largest multidimensional CSP database available to the 
public”. 
 The measure of corporate reputation, Fortune's America’s Most Admired 
Companies (MAC), has a history dating to 1982 of obtaining reputation 
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assessments from industry executives as well as financial analysts covering those 
industries.  Based on eight equally weighted categories (for details see Appendix 
B), the average of the 1 to 10 ratings and an industry ranking are published in a 
spring edition.  Using the Fortune publications for the years 2002 to 2007, where 
the publication of the March list represents the previous year-end’s ratings, we 
compiled the ratings assigned to the top firms representing some 60 industries in 
each of those years.  For 2008 the ratings were revised to a common survey for 
the former America’s Most Admired Companies and the former World’s Most 
Admired Companies (Fortune, 2009).  As this change significantly reduces the 
number of American companies, eliminating those relatively smaller when 
compared to global firms, the 2007 ratings published in March 2008 are the last 
comparable reputation ratings. 
 The OSIRIS database from Bureau van Djik Electronic Publishing is the 
source of all financial data to be used as controls. 
 
3.4  Measures 
3.4.1  Corporate social actions 
 The KLD ratings consider seven broad categories: community, 
governance, diversity, employee relations, environment, human rights and 
product.  KLD also has exclusionary screens for which only concerns are noted in 
the areas of alcohol, gambling, firearms, military, nuclear power and tobacco.  
The single-sided nature of the exclusionary screens are industry focused rather 
than aligned with stakeholders (Strike et al., 2006), and as in prior studies using 
KLD (Griffin & Mahon, 1997; Hillman & Keim, 2001; Mattingly & Berman, 2006; 
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McGuire et al., 2003; Shropshire & Hillman, 2007; Strike et al., 2006) we do not 
consider these ratings. 
 The specific criteria for which KLD awards a strength or posts a concern 
are included in Appendix A.  While KLD's naming convention may have changed 
over the years, they provide clear descriptions and explanations of the ratings 
criteria to enable a consistent matching.  For example, in 2000 they began 
assigning strengths for exemplary and concerns for problematic indigenous 
peoples relations within the community category and then moved these to the 
human rights category in 2002.   
 Mattingly and Berman (2006) develop a taxonomy of social actions at the 
firm level within the KLD qualitative social ratings.  Using exploratory factor 
analysis over five years of data, they identified four distinct categories of 
corporate social action:  institutional strengths, institutional weaknesses, 
technical strengths and technical weaknesses.  The institutional stakeholders are 
the KLD categories of community and the environment, while the technical 
stakeholders are KLD categories of employees, customers and shareholders.  The 
KLD category of diversity strengths is related to the community, while KLD’s 
diversity concerns are linked to KLD’s employee relations.  Mattingly and 
Berman (2006) note the complexity of the relationship with diversity-related 
employees who in addition to being resource suppliers (i.e. technical 
stakeholders) also have normative expectations, as do all diversity-related 
community stakeholders (i.e. institutional stakeholders).  They also note that 
environmental strengths and concerns are highly correlated, offering as a 
possible explanation that those firms responsible for environmental harm are 
96 
 
also those that rely heavily on the environment in exploiting their business.  
Delmas and Blass (2011) also found significant correlation between KLD’s 
environmental strengths and weaknesses, concluding that strong management 
practices do not translate into better environmental compliance, while Chatterji 
and colleagues (2009) suggest that having more environmental strengths also 
means that there will be more environmental concerns related to the firm.    
 Building on Mattingly and Berman's (2006) findings (Appendix E), as 
confirmed by a confirmatory factor analysis of our data sample (see Chapter 4.3 
for details), we adopt their stakeholder categorization of the KLD data, as follows: 
 
Figure 7.  Stakeholder categorization 
Institutional Strength 
     Community 
     Diversity 
Technical Strength 
     Employee 
     Customer (product) 
     Shareholder (governance) 
Institutional Weakness 
     Community 
     Environment (including strengths) 
 
Technical Weakness 
     Employee 
     Diversity 
     Customer (product) 
     Shareholder (governance) 
 
  
 While the split classification of diversity as an institutional strength but a 
technical weakness might appear an anomaly, further examination of the specific 
criteria utilized can support this interpretation with face validity.  Remembering 
the premise that corporate social strengths and weaknesses are not a continuum, 
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the eight criteria assessing diversity strengths cover a broad spectrum of 
considerations such as provisions for women/minority contracting, disabled 
persons, women/ minority directors, etc., most of which are policy based 
initiatives which can readily be interpreted to be institutional.  The three diversity 
concerns represent affirmative action and other controversies, as well as the non-
representation of women on the board, which may be interpreted as more closely 
aligned with governance and employee concerns and thus classification as 
technical weaknesses is coherent. 
 As the number of criteria used by KLD in assessing strengths and concerns 
varies considerably by category, a built in dominance of either strengths or 
weaknesses is inherent in a simple summing (Strike et al., 2006) and has been 
identified as skewing results (Hillman & Keim, 2001).  However, we have 
followed Chatterji and colleagues’ (2009), Cho and colleagues’ (2010) and Walls 
and colleagues’ (2011) summing of the KLD environmental strengths and/or 
concerns as a representative measure of institutional and technical strengths and 
concerns.  As their findings also noted a significant number of companies within 
their sample had KLD scores of zero, the disparity between the number of 
questions within the various categories is less likely to skew results.  
Furthermore, utilizing the same summation in each of the five years is unlikely to 
affect any variance in the ratings over time. 
 These four categories of corporate social actions are the independent 
variables, constituting the overall measure of CSR.   The construct of corporate 
social actions as a formative, rather than a reflective construct, has implications 
on assessments of validity which will be discussed next. 
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3.4.2  Reflective and formative constructs 
 A key element to assess whether a construct is reflective or formative is the 
direction between the variables (Williams, Gauvin & Hartman, 2004).  The more 
common reflective indicator represents the manifestation of a construct (Roberts 
& Thatcher, 2009; Williams et al, 2004)  Formative measures are those that 
produce or form the construct to which they are associated (Williams, Edwards & 
Vandenberg, 2003).  The importance of making the distinction between reflective 
and formative constructs lies in how they may be modeled, as well as the 
assessment of their validity.  Williams and colleagues (2004) caution that 
strategy researchers incorrectly categorize as reflective, constructs that are better 
represented as formative. 
 Using Roberts and Thatcher’s (2009:  12) framework of conceptualizing a 
formative indicator, the corporate social actions construct may be viewed as 






















Figure 8:  Formative indicators 
 
 
Concept Formative indicators Applied to construct of corporate 
social actions 
Causality Viewed as causes; 
construct formed by its 
measures 
A series of actions directed to a 
variety of stakeholders forms the 
construct of corporate social actions; 
Corporate social actions may be 
defined as the institutional and 
technical strengths and the 
institutional and technical  
weaknesses of the focal firm 
Interchangeable Not interchangeable, 
unlike reflective where 




The 4 factor composite represents 
corporate social actions so that by 
removing any one would remove a 







(taken as given) 
“Reliability in an internal 
consistency sense is not meaningful 
for formative indicators” ..... 
“construct intercorrelation is less 
than .71” (Diamantopoulos, Riefler & 
Roth, 2008: 1215 & 1216) 
 
  
 As a formative construct, traditional indicators of validity such as 
Cronbach alpha are not relevant.  Validating formative constructs relies heavily 
on face validity and on identifying structural relations (Williams et al., 2003).  In 
consideration of KLD’s underlying structure of assessing CSR, the 
comprehensiveness of the stakeholder categories, the consistency over time of the 
aspects of CSR that are examined, as well as the appropriateness of the issues 
considered, we find this measure of CSR to have face validity.  As seen in 
Appendix A, each strength and concern is distinctly formulated without 
ambiguity, further reinforcing face validity.  The wide acceptance of the KLD 
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measures by both the academic and social investment research communities 
attests to this face validity.    
 
3.4.3  Reputation 
 Fortune's ranking of America's Most Admired Companies (MAC) is based 
on an annual survey of senior executives and board directors of Fortune 1000 
companies, as well as financial analysts, where they rate the major companies in 
their industry on eight reputation drivers.  These include the quality of 
management, product and service quality, innovation, use of corporate assets, 
personnel development and ability to attract talent, long-term investment value, 
financial performance and social responsibility.  The published 2008 ratings were 
based on fourth quarter, 2007 survey responses from over 3,300 executives, 
directors and analysts representing over 600 companies in almost 70 industries.  
See Appendix B for a more detailed description of the data collection 
methodology. 
 Roberts and Dowling's (2002) longitudinal examination of the link of 
reputation to persistent superior financial performance found evidence "that 
Fortune's reputation measure is a global firm attribute that allows stakeholders 
to fill in the blanks when full information about firm particulars is not readily 
available" (Roberts & Dowling, 2002:  1082), confirming earlier findings by 
Fombrun and Shanley (1990:  245) "that the eight attributes elicited from 
respondents were components of an underlying and stable construct of 
reputation".  While the criticisms of using individual components of the MAC 
ratings focus on the financial halo (Brown & Perry, 1994) and its rating of 
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reputation "as an investment" (Fryxell & Wang, 1994:  13), our use of the 
aggregation is as an indicator of overall firm-level reputation.  A more recent 
study by Flanagan, O’Shaughnessy and Palmer (2011) replicated Brown and 
Perry’s 1991 sample along with one drawn from 2006 data to conclude the 
“impact of financial variables on reputation is much weaker today than it was in 
the past” (Flanagan et al., 2011:  13), going on to reinforce the use of MAC ratings 
as a valid measure of corporate reputation.  To explain this deflation of the link 
between reputation and financial performance they suggest both constructs to be 
more dynamic today, as well as the greater information sources available to 21st 
century raters to provide data beyond the reported financial results upon which 
raters base their assessments (Flanagan et al, 2011).   
 Although one of the Fortune MAC considerations is social responsibility it 
is the respondents' overall estimations of this aspect within their perception of 
the reputation of a firm and not the structured analysis of KLD.  Kraatz and Love 
(2006) note the importance of using reputation measures which are of 
importance to firms, singling out Fortune's ratings for special consideration.  One 
example of how the Fortune placing forms part of the strategic goals may be 
found in General Electric's  proxy statement where the CEO's compensation 
related to risk and reputation management is assessed as "GE remains one of the 
most admired companies...Fortune (#1)" (GE, 2007:  19).   
  
3.4.4 Industry 
 The significance of industry in all strategy research is well recognized 
(Waddock & Graves, 1997), however the diversification of many large firms is 
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reflected in their multiple standard industry codes (SIC), leading researchers to 
often assign an industry category based on the primary SIC determined by 
revenue source.  While extremely simple distinctions such as service or 
manufacturing (Christmann & Taylor, 2006) or broad category one-digit SIC 
(Strike et al., 2006) may represent attractive options to compress industry 
categories, the use of the two-digit SIC (Hillman & Keim, 2001; Johnson & 
Greening, 1999) provides adequate distinction for our purposes, without the 
undue fine-tuning of the four-digit SIC (McWilliams & Siegel, 2000; Russo & 
Fouts, 1997).  While the firms’ designation of the primary SIC recognizes their 
principal revenue/profit source, the relative proportion of earnings derived from 
this industry sector may fluctuate over time as firms acquire/divest operating 
units, however this is not captured in the stagnant SIC reported by most firms.    
 With reputation being a comparison against competitors (Frombrun, 
1996) and the Fortune respondents specialized by industry, we propose an 
adequate categorization by industry is achieved using the primary SIC.  Flanagan 
and colleagues’ (2011) findings maintain that industry influences corporate 
reputation, and suggest the use of industry dummy variables when modeling 
corporate reputation.   
 The final sample of 285 companies had the following SIC distribution as 
shown in Figure 9.  Initially to control for industry  44 industry dummy codes 
were created to represent the 45 two-digit SIC codes, however then a more simple 
7 industry dummy codes representing the 8 one-digit SIC codes were considered, 
however to not to remove power the categorization of industry was further 
reduced to four broad categories, represented by 3 dummy codes.  Our structural 
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equation models used the four broad industry categories of manufacturing, 
services, retail/transportation and other.  
 
Figure 9.   Industry distribution by two-digit SIC 
SIC Number %  SIC Number % 
10-19 16 6  50-59 51 18 
20-29 61 21  60-69 44 15 
30-39 63 22  70-79 19 7 
40-49 25 9  80-87 6 2 
       
Summary 
of 4 codes 
  
% 
    
% 





60-87 Services 24  10-19, 
48-49 
All other 11 
 
 
3.4.5 Financial controls 
 We include control variables to eliminate possible confounding variables 
that could provide alternative explanations and in response to McWilliams and 
Siegel's (2000) criticism of model misspecifications. 
 Prior research studies have shown a variety of financial factors to have an 
effect on CSR and we address the pertinence to control for each of these factors in 
our analysis.  Using the table that follows we indicate prior operationalizations 
(including references), as well as the measure we have chosen for this research. 
 While our objective is to examine the largest corporations, the issue of 
firm size has long been seen as affecting both CSR and reputation.  Similarly, 
profitability and prior period profitability have been seen as precursors that 
warrant controls.  Other more random factors have included asset age, slack 
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resources, and leverage and R&D intensity.  The fact that our sample includes 
both services and manufacturing within a broad cross-section of industries 
indicates we consider both physical resources and human capital to capture a 
comparable indicator of size.   
 To further greater comparability of period to period results by excluding 
taxation regulations that underwent changes over time, we focused on pre-tax 
income as the foundation of performance or profitability in determining the 
various financial returns.  This had the advantage of not only enhancing 
comparability, but of excluding the tax corrections that were imputed when the 
prospective of future earnings changed underlying accounting assumptions to 
distort declared net income.   
 
 




References Rationalization and choice for 
this research 
Number of employees 
 
 
Net sales & net income 
 
Average log of total 
assets, total firm sales & 
total employees 
Log of number of 
employees 
Natural log of total assets 
 















Based on Boyd et al.'s (2005) call for 
multiple indicators, and on the 
previous uses, we have selected the 
natural log of total assets and the 
natural log of total employees as best 
quantifying firm size.  Given our 
sample includes both service and 
manufacturing, employees and assets 
constitute a true measure of “size” of 
the organization.  Adding the two logs 
is equivalent to the log of assets x 
employees, resulting in a weighted 




Firm profitability (financial performance): 
Prior 
operationalizations 
References Rationalization and choice for 
this research 
2 year averages of return 
on sales, return on assets & 
return on equity 
Prior return on assets, two 
year average 
Return on sales (1 year lag) 
Return on sales, return on 











Based on Boyd & al.'s (2005) call 
for multiple indicators, and on the 
previous uses, we have selected the 
pre-tax return on shareholder 
funds & pre-tax return on assets as 
best quantifying firm profitability. 
 
Slack, R & D, risk & asset age: 
Prior 
operationalizations 
References Rationalization and choice 
for this research 
Slack and R & D: 
Ratio of current assets 
over current liabilities, log 
transformation 
Leverage and times 
interest earned ratios 
Industry average R&D as 




Beta reported in Standard 
& Poor's 
Coefficient of variation of 
daily stock price for each 
firm in each year, log 
transformed 






Ratio of net and gross 





Strike et al., 
2006; 
McGuire et al., 
2003 



















Strike et al., 
2006 
 
Following Lawson's (2001) 
argument for the role of slack in 
innovation, and McWilliams & 
Siegel's (2000) call for controlling 
for R & D, we use slack as a proxy 
for R & D, using the ratio of 
current assets over current 
liabilities. 
 
Following Waddock & Graves' 
(1997: 309) "proxy for 
management's risk tolerance" we 
use their ratio of long-term debt to 
total assets, operationalized as one 
minus the solvency ratio 
(shareholder funds to total assets) 
to capture the indebtedness of the 
firm, long viewed under agency 




We explored this control, however 
given the mix of services and 
manufacturing firms chose to 





3.4.6  Years 
 The time frame 2002 to 2006, for a total of five years provides ample data 
to achieve necessary power for a longitudinal and structural equation modeling  
analyses.  In discussing environmental performance measurement, Delmas and 
Blass (2011) favour multi-year data as change is a lengthy process and any one 
year may not be representative. 
 
3.5  Reliability and validity 
 The KLD data have been used extensively and are well acknowledged as 
representing the construct of corporate social actions (Sharfman, 1996; Walls et 
al., 2011) despite their critics (Entine, 2003), they are reliably constructed to 
ensure internal, external and construct validity (Chatterji, Levine & Toffel, 2009; 
Sharfman, 1996).  The Mattingly and Berman (2006) four factor regrouping of 
the KLD data has not been widely utilized in its entirety.  For example Bear, 
Rahman and Post’s (2010) study focuses only on the two strength dimensions 
(institutional and technical), while Muller and Kräussl (2011) attempted to 
replicate the exploratory factor analysis but were unable to match the factor 
loadings of Mattingly and Berman, and so did not choose to use the four factors.  
We encountered similar difficulties when using the unrestricted exploratory 
factor analysis, however a more appropriate test is confirmatory factor analysis 
(Kaplan, 200; Maruyama, 1998).   Having established face validity (see Chapter 
3.4.2) to validate the four factor model as proposed by Mattingly and Berman 
(2006) we performed a confirmatory factor analysis which fitted our data, the 
details of which follow in the Chapter 4.3 on results.  
107 
 
 As an overall global measure of reputation, Fortune's America’s Most 
Admired Companies is considered to be “one of the most reliable data points to 
measure corporate reputation” (Lee, Fairhurst & Wesley, 2009), with empirical 
evidence “which support validity and reliability of the Fortune survey data 
(Flanagan, O’Shaughnessy & Palmer, 2011:  5).   It has also been used extensively 
in prior research on reputation (e.g. Brown & Perry, 1994; Carter & Ruefli, 2006; 
Fombrun & Shanley, 1990; Lee et al., 2009; Love & Kraatz, 2009; Roberts & 
Dowling, 2002; Straw & Epstein, 2000).  As noted earlier, a recent study by 
Flanagan and colleagues (2011) found the more recent Fortune ratings (e.g. 
2006) to not be unduly influenced by performance and suggest that Fortune 
continues to be a very appropriate data source. 
 The financial controls are coherent with previous research in their use, 
application and source.  As suggested by Flanagan and colleagues (2011), the 
importance of industry effects on firm reputation must be taken into account, for 
which they suggest including industry dummy variables.  Bureau van Djik’s 
OSIRIS is a reputable, well-respected source of comprehensive financial data 
(Bener, M. & Glaister, K.W, 2010;  Muino, F. & Trombetta, M, 2009; Shao, L., 
Kwok, C.C. & Guedhami, O., 2010).   OSIRIS includes some 65,000 listed and 
major unlisted/delisted companies with data sourced from over a hundred 
specialist information providers, such as D&B, EIU, S&P and Thomson Reuters 
among others (Bureau van Djik, 2011).  A review of peer-reviewed journal articles 
using ProQuest found increasing references to OSIRIS as a data source, with six 
such articles for 2011, equal to the number for all of 2010.  As recommended by 
Boyd and colleagues (2005),multiple indicators have been selected. 
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3.6  Summary of all variables to be considered 
 The following table summarizes the proposed variables of interest and 
identifies how they will be operationalized. 
 
Figure 11.  Summary of variables 
Independent variables: 
Corporate social action strengths 
     Institutional 
 
     
     Technical  
 
KLD strengths assigned for community 
(7) and diversity (8) for a possible 15 
captions as a sum of strengths. 
KLD strengths assigned for employee 
(7), governance (3) and product (4), for  
a possible 14 captions as a sum of 
strengths. 
Corporate social action weaknesses 
     Institutional 
 
      
     
       
     Technical 
 
KLD concerns assigned for community 
(6) and net environment (7 possible 
concerns, reduced by a possible 6 
strengths by reverse coding strengths), 
as a sum of concerns. 
KLD concerns assigned for employee 
(6), governance (4), product (4) and 
diversity (3), for a possible 17 captions 
as a sum of concerns. 
Industry Primary SIC code reduced to 4 broad 
categories (manufacturing, services, 
retail/transportation and all other), 
represented by 3dummy codes. 
Firm size OSIRIS, total assets transformed to 
natural log, plus total employees 
transformed to natural log 
Firm profitability OSIRIS average of pre-tax return on 
shareholder funds and pre-tax return 
on total assets 
Slack resources, R&D proxy OSIRIS current ratio calculated as 
current assets divided by current 
liabilities 
Risk OSIRIS solvency ratio calculated as 
total shareholder funds divided by total 
assets, then subtracted from one, to 
equal the percentage of assets not 




Reputation Fortune's America’s Most Admired 
Companies actual rating for each 
individual year from 2002 to 2007. 
 
 
3.7  Data screening 
 The KLD, FMA and OSIRIS data were extracted and examined to ensure 
comparability year over year, as well as to ensure an exact match at the firm level.  
Corporate name changes were identified to reduce attrition.  Wherever possible 
when financial data were missing from OSIRIS, the firm’s annual reports and 
SEC filings were consulted to extract the data and perform the ratio calculations.  
To ensure consistency and correct interpretation, these calculations were also 
performed for other periods reported by OSIRIS as a further validation.   
 The changes effected by KLD in the categorization of certain questions 
were examined to best attribute the characteristic to a stakeholder classification 
and to ensure a consistent treatment across the period under study.  Alternative 
interpretations of classifications were examined to assess the best ideological fit, 
such as the reintegration of the human rights categories into their previous 
community or employee classifications. 
 To ensure comparability across the years, only the KLD questions that 
were asked for the entire five years were included in the scoring.  However, given 
the all other question within each strength or concern it was also deemed 
necessary to examine the KLD questions added after 2002 to ensure true 
comparability between years.  The underlying rationale being that at the outset a 
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particular CSR action might be fairly rare and thus be captured in the all other 
category, however if a trend of acceptance was noted that provoked KLD to add a 
distinct caption the same CSR gesture might now be recognized in the new 
category and no longer in the all other.  As new questions were not considered it 
would be necessary to reintegrate the observation into the all other tabulation.   
An example of one such detailed review of new captions added is the 2006 
recognition of a firm’s commitment to environmental management systems 
within KLD’s environmental strengths.  The unusually large increase in all other 
environmental strengths in 2005 was obviously a precursor of the new 2006  
commitment to environmental management systems category which was not 
considered in the earlier coverage from 2002 to 2004.  Within the sample there 
were 54 firms recognizing a 1 in other environmental strengths in 2005.  These 
were compared individually to the 2006 ratings for commitment to 
environmental management systems to identify those firms receiving a 1, as well 
as compared to the 2004 other environmental strengths ratings.  Where a firm 
did not rate a 1 in the 2006 commitment to environmental management 
category the 2005 rating of 1 in the other environmental strength category was 
considered to be a true measure of the constant measure from 2002 and was 
maintained.  This is coherent with maintaining a stable measure over the period 
as formal environmental management systems were generally not in place in 
2002.  Of the 54 firms with an other environmental strength in 2005 only 4 were 
maintained as consistent with previous years, while the other 50 related to a new 
measure so were eliminated.  As noted earlier, the policy nature of certain of the 
KLD ratings favour a constant rating and underlie the data screening undertaken. 
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3.8  Temporal effect 
 The five year time period from 2002 to 2006 is viewed as an ample 
window upon which to capture the effect of the change in corporate social actions 
on the change in corporate reputation.  Based on our expectations of the 
evolution of corporate social actions the chosen sample is expected to provide 
adequate change, however we have no guarantee as to whether this data sample 
will capture the anticipated change (Ployhard & Vandenberg, 2010). 
 Given the role of stakeholder management in developing CSR initiatives it 
is logical to expect stakeholder expectations to change over time in response to 
shifts in social issues as well as their perceptions of how business has behaved.  
The classic stakeholder salience model of urgency, legitimacy and power 
attributes (Mitchell et al., 1997) would predict change over time, as at least 
urgency by its very definition is unlikely to be stable over the years, providing 
somewhat of an assurance of variability over time.   
 As the element of change over time in both the dependent and 
independent variables is of vital interest to our study, the measurement of such 
change is a key methods decision.  The use of change scores, while common in 
strategy research, has its critiques who note severe limitations (Bergh & 
Fairbank, 2002).  Chan (1998:  423) observes that “limited information on 
individual change over time can be obtained from a difference score analysis”.  
 Williams and colleagues (2004: 329) identify “latent growth modeling has 
the potential for many applications in strategy research when repeated 
observations are collected across observational units”, generating growth 
trajectories across firms over time.  We will now examine some of the underlying 
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considerations before latent growth modeling (LGM) may be undertaken, 
followed by a discussion of the appropriateness of LGM. 
 
3.8.1  Measurement equivalence or invariance 
 In order to attest that the same construct is being measured in each of the 
selected years, with the same precision, measurement invariance tests are a 
prerequisite to LGM (Bentein, Vandenberg, Vandenberghe & Stinglhamber, 
2005; Chan, 1998; Chan & Schmitt, 2000; Ployhard & Vandenberg, 2010).  To 
ensure corporate social actions from 2002 to 2006 are consistently measured, 
following Chan (1998) our four factor model was replicated for each of the five 
years.  “Invariance is said to exist if (a) each time point has the same single factor 
with the same specific items loading on each factor, (i.e. configural invariance) 
and (b) the factor loadings correspond to the identical items are equal across time 
points (i.e. factorial invariance)” (Chan & Schmitt, 2000:  195).  As reputation is a 
single item measure, no measure invariance test is required.  “Evidence of 
measurement invariance establishes the meaningfulness of the analysis” (Chan, 
1998:  433) for modeling the growth trajectories.  The results of the measure 
invariance tests are reported in the next chapter.    
 
3.8.2  Latent growth modeling (LGM) 
 Bentein and colleagues (2005) provide a comprehensive analysis for 
operationalizing change to conclude the superiority of LGM.  They note LGM’s 
capacity to capture individual change for each subject across time, along with the 
subject’s initial relationship between constructs and the trajectory of change.  
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Williams and colleagues (2003) observe the scarcity of empirical applications of 
LGM, and note that although at the time only completed at the individual level 
that “LGM is equally applicable to other units of observation and analysis” 
(Williams et al, 2003:  926).  The LGM framework followed in the subsequent 
chapter’s results is that advocated by Chan’s (1998) often cited discussion and 
example of LGM. 
  
3.9  Summary of methods 
 The relationship between corporate social actions and corporate 
reputation will be empirically tested for 285 major US firms using five years 
(2002-2006) of data from KLD (corporate social actions) and six years (2002-
2007) of  data from Fortune (corporate reputation), with industry dummies and 
financial controls from OSIRIS.  The reliability and validity of these data sources 
have been established and the Mattingly and Berman (2006) four factors of KLD 
supported by a confirmatory factor analysis.  The industry and financial controls 
conform with those used in previous studies, while the KLD and Fortune 
measures have been utilized extensively by other organizational researchers.   
 To measure the effect of changes in corporate social actions on changes in 
corporate reputation latent growth modeling (LGM) is the best suited technique, 
as difference scores are an inadequate alternative (Chan, 1998).   The measure 
invariance of the KLD data is established as a precursor to LGM to ensure the 
comparability of the measure/interpretation of corporate social actions across 
time.  The next chapter will address the data analysis strategy in greater detail as 
well as report the results of the empirical testing of the hypotheses. 
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4.  Results  
4.1  Overview of analysis of results 
 The five year data set of 285 firms’ complete information will first be 
reported as descriptive statistics, including relevant correlations, to provide an 
insight into the variables which will be utilized for hypothesis testing.  Extensive 
use of structural equation modeling (SEM) using EQS6.1 is employed to perform 
the data analysis, along with multivariate regression analysis using IBM’s SPSS, 
version 19. 
 A confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) of the four-factor model 
(institutional strengths, weaknesses; technical strengths, weaknesses) proposed 
by Mattingly and Berman (2006) will then be presented.  The acceptable fit 
indices obtained provide support for the use of the four-factor model with this 
research dataset. 
 To capture the effects of change over time in the focal constructs, a SEM 
technique, latent growth modeling (LGM), will constitute the primary analysis 
vehicle.  The data analysis techniques follow those detailed by Chan (1998), as 
well as utilized by Bentein and colleagues (2005).   LGM requires the 
confirmation that the same constructs are being measured with the same 
precision across the time period.  This was performed for corporate social 
actions, but given the single reputation rating was not relevant for reputation 
(Chan, 1998).   
 Thus an examination of measurement invariance is reported which 
confirms this prerequisite condition necessary to undertaking LGM.  The good fit 
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of all of the models confirms that the four factors are constant across the five 
years with the same elements loading on each of the factors across each year. 
 Having established this precursor condition, the LGM which captures a 
growth trajectory for each firm over the period is analysed.  The acceptable model 
fit supports the linear change found in corporate social actions and corporate 
reputation.  Then a second-order factor LGM was developed introducing the 
industry and financial control variables.  Once again, the acceptable model fit 
supports that the change in corporate social actions predicts a change in 
corporate reputation. 
 To test the relative importance of technical strengths and institutional 
concerns, regression analysis including the control variables was performed.  The 
regression model confirmed the significance of technical strengths, but not that 
of institutional concerns on the relationship between corporate social actions and 
corporate reputation.  A summary of findings against the hypotheses tested 
concludes the analysis. 
 Finally, to translate the statistical models into more tangible examples, a 
selection of sampled firms were illustrated and related to the hypothesized 
relationships.  The implications of these results will be discussed in Chapter 5. 
 
4.2  Descriptive statistics  
 The descriptive statistics that follow present the 285 firms year by year, 
while further descriptive details may be found in Appendix C.  A year by year 
review shows relatively little variability.  As expected, profitability generally has 
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the largest standard deviation due to corporate losses which may extend to the 
negative range, along with the greatest volatility. 
 










 Statistics Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Institutional 
Strength  
1.70 1.97 2.02 2.13 2.12 2.20 2.32 2.15 2.45 2.26 
Technical  
Strength  
0.86 1.10 0.82 1.10 0.85 1.16 1.03 1.30 1.05 1.32 
Institutional 
Concern  
6.48 1.33 6.47 1.23 6.58 1.26 6.58 1.43 6.52 1.51 
Technical  
Concern  
2.17 1.75 2.60 1.90 2.78 1.80 2.89 1.85 3.18 2.03 
Size  26.77 2.16 26.85 2.15 26.97 2.13 27.07 2.14 27.16 2.16 
Profitability 13.58 36.93 13.24 19.30 14.81 21.48 16.86 20.33 15.44 22.72 





65.01 19.81 63.78 19.41 63.52 20.01 63.85 19.33 
Reputation* 6.17 1.06 6.47 1.03 6.50 0.93 6.41 0.97 6.36 0.94 
 
*In 2007 reputation mean = 6.39; SD = .96 
 
 
 While technical strengths and concerns as well as institutional strengths 
all have a minimum of zero (see Appendix C for ranges), the reverse coding of 
environmental strengths added to environmental and community concerns 
results in a minimum of two.  This reverse coding achieves the netting of 
strengths against concerns and is similar to Kempf and Osthoff’s (2007:  911) 
transforming of KLD “concerns into strengths by taking the binary 
complements”.  While reverse coding has its particularities when developing 
survey questions on a range of scales, the operationalization of this reverse 
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coding is similar to converting yes/no questions and less likely to build in 
misinterpretations  (Spector et al., 1997), however reverse coded items are 
sometimes thought to be more difficult to interpret (Pallant, 2007).  For more 
information on the frequencies of each strength/concern, see Appendix C. 
 A review of the distribution of the primary industry SIC codes for the 285 
firms covers a range from industry code 10 to 87 as shown earlier in Figure 9.  To 
visualize how these 45 distinct industry codes relate to each other, a broad 
regrouping into four categories shows that the sample represents  manufacturing 
(SIC 20-39) for 43%,  services (SIC 60-87) for 24%, retail and transportation 
(SIC40-47 & 50-50) for 22%, with all other constituting the remaining 11%.  
Using these broad industry grouping to generalize on how they compare, there 
are no major distinctions (see Appendix C for details).   
 A correlation analysis was performed for each year as well as the panel, 
with the key results summarized in tables found in Appendix D.  Given the 
relatively large data set, although there are some statistically significant 
relationships, the correlations are generally small, however most are in the 
expected direction.   
 The year-by year relationship of the institutional and technical strengths 
and concerns to firm reputation found significant correlations only for the 
strengths, as detailed in Appendix D.  The panel found significant relationships 
for all but the technical concerns.  There was no consistent pattern of which time 
frame had the strongest relationships.  The institutional and technical strengths 
produced significant relationships to reputation over all time periods however, 
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there were no significant relationships for technical concerns over any of the time 
periods, while institutional concerns had modest correlations. 
 
 These preceding statistics are for descriptive purposes only.  The 
hypothesis testing will follow the preliminary data reliability/validity tests  
reported in the next section.   
 
4.3  Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) 
 As indicated in the earlier Figure 7, the four-factor structure of 
institutional strengths/weaknesses and technical strengths/weaknesses proposed 
by Mattingly and Berman (2006) is the manner in which we will operationalize 
corporate social actions.  To ensure the validity and reliability of these factors 
with our data we undertook a CFA.  All of the SEM modeling used maximum 
likelihood (ML) estimators which Nyle and Drasgow (2011:  550) note “in large 
samples, ML estimates are (nearly) unbiased with the smallest possible standard 
errors”.    
 There are a number of  tests of overall SEM model fit, known as fit indices, 
however “there is no agreement about a single optimal test or even set of optimal 
tests” (Maruyama, 1998:  238), leading Hu and Bentler (1998) to suggest that 
researchers report multiple indicators.  Starting with the chi-square (χ2) statistic 
and its degrees of freedom (df) as an absolute index (Maruyama, 1998) provides 
an indication of acceptable fit as long as it is less than 3*df.   There are then a 
number of comparative fit indexes generally scaled to fall between 0 and 1, with 
“one representing perfect fit relative to baseline; usual rule of thumb is that .95 is 
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indicative of good fit” (Kaplan, 2000:  107), while an acceptable fit is better than 
.9 (Bentler, 1988).  Bentler (2004:  118) suggests selecting one or two fit indices 
as “these indices are very highly correlated and hence redundant”, while Williams 
and O’Boyle (2011:  354) “focus on two of the most popular global fit indices, the 
comparative fit index (CFI) and the root mean square error of approximation 
(RMSEA)”.  
 The CFI was developed by Bentler to adjust McDonald and Marsh’s 
relative noncentrality index (RNI) to lie in the range of 0 to 1 (Kaplan, 2000).  As 
the popular CFI is reputed to have good performance (Bentler, 2004), it will be 
one of the indices reported when examining model fit.    
 Another perspective on model fit takes into consideration the residual 
errors in approximating a model solution.  Two such indicators are the 
standardized root mean-square residual (SRMR) and the RMSEA, where the 
objective is to have as small as possible a value of error (Kaplan, 2000; Williams 
& O”Boyle, 2011).  While generally this is less than .05, values “between .05 and 
.08 indicate reasonable fit,  .08 to .10 indicating mediocre fit” (Williams & Boyle, 
2011:  355).   Bentler (2004:  118) claims “if the SRMR value is very small, the 
model fits the data well regardless of what other measures of fit may imply”, 
while Kaplan (2000:  113) points to the advantage of RMSEA’s 90% confidence 
interval (C.I.) “enabling an assessment of the precision of the estimate”.  
 Building on these model fit criteria, the CFA four-factor model yielded an 
excellent statistical fit: χ2 (df) = 38.2 (37), CFI = .995 and RMSEA = .01, C.I. .00 - 
.04.  As seen in Table 4.3.1 an alternative one factor and two factor models 
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demonstrated a less optimal statistical fit to further reinforce our conclusion of 
the viability of the four-factor model.   
 
Table 4.3.1   CFA nested models for CSR dimensionality in 2002 
 Chi-sq (χ2) 
(df) 
CFI SRMR RMSEA 
90% C.I. 
 Δ Chi-sq 
(Δdf) 
4 Factor (baseline) 
Model 
38.2 (37) .995 .048 .011 
.0-.044 
 
2 Factor Model 
(strengths vs 
concerns) 
48.8 (43) .977 .057 .022 
.0 - .047 
10.6 (6)T 
2 Factor Model 
(institutional vs 
technical) 
57.5 (42) .940 .061 .036 
.0 - .057 
19.3 (5)** 
1 Factor  
Model 




**p<.01; Tp<.10  
 
 
 Further discussion of the model structure consistency over time (in 2002-
2006) follows in the next section on measurement invariance. 
 
4.4  Dimensionality of corporate social actions 
 An essential precursor to longitudinal analysis is to ensure the constructs 
being measured across time are consistent in their factor structure (configural 
invariance) as well as the interpretation of what is being measured (Bentein et al., 
2005; Chan, 1998; Chan & Schmitt, 2000; Lance, Vandenberg & Self, 2000).  
This was accomplished using CFA and a nested models technique at time 1 (i.e. 
2002), given the “first one being most critical, since it tests whether the same 
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conceptual frame of reference was used to interpret items across occasion” 
(Lance et al., 2005:  110).   
 As demonstrated by the preceding CFA, Mattingly and Berman’s (2006) 
four factor (institutional/technical - strengths/weaknesses) is confirmed for our 
data, the details year by year which follow in Table 4.4.1.    
 
 
Table 4.4.1  CFA model fit by year  
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Chi-sq (χ2) (df = 1) 7.920 1.283 0.687 0.117 0.156 
CFI .930 .996 1.000 1.000 1.000 













Std. Factor Loading      
Institutional Strength .726 .440 .425 .929 .903 
Technical Strength .452 .630 .687 .380 .371 
Institutional Concern .263 .265 .229 .028 .101 
Technical Concern .578 .903 .866 .443 .465 
Std. Solution -  
R-sq.  
     
Institutional Strength .61 .162 .143 1.0 .994 
Technical Strength .24 .804 1.0 .116 .106 
Institutional Concern .01 .058 .042 .072 .151 
Technical Concern .23 1.0 1.0 .157 .167 
(Least squares – elliptical distribution used for all models) 
  
 
 Furthermore configural and metric invariance were established by 
estimating separate baseline models for corporate social actions in 2002 to 2006.  
As indicated by the Lagrange multiplier test for adding parameters, minor 
modifications such as correlations of some error terms were implemented to the 
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models across each of the five years.  All of these baseline CFAs demonstrated a 
good fit to the data, as shown in the following table 4.4.2. 
 To test for invariance of factor loadings requires that an equality 
constraint be imposed on all factor loadings across the five time periods (Bentein 
et al., 2005; Chan,1998; Lance et al., 2000).  Results from this test yielded an 
appropriate fit as indicated in the following table 4.4.2. 
 
Table 4.4.2  Invariance models fit 
 Configural Invariance Measurement Invariance 
Chi-sq (χ2) (df) 10.16 (5) 41.46 (17) 
CFI .985 .929 








 However, as may be seen in a comparison of the two models above, there 
is a statistically significant difference in the chi-squares (∆31.3 (12), p<.05) and 
the CFI difference exceeds .05, suggesting the presence of non-invariance 
loadings (Cheung & Rensvold, 2002).  To address this indication, a Lagrange 
Multiplier test which assesses the validity of the model restrictions was 
implemented and identified two non-equivalent factor loadings.  These are 
technical strengths at 2002 not equivalent to 2003 and technical concerns at 
2002 not equivalent to 2004.  However, as Lance and colleagues (2000:  111) 
note this “is less serious because partial measurement inequivalence may be 
modeled in the LGM parameterization.  As such, sources of inequivalence are 
controlled for in the LGM”.  Hence partial measure equivalence was established. 
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 Accordingly, we may conclude that the measures of corporate social 
actions across time are configurally and metrically invariant and that the four-
factor structure of corporate social actions is optimal.  The non-equivalent factor 
loadings were controlled in the further analysis.  Further details on the models 
are included in Appendix F.  We have now met the prerequisite conditions to 
proceed with LGM, as described in the following section. 
 
4.5  Latent growth modeling (LGM) of growth trajectories 
 A second-order factor LGM technique was utilized to test the change over 
time hypotheses of corporate social actions, as well as the relationship with 
corporate reputation.  Following Bentein and colleagues (2005), a first phase of 
the analysis was to specify a linear trajectory of change over time of corporate 
social actions.  With only a five-year horizon, within a relatively stable external 
context we have no reason to believe CSR change to be anything other than 
linear.   
 This model included the repeated measure for each of the four corporate 
social action dimensions as indicators of a latent intercept variable (initial status, 
as measured at 2002) and a latent slope variable (change over the period).  The 
two latent variables were permitted to covary.  The intercepts for each indicator 
were fixed at 1.0 and the change factor loadings were fixed to 0, 1, 2, 3, and 4 for 
2002 to 2006, respectively.  The factor loadings were fixed this way in order to 
represent the time intervals in between measurements of the variable creating a 
linear model that accounted for the annual measures.  The linear change model 
represented a good fit to the data:  χ2 (df) = 336.7 (146), CFI = .989, RMSEA 
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=.049, C.I. .036-.060.  As a comparison or alternative to the hypothesized linear 
change, quadratic and cubic LGMs were tested, but demonstrated significantly 
worst fit.  Hence, the model representing a positive linear change in corporate 
social actions is retained for the analysis, and Hypothesis 1 predicting a positive 
change in corporate social actions is confirmed. 
 As corporate reputation is a single item measure, we are unable to perform 
a second-order factor LGM, so that a base LGM was used to assess the trajectory 
of change for corporate reputation.  A good fit was achieved with a beginning, 
middle and end of period measure of reputation, specifying a linear growth and 
fixing the change factor loadings to 0, 1, and 2, respectively.  Given the sample 
size of only 285 firms, using a more parsimonious model of three data points was 
preferable.  The linear change model represented a good fit (χ2=28.3 (1), CFI = 
.994, SRMR = .014) and demonstrated statistical significance in both intercept 
and change parameters, thus indicating a positive linear change in corporate 
reputation.   
 
4.6  Multivariate LGM analysis 
 To test the dynamic relationship between corporate social actions and 
corporate reputation, a multivariate second-order factor LGM was utilized.  This 
allowed us to introduce the industry and financial control variables discussed 
earlier in our theory development.    In an effort to create a parsimonious model 
of the sample of 285 firms, we examined the control variables to establish the 
appropriateness of introducing only the initial (2002) variables based on their 
comparability with the subsequent years.  As preliminary analysis had failed to 
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find any significance in the relationship with slack, this control variable was 
excluded from further LGM analysis.  The initial state of size, industry, profit and 
risk were treated as time invariant variables based on the following reasoning.  
We had tested the profit and risk variables for linear growth; however the fact 
that they did not demonstrate any change/growth allowed us to consider them to 
be stable.  Company size demonstrated a positive linear growth, however when 
considering only the employee component (log employees3) there was no 
change/growth, so that only the initial state of firm size was considered in further 
analysis.  Industry is time invariant by definition as firms’ primary SIC codes are 
constant.  The control variables measured in 2002 were introduced into both the 
intercept and parameters change equations predicting the dynamic relationship 
between corporate social actions and corporate reputation.  All of these year 
2002 control factors were found to be a significant predictor of the initial state of 
corporate reputation, however only initial profit was found to influence a change 
in reputation.  Hence only profit was maintained in the final model of reputation 
change, however the other factors were retained as a predictor of the initial state 
(intercept) of corporate reputation. 
 The final model exhibited a good fit (χ2=819.3 (272), CFI = .965, RMSEA = 
.067, (C.I. .06-.07).  Furthermore, the change in corporate social actions was 
found to significantly and positively relate to the change in corporate reputation.  
This demonstrates that a positive change in corporate social actions can predict a 
positive change in corporate reputation, while controlling for profit, confirming 
Hypothesis 2.  
                                                            
3
 In running these LGM analysis using log employees only for size, the results were very similar.  
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 Accordingly, the predictive equations (standardized solution) for corporate 
reputation are as follows: 
 
Reputation at t (intercept represents initial state) = .081*industry +.159*sizet + 
.264*profitt - .290*riskt - .09 corporate social actionst + .894error 
 
Reputation change 2006-2002 (slope represents change) = .236*industry + 



















Figure 12.  Representation of Latent Growth Second Order Factor Model:  








4.7  Multiple regression analysis 
 To ensure there was no problem of multicollinearity with the data set, the 
SPSS calculations of tolerance and the variance inflation factor (VIF) were 
reviewed and found to be well within the cut-off points of multicollinearity which 
exists when tolerance<.10 or VIF>10 (Pallant, 2007:  156).  Normality was 
established through a review of the Normal P-P Plot as well as the scatterplot of 
the standardized residuals which both corresponded to the distribution expected 
for a normal distribution.  Furthermore, a review of the scatterplot identified only 
7 outliers out of the total of 1425 (defined as those cases with a standardized 
residual of +/- 3.3, c.f. Pallant, 2007:  156).  Also verifying the Mahalanobis 
distances and Cook’s distance reaffirmed the absence of any significant outliers 
requiring further action (Pallant, 2007).  The absence of autocorrelation was 
established using the Durbin-Watson test which at 1.971 is very close to the value 
of 2 which indicates non-autocorrelation (Bartels & Goodhew, 1981). 
 Regression analysis to test Hypotheses 3 and 4 was performed.  The 
industry and financial controls were introduced at the first step of the analysis, 
followed by the institutional and technical strengths and institutional concerns at 
the second step, and finally the last step considered technical strengths as a 
predictor of reputation at time one, midpoint and the final measure in 2007.  The 
significance of technical strengths confirms Hypothesis 3.  The Hypothesis 4 
considering institutional concerns was tested in a similar manner.  The lack of 
significance of institutional concerns was contrary to Hypothesis 4.    The 




Table 4.7.1 Results of regression analysis of predictive power of  
technical strengths and institutional concerns in relation to corporate reputation 
 
            2002                                                               Reputation 2002  

























Institutional Strength  
Technical Concerns 
Institutional Concerns 





- .01 (.05) 
Technical Strength  
 
  .13*(.06) 
F 6.6** 5.3** 5.3** 
R2  .14 .16/.18 .17/.18 
ΔR2   .02/.03* .01*/.00 
 
            2002                                                               Reputation 2004  

























Institutional Strength  
Technical Concerns 
Institutional Concerns 





- .01 (.05) 
Technical Strength  
 
  .14*(.06) 
F 4.9** 3.9** 4.2** 
R2  .11 .12/.14 .14/.14 
ΔR2   .01/0.3* .02*/.00 
 
            2002                                                               Reputation 2007 





















.09 * (.04) 
.002 (.002) 
-.01** (.003) 
  .003 (.05) 
Institutional Strength  
Technical Concerns 
Institutional Concerns 





 .04 (.05) 
Technical Strength  
 
  .13*(.06) 
F 4.7** 3.8** 3.9** 
R2  .11 .12/.13 .14/.13 
ΔR2   .01/0.3* .02*/.00 
 
Values shown are the unstandardized regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. 
Values provided after a slash mark represent R2 and ΔR2 of the model where Institutional Concerns are 
introduced as a final step, after controls and the three dimensions of CSR.  






 The significance of technical strengths in the above results confirm 
Hypothesis 3, while the lack of significance of institutional concerns in the above 
results is contrary to Hypothesis 4.  We also reproduced the analysis using the log 
of employees as the proxy for firm size and obtained very similar results.  
 While technical concerns marginally affect 2002 and 2004 reputation, 
they have no significance in predicting final reputation. 
 
4.8  Summary of LGM and regression analyses 
 The preceding LGM analyses have examined the dynamic relationship 
between corporate social actions and corporate reputation, while the regression 
analysis has explored the moderating effect of stakeholder orientation of 
corporate social actions on the relationship with reputation. Relating these 
conclusions to the hypotheses developed in Chapter 2, the following table 













Table 4.8  Summary of results of hypotheses testing 









1. During the time period of this study, a positive 
change will occur in corporate social actions. 
LGM  ∆ 124 √ 
2. During the time period of this study, the greater 
the rate of increasing change in corporate social 
actions, the greater the rate of increasing change in 
reputation.  In other words, improvements in 
corporate social actions are positively related to an 
improvement in corporate reputation. 
LGM  ∆ 125 √ 
3. Strengths in corporate social actions directed to 
technical stakeholders will more strongly influence 
corporate reputation than those directed to 
institutional stakeholders. 
Regression 129 √ 
4. Concerns over corporate social actions directed to 
institutional stakeholders will more strongly 
influence corporate reputation than those directed to 
technical stakeholders.  




4.9  Illustrations drawn from the sample 
4.9.1  Introduction to illustrations 
 To bring the statistical analyses back to an individual firm level, we will 
examine five firms in our sample drawn from a variety of industries.  Consistently 
good reputation as well as consistently improving reputation firms are included, 
as well as the opposite with consistently deteriorating reputation firms.  
Similarly, these firms illustrate different patterns of corporate social actions 
directed to institutional and technical stakeholders.  The purpose of this section 
is to bring to light some of the anomalies in assessing corporate social actions 
across time.  This also allows a more specific discussion of some of the individual 
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elements considered behind the corporate social actions directed to institutional 
and technical stakeholders. 
 These are not related to any hypotheses testing, but will provide some 
insights into the inherent limitations of measuring corporate social actions across 
time.  The count of the number of strengths/concerns each year are segregated 
into those directed to institutional and to technical stakeholders.  For the 
purposes of these illustrations institutional concerns are represented as 
conceived to be the sum of community concerns and net environmental concerns 
(i.e. environmental concerns less environmental strengths), rather than the 
reverse coding utilized in the results analyses.  This presentation aligns with the 
conceptual identification of institutional concerns, rather than the technical 
operationalization of environmental concerns net of strengths.   
 The reputation horizon has been extended to include more recent years of 
Fortune’s World’s Most Admired Companies, which has been the rating scheme 
since 2008.  These later ratings are provided for information purposes only, 
recognizing the limited comparability.  As subsequent KLD ratings have not been 
purchased it is not possible to provide a similar extension on more recent 
corporate social actions. 
 As was noted in testing the dynamic corporate social responsibility – 
corporate reputation relationship, while controls influenced the initial state (i.e. 
2002) with size showing some growth, the only control variable that contributed 
to the change in reputation was profit.  Accordingly, these factors were examined 
for each of the examples however size (log value of assets and log value of number 
of employees) demonstrated very little variability, ranging from a decrease of 
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2.6% (International Paper) to an increase of 5.2% (Procter & Gamble) over the 
five year period.  Profit (average pre-tax return on shareholder funds and on 
average assets) on the other hand reported more fluctuation, however with the 
illustration firms generally demonstrating an inconsistent pattern, with the 
exception of Wendy’s International which steadily fell from 10.14% in 2002 to 
3.13% in 2006.  
 We will now illustrate Procter & Gamble, Southwest Airlines, International 
Paper, Wendy’s International and Tribune for insights on the dynamic 
relationship of corporate social actions and corporate reputation.  In addition to 
the KLD ratings, we draw on corporate web disclosure as well as annual financial, 
sustainability and social responsibility reports from these firms. 
 
4.9.2 Procter & Gamble 
 A consistently Fortune MAC star firm was Procter & Gamble (P&G), 
having ranked first in its industry since 1997 up to the most current 2010 
rankings.  However, for the period under study P&G’s 2007 reputation rating was 
a six year low of 8.20, yet still top of its industry as it is through to 2010, despite 
the lower rating.  The increase in CSR concerns and the decrease in CSR  












 Fortune MAC ratings: 
     2002 2003     2004 2005     2006 2007      
       8.31   8.83      8.33 8.45      8.48 8.20 
 (Fortune World MAC ratings: 2008- 7.69; 2009- 7.94; 2010- 7.43) 
 
 One of the technical strengths present in all years includes a notably 
strong program of retirement benefits.  As might be expected, once this is in place 
it would be maintained.  In 2002 and 2003 the other technical strength was 


















 Five institutional strengths are present in all years.  They are all in the 
Diversity category and recognize four or more minorities, women or the disabled 
on the Board; outstanding programs oriented to family/work concerns; more 
than 5% subcontracting with women or minorities; employment of the disabled; 
and notably progressive gay/lesbian policies.  In 2005 and 2006 P&G was further 
awarded an additional Diversity strength for notable progress in promoting 
women and minorities, particularly to line positions with profit and loss 
responsibility.  This focus on diversity is not surprising as P&G senior 
management have diversity results tied to their stock option awards (P&G, 2006: 
p.59).  The two additional institutional strengths in 2002 and 2003 were in the 
community area related to support for education and the making of charitable 
contributions abroad. 
 One technical concern found across all years is related to high executive 
compensation defined by KLD as CEO salary over $10 million or director 
remuneration over $100,000.  While this might be a relevant definition for 
national firms applying it to all global firms lacks nuance, particularly without 
any relationship to profitability or other performance measures.  Given the 
complexity of P&G, the long-serving CEO (A.G. Lafley) and their financial 
situation, these KLD concerns might well be expected across all periods.  In 2002 
and 2003, a significant reduction in the workforce gave rise to a concern, while 
from 2003 on, a concern was raised related to a substantially underfunded 




 Institutional concerns only came to light in 2005 related to regulatory or 
environmental controversies as well as toxic waste emissions.  While technical 
strengths were diminishing, institutional concerns were rising, generating an 
overall deterioration in CSR, which when compared to the reputation ratings 
showed a similar pattern.  Consistent with the proposed model, the strong 
technical strengths may have helped establish the sterling reputation, however 
the rise of institutional concerns may have influenced the deterioration in 
reputation.  The parallel overall trends of CSR and reputation support an  
interpretation that P&G’s corporate social actions are substantive, rather than 
symbolic.   
 Throughout the period, P&G had no other concerns noted, however EU 
regulators have fined P&G €211.2 million in April 2011 for participating in a 
laundry detergent price fixing cartel operating between 2002 and 2005 (Business 
News Network, 2011).  This highlights the difficulty in accurately assessing CSR 
compliance as the due process of investigations, particularly related to complex 
issues, can be very lengthy.   
 P&G has long been recognized as a leading socially responsible company 
and has published an extensive sustainability report for over a decade.  One 
striking feature is however how the composition of the business lines has 
changed over the years with significant acquisitions and divestitures.  P&G 
identified 12 Billion$ brands in 2002, which by 2006 had grown to 22 such 
brands.  Even in the 2002 to 2006 period there were several acquisitions such as 
Clairol, Wella and Gillette, while subsequent divestitures include Folgers, the 
European family care business and the global pharmaceutical business, as well as 
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the recently announced Pringles line.  Shifting away from food and beverage to 
the higher yielding beauty product lines not only account for increased margins, 
but may also be seen as an explanation for the previously noted institutional 
concerns related to environmental issues.  All the while the primary SIC code for 
P&G remains 28 (Manufacturing, grouped within chemicals and allied products).  
These comments are raised to highlight subtleties in comparing performance 
(financial, social and reputational) over a number of years, as even the same 
corporate entity does not represent the same sphere of operations.  Furthermore, 
the broad nature of the KLD ratings questions may not adequately nuance CSR 
performance for firms with highly diversified product lines.  For example, within 
the product category P&G had no strengths or concerns awarded from 2002 to 
2006.  However a review of the P&G sustainability reports over these years 
highlight product innovation as attested to by the organic growth in brands, as 
well as their water purification tablets (PUR) offering notable social benefits, 
both KLD product strength categories for which no 1’s were assessed.  This is not 
meant to second-guess the KLD raters, but to underscore the diversity of 
interpretation possible, as well as substantiate our interpretation that corporate 
social actions of P&G are substantive. 
 
4.9.3  Southwest Airlines (LUV) 
 With reputation ratings suggesting a rising star, Southwest Airlines, the 
LUV airline (the Southwest ticker symbol affectionately used as an identifier) saw 
a significant improvement in its 2007 Fortune MAC score to 8.02, ranking it in 
first place in its industry category.  This was unfortunately short lived as it fell to 
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third place the following year with a then declining trend in subsequent 
reputation ratings (remembering that these are not exactly comparable to the 
period under study due to changes in Fortune’s methodology to report World 
rather than America’s MACs). 
 
Figure 14.  Southwest Airlines corporate social actions and reputation 
 
 
Fortune MAC ratings: 
     2002 2003     2004 2005     2006 2007      
       6.98   7.01      7.35  7.19      7.08 8.02 
 

















 There is a striking absence of any concerns from 2002 to 2005, with only 
two technical concerns raised in 2006 related to an other category in Diversity 
and to employee workforce reductions.   
 The four technical strengths present over the entire period were Product 
Quality and three employee strengths (strong union relations, strong retirement 
benefits and other noteworthy commitments to employees’ well-being).  To these 
were added strong encouragement of worker involvement (2005 and 2006) and 
in 2006 the corporate governance strength of limited executive compensation 
(defined by KLD as CEO salary less than $500,000 and directors less than 
$30,000). 
 This illustration is consistent with the proposed model in that improved 
technical strengths may be interpreted to have contributed to the improvement in 
reputation assessments, albeit with certain lags.  Also, overall strengths in social 
actions showed consistent improvement from six in 2002 to eight in 2006 that 
corresponds with the improvement in reputation rating from 6.98 in 2002 to 
8.02 in 2007.  Once again, this pattern directs our interpretation of Southwest 
Airline’s corporate social actions as substantive. 
 A review of the LUV sustainability reports found a focus on many 
environmental initiatives which did not earn any recognition in the KLD ratings.  
Perhaps the consistency of operations and single line of business of Southwest 
Airlines may have facilitated the link between corporate social actions and 
corporate reputation.   Southwest Airlines is often used as an exemplar and as a 
successful outlier in its industry it has somewhat of a celebrity status which might 
also have influenced the reputation assessments.  Another unusually consistent 
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performance feature, particularly within the airline industry, has been the LUV 
quarterly profitability which may be interpreted to reflect not only on 
management but on consumer acceptance/support of their airline services and 
value for money.  Capturing the volatile industry dynamics, where successive and 
repeated bankruptcies are the norm, is undoubtedly a challenge for any 
longitudinal evaluation of one of the few surviving USA based airlines.  The 
impact on LUV reputation related to the morose industry outlook may also be a 
factor on the subsequent decline in reputation.  An inherent conflict of interest 
exists between the consumers’ expectation of quality service at low prices and the 
airlines’ financial performance to avoid bankruptcy restructuring, further 
complicating overall assessments of both CSR and reputation.   
 
 
4.9.4  International Paper 
 Looking to the only firm that consistently improved its reputation rating 
from 2002 to 2007 and continued to so under the 2008 World’s Most Admired 














Fortune MAC ratings: 
     2002 2003     2004 2005     2006 2007      
       6.92   6.95      7.31  7.45      7.60 8.07 
 (Fortune World MAC ratings: 2008- 8.56; 2009- 6.12; 2010- 6.58) 
 
 Although International Paper has all manner of strengths and concerns, 
the overall trend is for improving institutional strengths, but also more technical 
















The technical strengths relate to employee health and safety and governance 
communications, and are constant over the five years.  The institutional strengths 
include five years of community support of education, four years of diversity 
policies favouring gays and lesbians, along with notable promotion of women and 
minorities from 2004 to 2006. 
 The institutional concerns in 2002 included two community concerns over 
negative economic impact and another unidentified (one of the rarely used 
“other” categories), while the net environmental concerns were maintained at one 
throughout the five years. 
 Technical concerns were more far-ranging, as well as less consistent, with 
only high compensation being maintained over the five years, while antitrust 
violations and underfunded pension liabilities were of concern from 2003 to 
2006.  Health and safety concerns were first noted in 2002 and then recurred in 
2005 and 2006, while there was only one occurrence of a marketing incident in 
2002, an affirmative action controversy in 2004 and an “other” corporate 
governance concern in 2006.  
 While the model proposes technical strengths (a constant 2 over the 
period) as a driver of reputation improvement, the greatest increase is in 
technical concerns (from 3 to 5), however the increasing institutional strengths 
(from 1 to 3) and decreasing institutional concerns (from 3 to 1) may cause an 
interaction effect to propel reputation improvements until 2008.    Although 
International Paper’s reputation consistently rose over the period its CSR 
gestures did not trend as cleanly.  While institutional strengths and technical 
concerns were on the rise, aligned with the proposed model decreased 
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institutional concerns may support the improving reputation.  A further aspect 
not explored by the model is the role of industry associations or networks 
founded on CSR issues, such as the highly respected Forestry Stewardship 
Council (FSC) of which International Paper is a member and whose products 
hold certifications (FSC, 2011).  Although FSC is generally accepted as the gold 
standard of sustainable forest management, Driscoll (2006:  343) cautions that 
for some firms “certification can be more symbolic than a reflection of 
substantive change”.  Interpreting the consistently improved reputation against 
the mixed CSR performance, a symbolic or substantive distinction is not readily 
apparent.    
 In perusing the International Paper press releases they prominently noted 
their first place Fortune ranking in Forest and Paper products for the fifth 
straight year and made particular reference to their good CSR performance 
(International Paper, 2007).  Considerable corporate attention is given to 
sustainability and the environmental issues facing the forestry industry, however 
the KLD environmental rating considerations do not address any industry 
specific issues.  Once again, in terms of the corporate composition, International 
Paper notes a considerable number of divestitures and acquisitions of various 
properties, business lines and subsidiaries, for an ever evolving corporate 
structure.     
 
4.9.5 Wendy’s International 
 Now turning to a firm in reputational collapse as its rating consistently 
deteriorated from 2002 to not even be rated by 2008, is Wendy’s International.    
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Fortune MAC ratings: 
     2002 2003     2004 2005     2006 2007      
       7.22   7.05      6.63  5.58      5.45 4.74 
(Fortune World MAC ratings: 2008- below 4.88 cutoff; 2009-4.83; 2010- 4.08) 
  
 Surprisingly, there is a striking absence of institutional concerns, while 
there was only one technical concern in 2004 and 2005 in the diversity area 
related to affirmative action controversies.  However, turning to Wendy’s 













years, while change in size (combination of assets and employees) was less 
consistent but was lower in 2006 than 2002. 
 The only technical strength from 2002 to 2004 was employee 
involvement, while the institutional strength came in the diversity area related to 
notable progress in the promotion of women and minorities from 2002 to 2005, 
as well as strong representation from these communities on the Board of 
Directors from 2004 to 2006, while in 2006 a female CEO provided the second 
strength.  However, similar to Walls and colleagues’ (2011) speculation that KLD 
measures may be artificially inflated when an issue is captured in multiple areas 
(in their study it was KLD concerns in environmental and other categories), the 
promotion of a female to CEO is highly likely to translate into an additional 
female on the Board, as the CEO position is generally appointed to the Board.  
This may account for the inability of these institutional strengths to promote 
corporate reputation, however the deterioration in profitability may also be 
somewhat reflected in the declining reputation, possibly a reverse financial halo 
effect.  While the model predicts institutional concerns to drive a deterioration in 
reputation, the constant decline despite no institutional concerns and stable CSR 
strengths may be interpreted as symbolic CSR.  Going beyond the KLD ratings 
the following considerations may reinforce this interpretation.    
 In reviewing Wendy’s press releases they have concentrated significant 
attention on the nutrition debate and have given customers healthy choices, 
eliminated transfats and encouraged healthy eating.  However, as these are newer 
issues of specific interest to the food services industry, they do not fall into any 
particular KLD categories.  Ironically, Wendy’s started publishing a CSR report in 
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2005, however they were also fending off a public relations disaster which their 
president noted “our brand reputation has been affected nationally” related to a 
foreign object (alleged to be a human finger) found in a bowl of chilli on March 
22, 2005 in San Diego (Wendy’s/Arby’s, 2005).  Given the reputational collapse 
Wendy’s experienced it might be inferred that stakeholders interpreted Wendy’s 
CSR actions to be symbolic given the contradictory reports of tainted products. 
 Also, in examining Wendy’s corporate reports other factors come to light 
that may impact interpretations of the factors influencing their reputation.  
During the 2002 to 2006 period Wendy’s also included newly acquired Baja 
Fresh and Tim Horton’s (spun off by fourth quarter 2006), while a subsequent 
take over in September 2008 by Triarc gave rise to the Wendy’s/Arby’s Group, all 
the while still under the same ticker symbol, WEN.  Most recently, they have 
indicated that selling off Arby’s is being aggressively pursued in 2011 to refocus 
on Wendy’s.  This remixing of brands within the corporate banner may also be a 
factor in the constant deterioration of the reputation rating as well as of 
profitability. 
 
4.9.6  Tribune 
 Another firm in reputational decline since 2003 to the point of Chapter 11 











Fortune MAC ratings: 
     2002 2003     2004 2005     2006 2007      
       7.11   7.52      7.17  6.56      5.82 5.28 
(Fortune World MAC ratings: 2008- 2.85; no subsequent ratings) 
 
 While a technical strength for a quality program was maintained over the 
five years, the institutional strength in 2002 and 2003 was for support of 
















 The technical concerns commenced in 2003 with governance concerns 
over excessive compensation and employee concerns over union relations and 
workforce reductions, which were repeated in 2004.  However while the 
workforce reductions no longer rated a concern, for 2005 and 2006 additional 
concerns over tax disputes and marketing controversies were noted to increase 
the technical concerns from none in 2002 to four in 2006.  Consistent with the 
proposed model, increasing CSR concerns correspond to decreasing reputation as 
CSR strengths are negligible. 
 While a pre-existing tax dispute that came with an earlier acquisition was 
decided against the Tribune in 2005, upon appeal the Tribune was vindicated 
and received a significant tax refund at the end of 2007 (Tribune, 2007).  It 
would also appear that the marketing controversy over the inflation of paid 
circulation which likely gave rise to the 2005 and 2006 concern were also settled 
with “no fines or other sanctions levied against the company” (Tribune, 2006), as 
the Tribune’s remedial actions more than satisfied the SEC.   These reversals of 
situations flagged by KLD as concerns cannot be integrated into the prior year 
ratings as KLD does not restate.  While significant reversals are probably rare, the 
double occurrence at the Tribune raises questions of measurement integrity.   
Given the time lapse before resolution of these concerns, they still most likely 
contributed to the decline of the Tribune’s reputation.   
 
4.9.7  Summary of insights from illustrations 
 The intent of the illustrations was to personalize the statistical model and 
highlight some of the possible sources of noise or measurement error across the 
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various components of the proposed model.  Starting with the industry 
classification and financial controls, the shifting composition of subsidiaries, 
business lines and brands over five years in some of these major corporations 
complicates true comparisons.  As new facts come to light, none of the historic 
data is restated, while subsequent accounting periods may record charges related 
to prior periods so that trends are obscured or volatility amplified.  Even firms 
with a history of stable profitability, such as Tribune, subsequently fell into 
bankruptcy protection not predicted by the earlier financial controls.  
Furthermore, issues of the timing of settlements of disputes, fines and the like 
can significantly distort annual comparisons.   
 The highly subjective assessment of corporate social actions is framed with 
consistent considerations over time; however this consistency may constrain 
recognition of evolving issues relevant to particular industries.   Applying the 
same series of corporate social actions across highly disparate industries may 
ignore significant social issues of importance only to a small segment (i.e. obesity 
and nutritional value of fast foods).  Also, similar to the timing issues affecting 
the financial controls, attributing strengths or concerns over social actions is also 
subject to delays in being detected as well as reversals on appeals for which no 
restatement of past assessments is performed.  Also, the KLD presence (a rating 
of 1) or absence (a rating of 0) measurement model lacks nuance in how well a 
firm meets a condition or how much it may have changed from one year to 
another.    
 With an overall reputation rating which reflects a comprehensive 
perception of each firm compared to their competitors, our understanding of the 
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changes over time of corporate reputation has been placed in the perspective of 
the changes in corporate social actions.  The Fortune single rating does provide 
an insight into year over year change in reputation, although some of these 
modest changes did not affect the firm’s ranking against its peers (i.e. Procter & 
Gamble’s consistent first place industry ranking despite ratings fluctuations).      
 These insights are not meant as a criticism of the reputable data sources 
utilized in this research, but as a reminder that the accuracy of any single data 
point may be subject to interpretation based on events subsequent to the date of 
record.  The large number of firm years of data does however compensate for the 
types of anomalies discussed in the illustrations.  While there may be some under 
reporting or over reporting of corporate social actions, the overall portrait 
provides a valuable lens into the dynamic relationship to corporate reputation.  
We will now proceed to a discussion of the results of this research and a 
recognition of the limitations faced in capturing dynamic change of perceptual 
cospecialized intangible assets. 
 
4.10  Summary of key results findings 
 The dynamic relationship of corporate social actions and corporate 
reputation were tested using LGM to find support for that the trajectory of 
change in corporate social actions is positively related to the trajectory of change 
of corporate reputation.  Furthermore, the corporate social actions directed to 
technical stakeholders were found to have a significant positive effect on 
corporate reputation, while the relationship of concerns related to corporate 
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social actions directed to institutional stakeholders and corporate reputation 
were not statistically significant.   
 To rule out the alternative model that it is the change in corporate 
reputation that predicts the change in corporate social actions we revised the 
LGM predictor variables to test this alternative relationship, however the model 
did not converge so that there were no reliable estimates, leading us to conclude 
that the inverse is not supported.  Thus no reverse causality is suspected. 
 Our research makes an important contribution in substantiating firstly 
that corporate social actions demonstrate linear change over time.  The proposed 
feedback loop of corporate social actions inciting further actions to maintain or 
improve reputation is thus substantiated.  Secondly we supported our hypothesis 
that the change in corporate social actions is positively related to the change in 
corporate reputation; in other words improvements in corporate social action 
improve reputation.   
 Furthermore, in examining the components of corporate social actions we 
confirmed the four-factor model of Mattingly and Berman (2006).  Controlling 
for industry and financial performance, corporate social actions directed to 
technical stakeholders were found to positively influence corporate reputation 
more than those actions directed to institutional stakeholders.  While our theory 
building predicted concerns over social actions directed to institutional 
stakeholders would have a negative impact on corporate reputation, we did not 
find support for this expectation.  We will go into greater discussion of these 




5.  DISCUSSION OF RESULTS AND LIMITATIONS 
 This research focuses on the evolution of overall firm corporate social 
actions over time, as operationalized for a period of five years from 2002 to 2006.  
Given the role of stakeholder management in developing CSR initiatives it is 
logical to expect stakeholder expectations to change over time in response to 
shifts in social issues as well as their perceptions of how business has behaved.   
 Returning to the hypothesized changes over time in corporate social 
actions and corporate reputation, finding support for the improvement in CSR 
over the five-year time period of our study laid the foundation for interpreting the 
relationship between these constructs.  This supported our initial premise that 
rising expectations would prompt an increase in corporate social actions.   Our 
hypothesis that improvements in corporate social actions will be positively 
related to an improvement in corporate reputation was supported by the LGM 
with statistically significant fit indices.  While LGM has become a common 
analytic technique in psychology and organizational behaviour, it is more novel in 
strategy research.  Using the change of firm corporate social actions to predict a 
change in corporate reputation makes a contribution to our understanding of the 
dynamic relationship and supports the feedback loop that we propose managers 
be aware of in assessing corporate social actions.  
 We then predicted that strengths in corporate social actions directed to 
technical stakeholders will more strongly influence corporate reputation than 
those directed to institutional stakeholders.  Finding support for this hypothesis 
built on stakeholder and resource dependence theories contributing to the 
resource-based view of intangible assets makes a theoretical contribution in 
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providing an integrated lens.  From a managerial perspective, understanding the 
importance of the perception of technical stakeholders on improving firm 
reputation may guide the choice of corporate social actions. 
 While we did not find support for our prediction that concerns over 
corporate social actions directed to institutional stakeholders will more strongly 
influence corporate reputation than those directed to technical stakeholders, we 
are not alone in being unable to find evidence of the role of institutional 
concerns.  In summary we found support for the following hypothesis: 
 
H1 – During the time period of this study, a positive change will occur in 
corporate social actions. 
H2 - During the time period of this study, the greater the rate of increasing 
change in corporate social actions, the greater the rate of increasing change in 
reputation.  In other words, improvements in corporate social actions will be 
positively related to an improvement in corporate reputation. 
H3 - Strengths in corporate social actions directed to technical stakeholders will 
more strongly influence corporate reputation than those directed to institutional 
stakeholders. 
 
 Before considering some of the limitations, a return to the theory 
development underlying these hypotheses confirms that CSR increases over time 
as firms recognize stakeholders expect more than the status quo (Barnett, 2007).  
While the motives prompting firms to engage in CSR have been identified as 
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sending signals to stakeholders, conforming to social expectations, managing risk 
by building insurance value, or alternatively over-investing in CSR, these could 
all be interpreted to incite firms to expand their corporate social actions over 
time.  Although motives were not captured in our empirical model, our 
theoretical model advocated an increase in CSR to maintain or advance firm 
reputation.  By establishing the growth in corporate social actions, we are then 
able to relate this positive change to an improvement in reputation over time.   
 Going back to the earliest conceptions of CSR, scholars such as Drucker 
(1954) advocated businesses’ need to respond to society’s expectations to 
maintain legitimacy  as well as to engage in social actions which demonstrated 
that corporations were committed to addressing societal concerns to which they 
devoted firm efforts (Drucker, 1984).  As stakeholders’ attentions shift over time 
(Godfrey, 2005), so do firms’ attentions as predicted by Mitchell and colleagues’ 
(1997) conditions for salience to management ( power, legitimacy and urgency) of 
which clearly urgency exhibits a temporal component.  By providing empirical 
support for the increase in CSR over the five years of this study, we effectively 
show that firms go beyond the status quo as their CSR performance is enhanced 
over time.   
 Although at the outset CSR was not found to be related to corporate 
reputation this is not surprising, given the complexity with which corporate 
reputation is formed.  The legacy effect of past actions (Fombrun, 1996) is one of 
the components influencing reputation as some of the mechanisms that explain 
reputation include character traits, technical efficiency, conformity to norms or 
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status by association (Kraatz & Love, 2006; Love & Kraatz, 2009).  The 
attribution of any or all such characteristics based on prior actions may have 
influenced corporate reputations at the time this study was undertaken, so that 
initial CSR was but one contributor to initial corporate reputation.  As 
stakeholder expectations of future corporate social actions are built on 
perceptions of past behaviour (Fombrun, 1996) subsequent corporate social 
actions would have to improve to at least maintain reputation.  This is consistent 
with the empirical support found for the improved reputation that corresponded 
with the positive change in CSR over the time frame of the research.  We 
examined an alternative model for reverse causality but found no support. 
Accordingly, we may therefor rule out that it is having a consistently good 
reputation that provokes a firm to engage in increasing corporate social actions.  
This reinforces that it is the improvement in CSR that contributes to improved 
corporate reputation. 
 Now turning to the segmentation between institutional and technical 
stakeholders and the underlying theoretical drivers of institutional and resource 
dependence theories, respectively, our data is consistent with Mattingly and 
Berman’s (2006) classification.  Recognizing the power that technical 
stakeholders have in providing resources critical to firm survival as well as the 
inherent legitimacy of technical stakeholders, our hypothesis that corporate 
social actions directed to technical stakeholders will dominate the relationship to 
reputation is consistent with Mitchell and colleagues’ (1997) predictions that 
stakeholders salient to management receive management’s attention.  As 
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technical stakeholders have both legitimacy and power (as indicated in resource 
dependency that the firm holds with such stakeholders), when there is any 
urgency they will attract management interest.  This is consistent with our 
findings that corporate social actions directed to technical stakeholders improve 
corporate reputation.   
 While any violation of legitimacy or non-conformity with societal 
expectations was expected to detract from corporate reputation to the extent that 
social concerns directed to institutional stakeholders were expected to be a 
deterrent to reputation, our empirical results did not provide substantiation.   
One interpretation may be that information asymmetry is sufficient to 
camouflage concerns or that firms deliberately dismiss institutional stakeholder 
expectations as they assess the costs to conform to be excessive or the risk to be 
minimal (Oliver, 1991).  The ambiguity of institutional stakeholder preferences 
(Pfeffer, 1981) may have also been demonstrated as concerns did not create the 
anticipated decrease in reputation.  Returning to Fombrun’s (1996) definition of 
corporate reputation as a comparative against rivals, the lack of backlash over 
corporate social concerns may reflect a stakeholder malaise over post Enron bad 
deeds.  With so many major US firms having a tainted history of bad behaviour, 
perhaps stakeholders discounted their expectations of future actions to be less 
sensitive to the concerns.  In other words, the concerns identified by institutional 
stakeholders may not have been a surprise so that they imposed no reputational 




 Substantiating change in corporate social actions is particularly 
encouraging given the KLD measures, as examining the underlying KLD 
foundation for the CSR ratings finds a number of the questions biased against 
change.  This is consistent with findings of other researchers (Cho et al., 2010).  It 
was only through the use of LGM techniques that the change over time in 
corporate social actions was captured. 
 While as pointed out earlier, considerable research has utilized the KLD 
ratings for a single year as a measure of social responsibility or irresponsibility, 
somewhat less use has been made in longitudinal studies.  Furthermore, while 
suitable to many researchers’ needs on specific aspects of CSR such as the 
environment (Cho et al., 2010; Delmas & Blass, 2011; Post, Rahman & Rubow, 
2011; Walls, Phan & Berrone, 2011), the KLD assessments have been less utilized 
in their entirety as an overall CSR measure.  The appropriateness of global 
ratings has been questioned as not reflecting the issues of importance related to 
ethics and compliance, for example (SustainAbility, 2011).  Furthermore, the 
industry particularities are not captured in a one size fits all ratings approach, 
which while having the advantage of being able to generalize findings does not 
support a deeper comparison of industry-specific issues as they evolve 
(SustainAbility, 2011). 
 While earlier studies netted concerns against strengths, Mattingly and 
Berman’s (2006) assertion that strengths and concerns are not a continuum have 
yet to be embraced.  Rather than a summing and netting, Kempf and Osthoff 
(2007) created an overall CSR score by reverse coding concerns.  Chiu and 
Sharfman’s  (2009) research compiled only the KLD strengths for each area to 
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focus on two CSP aspects which they entitled social and strategic.  Godfrey and 
colleagues’ (2009) summarization of institutional or technical CSR participation 
strengths found that only institutional strengths were significantly related to 
abnormal cumulative annual returns, while technical CSR was not significant, 
concluding that the insurance-like effect of CSR is captured only by institutional 
CSR participation.    Our study found only technical strengths, but not 
institutional concerns, to be significantly related to reputation, which when 
paired with the just noted Godfrey results may suggest that transactional 
stakeholders discount the insurance effect of CSR as they form their expectations 
and monitor outcomes on more accessible information than institutional 
stakeholders.   It may also be that the Fortune reputation assessments are more 
heavily weighted in favour of considerations identified with technical 
stakeholders. 
 Our research sought to remedy some of the criticisms of earlier CSR 
research by following the Mattingly and Berman (2006) suggestion to avoid 
netting concerns against strengths, as well as to develop a longitudinal 
perspective.  We were able to confirm the suitability of their four-factor model via 
CFA, allowing us to then base our analyses accordingly.  Their institutional 
concerns factor is the only one which loaded environmental strengths and 
concerns together, along with community concerns.  This was operationalized in 
reverse scoring environmental strengths, however as noted earlier, reverse coding 
can be problematic in truly capturing the respondents’ intensions (Pallant, 2007; 
Spector et al., 1997).  In retrospect this may partially account for our lack of 
support for the expected impact of institutional concerns on corporate 
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reputation.   This also echoes Walls and colleagues’ (2011) findings focused only 
on environmental issues, which found KLD’s environmental strengths to lack 
reliability, while KLD’s environmental concerns found no statistically significant 
association to environmental performance.  They suggest “the KLD concerns 
measure may be artificially inflated because a firm with one environmental 
problem could be captured in several of the KLD concerns categories” (Walls et 
al., 2011:  96), an artifact further distorted by reverse coding.  Orlitzky and 
colleagues (2011:  16) conclude the Walls and colleagues’ study “convincingly 
demonstrate the superiority of their proposed new measure to the extant proxy 
measures of KLD”, pointing to “critical limitations of widely used data sets in the 
study of CSR”.   Similarly, Post and colleagues’ (2011) lack of significant 
relationship between board composition and KLD’s environmental concerns 
prompted them to posit that the difference in time required to address 
environmental concerns was perhaps more significant than to act on strengths.  
Our findings not supporting institutional concerns’ (of which the environment is 
a primary component) relationship to corporate reputation would concur with 
the Post speculation that addressing institutional concerns takes longer than the 
five year period under study.  Furthermore, Doh and colleagues (2009) were also 
not able to find any statistically significant relationship summing KLD’s concerns 
into a CSiR measure.  The ability of the KLD concerns to accurately capture 
environmental and CSR missteps is well challenged by these studies, reinforcing 
our absence of any significant relationship of KLD institutional concerns on 
corporate reputation.  Orlitzky and colleagues (2011:  14) raise the issue of the 
“inconsistencies between CSR ratings and actual outcomes (which) raise 
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fundamental questions about the credibility and accuracy”, further putting into 
question the overall predictive capability of the KLD ratings.  As was noted in the 
illustrations, when additional information comes to light subsequent to the 
period being rated no modification or restatement is brought to the KLD ratings. 
 Although we did find a linear growth curve for corporate social actions, to 
better understand the less variable elements of institutional concerns and 
technical strengths, a further review of the underlying questions reveals the 
inherent policy nature of some of the responses.  While in theory any corporate 
policy that is implemented may be reversed, a practical application calendar 
would preclude a full cycle within five years.  That said, the KLD attribution of a 1 
for having a policy in place is likely to be constant thereafter, and as such will not 
provide for variability as there is no nuance to the question or expectation of 
further improvement.   Suggestions such as developing better metrics to assess 
CSR investments (Godfrey et al., 2009) may provide greater insight and 
differentiation by considering actual CSR spending.  Although standardized 
information may be difficult to obtain as such disclosure is entirely voluntary, 
evolution over time might better be captured.  
 Similarly, some of the rating items touch upon the very nature of the 
business, such as for example the community concern “the company is a financial 
institution whose lending or investment practices have led to controversies, 
particularly ones related to the Community Reinvestment Act” (KLD, 2009).  
This particular concern, classified in institutional concerns, was noted between 9 
and 12 times from 2002 to 2006 (touching a total of only 19 companies over the 
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period), with 7 companies rating a 1 in at least 4 of the 5 years, thus further 
compounding the limited applicability with limited variability.  
 A further consideration for the institutional concerns category is that this 
is the only incidence of reverse coding environmental strengths to sum to  
environmental concerns, which for most firms results in a larger score than the 
other categories of technical strengths/concerns or institutional strengths.  While 
the larger number of rating parameters might on the surface offer greater 
potential for variability, once again the nature of the company’s business is a key 
determinant.  For example, environmental strengths are noted when the firm 
provides environmental services or is a recycling firm, while environmental 
concerns are registered if it manufactures ozone depleting or agricultural 
chemicals or sells coal, oil or fuel.   
 While true variability is most likely to be found in those concerns which 
represent acts of commission, that because of fines or other retribution are 
unlikely to be repeated year after year, the institutional concerns include few such 
categories, with only two environmental questions related to fines for hazardous 
waste or for violating air, water or other environmental regulations.  Further-
more, the incidence of actions or events that would constitute a concern might be 
considered as outliers in that they are seldom recorded in the entire population of 
major US firms, for example representing less than 5% of the KLD universe in the 
two environmental categories just noted.  As was highlighted in the P&G 
illustration, the time lag before which fines are imposed may be so significant as 
to be beyond the scope of a five-year analysis. 
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 The sample of 285 firms had a significant proportion of firms with 
relatively few ratings of either strengths or concerns.  As noted, some of the KLD 
questions were unlikely to be widely applicable, such as the product strength of 
serving the economically disadvantaged for which only 3 firms in the sample (11 
in the 2006 universe or less than 0.4%) ever had a strength over the 5 years.  
Within each major category, there was always an “other” question to recognize a 
strength or concern not covered by the other ratings.  While rarely utilized in 
most categories except the product concern dimension, comparability is difficult 
to interpret, however given the judicious assignment of such ratings ignoring or 
eliminating them from the compilation would taint the overall assessment of a 
focal firm’s CSR. 
 Returning to the hypotheses testing, corporate social actions were found to 
have a positive linear growth trend over the period under study.  We then 
established that the improvements in corporate social actions were positively 
related to the improvements in corporate reputation over time.  Having also 
examined an alternative model reversing the causality (i.e. corporate reputation 
predicting corporate social actions) for which no convergence was achieved, 
further supports our findings that changes in corporate social actions are 
positively related to changes in corporate reputation.   The LGM model 
demonstrates the significance of the relationship in the change of corporate social 
actions and corporate reputation.  Utilizing regression analysis to look at the 
moderating effect of technical stakeholders also found support for the positive 
relationship of corporate social actions directed to technical stakeholders on 
corporate reputation.  Following the LGM model a regression analysis for 2002 
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corporate social actions was undertaken for reputation at 2002, 2004 and 2007, 
all confirming the strongly positive relationship, albeit with a modest r-squared.   
 Using these same analysis techniques, we did not find support for 
institutional concerns in the regression analyses.  We might speculate that less 
information asymmetry may explain the greater significance of transactional 
stakeholders to recognize technical strengths to then influence corporate 
reputation.   While institutional stakeholders’ expectations were anticipated to 
have greater influence when concerns were raised given the universality of 
impact on the community (Brammer & Pavelin, 2006), perhaps the lack of 
support for this assertion reflects these stakeholders’ limited access to 
information.  Once again, the time required for due process investigations and 
subsequent penalties may exceed the five-year time frame of this study.  
Furthermore, the reverse coding of environmental strengths to aggregate with 
environmental and community concerns to constitute institutional concerns may 
also have proved problematic.   
 While we did achieve good CFA model fit to confirm Mattingly and 
Berman’s (2006) aggregations of institutional and technical strengths and 
concerns, an alternative factor analysis was not tested.  Earlier we did attempt 
exploratory factor analyses for each of the years but were unable to obtain any 
consistent factor structure other than that confirmed by the CFA.   The limited 
quantitative research utilizing Mattingly and Berman’s composite KLD factors 
may also suggest certain difficulties.  While Chiu and Sharfman (2009) both 
criticize and vindicate the KLD measures, they “chose to use the dataset because 
164 
 
of its comprehensiveness and objectivity over other CSP measures” (p. 12), 
however focused only on the strengths for 2002.   
 While the consistency of the KLD universe over the period attenuated a 
common longitudinal challenge of participant attrition, the Fortune MAC 
measure of reputation’s concentration on only the best performing firms within 
each industry did limit the sample to those consistently “good” performers.  Also, 
newcomers not appearing until after the 2002 Fortune MAC were excluded from 
the sample, thus biasing against younger firms.   Furthermore, in selecting only 
major US firms across a variety of industries to favour the generalizability of 
findings, the industry control reflected only the primary industry code.  As the 
nature of the sample firms is often more diversified, including a change of 
composition over time, the measures utilized may not have sufficiently addressed 
the industry(s) or the components over the periods.  An example is the 
sale/purchase of lines of business seen in the insurance/ reinsurance sector or 
the restaurant brands discussed in the Wendy’s illustration, as well as the 
consolidation/divestment of business lines in consumer goods as detailed in the 
P&G illustration.  While the MAC respondents’ expertise may have considered 
these issues in their ratings, the control variables could not integrate these 
complexities.  The shift over time in the comparability within each of the sample 
firms’ financial, social and reputational performance may have also influenced 
the statistical results.  However as Chiu and Sharfman (2009) note that with 
increasing time lags between variables there is a greater risk of confounding 
factors, adding to the difficulty in establishing causal relationships or obtaining 
agreement between researchers on a most appropriate time line.  
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 Capturing overall perceptions of both the social responsibility initiatives 
and the corporate reputation from different evaluators at different times may 
have overcome any common method variance, however it may also not have 
adequately captured evolution over time.  The contextual background of the 
social initiatives/ missteps and any events surrounding their implementation (i.e. 
natural or man-made disaster, fraud, etc.) may not have been sufficiently 
integrated in the measures used.   Although publicly available documentation was 
a significant source of the KLD rating evaluations, independent reading of this 
information may give rise to differences in interpretation, as was noted in the 
P&G illustration of product categories, as well as the revised legal outcomes 
discussed in the Tribune illustration.  
 Reconsidering the perspectives taken by the respondents to the MAC 
survey and by the compilers of the KLD data may bring to light some of the 
limitations of only select stakeholder viewpoints.  Although the KLD measures 
are characterized by stakeholder, no broad stakeholder input is sought as most of 
the underlying data are firm self-reports, including those to regulatory agencies, 
without any external validation or audit.  As external to the focal firm, only 
publicly available information without any internal context fuels the opinions 
expressed by these respondents.  Recognizing that employees and contractors 
working within a firm’s walls are privy to a closer observation of corporate 
culture and thus consistency with demonstrated CSR, the absence of their input 
may ignore critical interpretations.  While management may externally project a 
very strong CSR focus, their internal actions may not carry through with stated 
policies.  One such example is KLD’s diversity strength related to life-balance 
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programs, which is easily publicized in formal documentation but is practically 
subject to discretionary application which may effectively deny many categories 
of employees such options.  Developing more fine-tuned measures, such as 
tracking the number and location of employees requesting and then receiving 
particular types of accommodations, might better differentiate firm commitments 
and the evolution over time of such actions. 
 The issue of reputation to whom, for what, also carries with it the 
limitations that the MAC ratings originate from within the investment 
community and direct competitors in the eyes of relatively senior respondents.  
While undoubtedly well informed by industry published documentation and 
media reports, there may be inherent biases and knowledge gaps tainting 
responses.  The halo around celebrity firms created by the media (Rindova et al., 
2006) may afford greater recognition for the same corporate social action as a 
lesser known firm, further enhancing corporate reputation without tangible 
justification.  The attention given CSR initiatives is inherently linked to the 
respondents’ attitudes about the relevance of such actions which influence their 
expectations as well as their assessments of the relative strength of CSR against 
their industry competitors.  Accordingly, not all corporate social actions are of 
comparable interest across stakeholders, however no such weighting is 
incorporated into the KLD dimensions as all aspects are considered equal.  
Conceivably the MAC respondents’ alignment with shareholder interests might 
elevate corporate governance as a dimension of greater interest than others such 
as diversity.  Had another stakeholder group such as customers formed the 
survey pool, the product dimension would have dominated over other CSR 
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aspects such as corporate governance.  Furthermore, many CSR gestures directed 
to technical stakeholders tend to attract more media attention on a stand-alone 
basis, compared to corporate social actions directed to the community or the 
environment which are often overshadowed by disastrous events or catastrophes.  
For example, while the support offered by many firms to victims of Hurricane 
Katrina captured momentary media attention as a commendable corporate 
movement, social actions directed to customers, shareholders and employees 
tend to benefit from more prolonged attention due to the distinct corporate 
identify tailored to entice media follow-up.      
 We do not find the expected influence of concerns over corporate social 
actions directed to institutional stakeholders on firm reputation, leading to the 
intriguing question of “why not”?  Is it because there is no disconnect between 
stakeholder expectations due to general cynicism about corporate behaviour, or 
have reputational assessments already been discounted for inevitable “bad 
behaviour”?   An alternative explanation may be the methodology of reverse 
coding or even the Mattingly and Berman (2006) factor loading of environmental 
strengths and weakness onto institutional concerns.  Spector and colleagues 
(1997) caution negating positive worded items may not produce appropriate 
negatively worded items.  Returning to the KLD environmental strengths, they do 
identify distinctively different criteria than the environmental concerns, with the 
exception of the little used “other” category.  Accordingly, adding to the KLD 
environmental concerns would be that the firm does not produce a beneficial 
product/service; it does not engage in pollution prevention; it does not recycle; it 
does not use alternative fuels; it has not signed the CERES Principles and finally 
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it does not demonstrate any other strong attributes not covered elsewhere by 
KLD.   Combining these items into one factor via reverse coding may have 
distorted the sought after net environmental concerns which was added to 
community concerns to reflect concerns over social actions directed to 
institutional stakeholders.      
 The asymmetry of the control over the visibility of CSR actions may also 
present a factor in stakeholder awareness.  While firms strategically promote 
their CSR strengths and tend to be silent or excusive of CSR weaknesses, thus 
favouring the diffusion of only positive gestures (Doh et al., 2010), social media is 
more likely to become viral over missteps than good deeds.  Traditional research 
in the early internet and pre-social media era has operationalized media visibility 
with news media article counts and various finite measures of how often or what 
key words were utilized to communicate information on corporate actions.  
Comparisons of corporate annual and more recently CSR/sustainability report 
disclosures have also become less meaningful as global reporting standards are 
voluntarily adopted.  However, the 21st century poses significantly greater 
research challenges on identifying and measuring stakeholder sources of 
information that influence their expectations as well as their assessments of how 
well CSR actions measure up, both absolutely and against competitors.  The 
advent of blogs, twitter, consumer reviews and a multitude of on-line constantly 
updated global sources, with varying levels of credibility or authenticity, have yet 
to be integrated into a viable research model.  While previously the challenge was 
to find informed stakeholders, the going forward challenge may be to weed out 
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misinformed stakeholders as even unsubstantiated accusations of wrong doings 

























6.  CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS 
 This research path has witnessed many detours since first proposed.  High 
expectations of the suitability of the KLD data for longitudinal CSR measures led 
to initial disappointment with the lack of variability, then to the pleasure of LGM 
techniques’ detecting growth in both corporate social actions and corporate 
reputation over the five years under examination.  The theoretical foundation 
answered the call of integrating multiple theoretical lenses, as the over-arching 
resource-based view linked to institutional, stakeholder and resource dependence 
theories.  The dynamic loop of improving corporate social actions leading to 
improved reputation was successfully demonstrated with change substantiated 
for each construct as well as the relationship between them.   
 This research has broadened the theoretical lenses with which we view 
CSR and has empirically tested for a growth in CSR over time, then linking the 
improvement in CSR to an improvement in corporate reputation.  Under the 
resource-based view of the firm, we have considered the synergy created by the 
cospecialized assets of CSR and reputation.  We have examined technical 
stakeholders as resource providers who under resource dependence theory create 
exchange capital while rewarding the firm with reputation enhancements.  Using 
institutional theory we have outlined how institutional stakeholders create moral 
capital, which is drawn-down upon when there are concerns over CSR, however 
as previously discussed we were not able to find empirical support for this 
relationship.  We have also contributed to understanding how the change in CSR 
over time is evidenced by a change in corporate reputation over time.  The 
longitudinal design of our research with LGM analytics provides these insights on 
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the dynamic relationship between CSR and reputation which cannot be captured 
by traditional cross-sectional studies. 
 We integrated stakeholder theory with stakeholder management to 
develop divergent expectations for corporate social actions directed to 
institutional and technical stakeholders; supporting the significant role of actions 
directed to technical stakeholders, while concerns related to institutional 
stakeholders were not supported.  Much has been learned and will be integrated 
in future research.   
 The findings of this study emphasize the dynamic relationship between 
corporate social actions and corporate reputation.  Although no initial 
relationship was expected, the findings that an improvement in corporate social 
actions improved corporate reputation over time imply that only maintaining 
corporate social actions may see reputation decline.  Future research into the 
consequences of constant or decreasing social actions on corporate reputation is 
warranted.  Furthermore, when looking at changes in corporate social actions 
future research might distinguish between firms with initially high or low 
reputation to compare the evolution of the relationship over time.  
 In earlier research we have proposed that firms can achieve a first-mover 
advantage when corporate social actions are central to the firm’s mission, provide 
some firm-specific benefits and are visible to stakeholders (Tetrault-Sirsly & 
Lamertz, 2008), however without continued attention to improving on this CSR, 
the first-mover advantage on corporate reputation could be very short-lived.   
Any testing of these propositions should consider the sustainability of the various 
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advantages attached to the speed of implementation of corporate social actions, 
along with the impact of improvements over time. 
 Returning to the role of stakeholder expectations in formulating 
reputation expectations, a background of time, place and culture should be 
integrated to future research.  The all-important context against which societal 
norms are developed was discussed in Chapter 2 and serves as a reminder that 
issues of importance to stakeholders evolve over time, in addition to being 
culturally grounded.  While racial discrimination existed long before the civil 
rights movement it did not preoccupy stakeholder attention during the 
depression years when other priorities, such as a lack of employment, were at the 
forefront.  The taken-for-granted gender equality of the Western world is not the 
reality found in countries like Saudi Arabia where women are denied what we 
view to be basic human rights.  As corporate social actions are discretionary and 
go beyond that which is required by law (McWilliams & Siegel, 2001), when 
legislation changes (either over time or by the nation of reference) the scope of 
required gestures will evolve and so need to be considered in future research 
designs.   
 Integrating firm legitimacy into stakeholder assessments of reputation 
might extend the risk-management motivation for CSR (Godfrey et al., 2009) as 
well as provide a deterrent for bad behaviour.  Building on Oliver’s (1991) 
defiance strategy of ignoring or manipulating stakeholders, when could this 
provoke a withdrawal of stakeholder approval of the firm’s license to operate?  
This understanding could provide valuable insights for both expanding theory 
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and for practice.  Furnishing managers with tools to weigh choices in corporate 
social actions against possible reputational  benefits can assist in building the 
business case for CSR options as well as directing CSR to influential stakeholders. 
 This study’s support of the dominant influence of technical stakeholders 
provides a starting point for future research to refine stakeholder segmentation to 
determine when CSR directed to which technical stakeholder(s) is most likely to 
improve corporate reputation.  Similarly, perhaps it was the aggregation of 
institutional stakeholders which failed to provide support for reputation decline 
over concerns.  Accordingly, determining which institutional stakeholder(s)’ 
disapproval over social concerns can damage reputation is of importance to both 
academics and managers when establishing a CSR strategy or making choices 
between possible corporate social actions.   
 Strategy research relies on many proxies for hard to quantify attributes, 
however just because a measure has been used extensively in the past may not 
make it suitable for all research designs.  Ironically, both key measures, the 
Fortune MAC and KLD have undergone significant make-over, rendering the 
time-frame utilized in this study as effectively the latest date upon which 
comparable longitudinal data are available.   Fortune now focuses on the World’s 
MACs, while KLD’s new ownership has completely revised scoring to go beyond 
the 0,1 of the academic spreadsheets available since 2002.   The consolidation 
and growth of the ESG (environmental, social and governance) reporting and 
tracking industry will complicate comparable longitudinal ratings, however the 
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critical mass of the merged MSCI group (owners of KLD) may lead to more 
comprehensive firm assessments. 
 The GAS (generalizability, accuracy and simplicity) challenge persists and 
may have to compromise generalizability to obtain greater accuracy.  Of 
particular note is the comparability of results over time, given changes in the 
composition of business lines, contextual factors and the consolidation of 
disparate operating results under common headings. Future research might 
avoid conglomerates or look at individual business lines due to the disparate 
reputations that may be attached to individual brands operating under a 
corporate umbrella with global CSR policies.   
 The pertinence of the research question posed by this dissertation 
warrants continued exploration, as corporate social initiatives and corporate 
reputation undoubtedly influence strategy and contribute to overall corporate 
performance.  However, recognizing the complexity of the relationship and the 
ambiguity to building corporate reputation, other research methodologies might 
be considered such as event studies or comparative case analyses. To integrate 
external context an event-study design around a provocative issue, integrating an 
assessment of various media coverage, might provide a starting point.  Access to 
relevant stakeholders and the corporate decision makers for repeated survey or 
interview could also provide invaluable input in triangulating the intersection of 
corporate social actions and reputation.  Capturing the dynamic relationship and 
evolution over time will provide a valuable piece to the puzzle of corporate and 
stakeholder value creation.   
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 Returning to the role of the CEO in championing corporate social actions 
offers interesting cross-level research possibilities, such as using the retirement 
or firing of CEOs as an event study on the stakeholder attention of corporate 
social actions.  Furthermore, examining the origin of the successor CEO (from 
within the organization, within the industry or outside industry) and the 
subsequent changes on firm CSR orientation may offer an opportunity to 
examine whether CSR is embedded within corporate culture or transferred with 
CEO.  As we saw in the early origins of CSR, the values embraced by the CEO laid 
the foundation for corporate social actions and may still do so today in the choice 
of both implementation of new policies or cessation of existing orientations. 
 The current economic recession will offer a unique research context for 
examining a reduction in corporate social actions as some firms take-back 
benefits such as defined benefit pension plans, scale back on community 
involvement and product recalls become more prevalent.  Stakeholder reactions 
to these gestures and the ensuing impact on firm reputations offer fertile research 
avenues.  The recent announcement by The Royal Bank of Canada (Shecter, 2011) 
to end defined pension benefits for new employees has thus far received minimal 
attention yet no other Canadian financial institution has followed suit.  While 
institutional theory might suggest mimicry within the banking oligopoly, the 
contentious issue of not only retirement benefits, but two-tiered benefits between 
existing and future employees, may find RBC alone its proposal.  Whether or not 
RBC goes ahead with the planned changes, the reaction of a variety of 
stakeholders (i.e. not just employees) would provide an interesting insight into 
the acceptability of such expense cutting by a profitable bank on its reputation.   
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 Building upon case studies of particular improvements/ deteriorations of 
CSR may unlock insights as to their underlying causes which may inform 
researchers and managers.  Concentrating on single industry or more mature 
firms may also provide a more stable research setting within which to compare 
year over year evolution in a comparable setting.  Another area of interest is the 
interaction between industry and the firms comprising an industry, strategic 
groups and the role of membership in industry associations.  Exploring the 
notion of reverse reputational gains as large firms piggy back on reputational 
gains made by smaller niche firms, such as the organic foods market, may offer 
additional insights.   Alternatively, understanding how firms in poorly regarded 
or sin industries can distance themselves to create reputational capital may also 
be another research avenue.  Ultimately, identifying how to build reputation and 
avoid reputation shocks must be meaningful to the corporate managers entrusted 
with navigating the reputational landscape.  Our findings of the significant 
relationship of improving corporate social actions to improving reputation 
assessments can assist managers in justifying, maintaining or extending CSR 
initiatives to nurture the valuable resource of reputation.  
 The motivation behind CSR initiatives might also provide a rich multi-
level research agenda as the motives behind CSR actions engaged by individual 
managers, firms and industries digress or overlap under what conditions, 
locations and contexts.  Integrating stakeholder assessments of corporate CSR 
motives may also help guide CSR agendas.  Going beyond large North American 
public companies, there is fertile research territory in small or privately owned 
firms, cooperatives and public corporations.  The geographic distance between 
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CSR beneficiaries and influential stakeholders may also be considered by global 
firms in selecting their CSR initiatives in consideration of the markets within 
which they are managing their reputation. 
 Corporate managers’ focus on financial performance is largely assured by 
compensation plan alignments, while many such schemes also refer to 
reputational achievements, however inserting corporate social performance into 
the management equation is perhaps key to future success.  Exploring the role 
social media plays in diffusing and critiquing CSR gestures is also undoubtedly of 
interest to managers hoping to economically leverage positive comments while 
minimizing the visibility of negative comments.  An integral component of 
superior management, strategic CSR can contribute to enhanced financial and 
reputational performance.    
 Throughout the business literature many references are made to the 
importance of protecting corporate reputation, however the presence of CSR 
concerns has not been found to be immediately detrimental to reputation.   Of 
interest to managers is distinguishing between CSR concerns that menace 
reputation and those which stakeholders are more likely to forgive, thus 
maintaining reputation intact without over CSR spending.   The cumulative and 
longer-term outcome of CSR performance on firm reputation requires further 
exploration to understand how and why CSR concerns take their toll.   
 What role does mimicry play when all participants in a market are equally 
guilty?  Does this serve to manage stakeholder expectations so that the lack of 
corporate social irresponsibility provides reputational advances without investing 
in further CSR?  Remembering that the perception of whether a corporate social 
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action is symbolic or substantive is in the eye of the stakeholder, how do firms 
signal CSR motives, to which stakeholders, to most influence these assessments?  
Public skepticism over insincere corporate social gestures, such as many of the 
pink products sold during October’s breast cancer awareness campaigns, must 
also be considered by managers when planning their CSR initiatives.   
 The issue of reputation measures and CSR scales cries out for research 
attention, as directing management attention to the broader reputational 
outcomes of CSR initiatives may provide justification for CSR investments over 
time.  There is a need to develop practical tools to assist managers to choose 
those CSR initiatives that will leverage relevant stakeholder attitudes to enhance 
corporate reputation.  This would allow firms to measure the on-going pertinence 
of their CSR gestures as well as guard against a repeat of the status quo when 
stakeholder interests may have evolved in new directions.  Akin to the old zero-
based budgeting concept where tomorrow’s investments/spending had to be 
justified, perhaps CSR choices may also benefit from a more structured 
relationship to stakeholder expectations and reputational outcomes.  The role of 
social media in diffusing good deeds also opens new opportunities for informing 
relevant stakeholders and monitoring perceptions.  Expanding our 
understanding of the synergies between CSR and reputation provides a tool for 
managers to create sustainable competitive advantage by investing in doing good 
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KLD Ratings Criteria*                 Appendix A 
 
The following questions were used by KLD Research & Analytics, Inc. to rate the 
1100 Socrates companies listed on the S&P 500, Domini 400 Social Index or 
Russell 1000 Indexes as of December 31st, 2001 and 2002.  As of 2003, some 
3300 Socrates companies (includes Russell 3000 index) were rated.  Each 
strength or concern identified is included as a 1 on the academic spreadsheet. 
 
Strengths Concerns 
Community and Human Rights 
 
1.  Generous Giving:  consistent 
charitable donations of more than 1.5% 
of net income before taxes (trailing 3 
years), or otherwise notably generous 
in giving. 
2.  Innovative Giving:  notable 
program of innovative giving to support 
not for profit organizations (especially 
those aimed at the self-sufficiency of 
the economically disadvantaged). 
3.  Indigenous Peoples Relations: 
established relations in actual or 
proposed operations that respect the 
indigenous peoples' land, sovereignty, 
human rights, culture and intellectual 
property. 
4.  Support for Housing:  
prominent participant in public/private 
initiatives favouring the economically 
disadvantaged (i.e.  National Equity 
Fund or Enterprise Foundation). 
5.  Support for Education:  notably 
innovative in supporting school 
education at the primary and secondary 
levels in programs that advantage the 
economically disadvantaged, or 
prominent support of youth job-
training programs. 
6.  Other human rights:  exceptional 
human rights initiatives or leadership 
not covered elsewhere. 
7.  Other: Exceptional in-kind giving 
program,  strong volunteer or other 
community program.  
 
 
1.  Negative Economic Impact: 
major controversies related to the 
economic impact on the community of 
firm actions.  Possibilities include 
water rights disputes, environmental 
contamination, "put-or-pay" trash 
incinerator contracts, plant closings or 
other actions that adversely affect the 
community's tax base, quality of life or 
property values.   
2.  Investment Controversies: 
controversial practices of financial 
institutions (lending or investments), 
particularly related to the Community 
Reinvestment Act.  
3.  Indigenous Peoples Relations: 
serious controversies where the 
indigenous peoples' land, sovereignty, 
human rights, culture or intellectual 
property were not respected. 
4.  Burma:  operations or investments. 
5.  Other human rights:  operations 
subject of major human rights 
controversies not covered elsewhere. 
6.  Other:  strong community 
opposition to firm's business or other 







1.  Limited Compensation:  notably 
low levels of top management or board 
compensation recently awarded (CEO 
less than $500,000 per annum; outside 
directors less than $30,000). 
2.  Ownership:  owns 20%-50% of 
another company that KLD has rated as 
having social strengths, or is more than 
20% owned by a firm rated by KLD as 
having social strengths. (Over 50% 
ownership represents a controlling 
interest, such that the other company is 
treated as a division of the parent 
company by KLD). 




1.  High Compensation:  notably 
high levels of top management or board 
compensation recently awarded (CEO 
more than $10 million per annum; 
outside directors more than $100,000). 
2.  Ownership:  owns 20%-50% of 
another company that KLD has rated as 
having social concerns, or is more than 
20% owned by a firm rated by KLD as 
having areas of concern. (Over 50% 
ownership represents a controlling 
interest, such that the other company is 
treated as a division of the parent 
company by KLD). 
3.  Tax Disputes:  recent major tax 
disputes at the Federal, state or local 
level involving more than $100 million. 







1.  Quality:  has well-developed, long-
term company-wide quality program or 
one recognized in its industry as 
exceptional in the U.S. 
2.  R & D / Innovation:  industry 
leader for R & D, particularly 
distinguished for notably innovative 
products. 
3.  Benefits to Economically 
Disadvantaged:  part of basic firm 
mission is to provide products or 
services for the economically 
disadvantaged. 
4.  Other:  (no specific criteria given). 
 
 
1.  Product Safety:  recent 
substantial penalties or fines paid, or 
regulatory actions or major recent 
controversies surrounding the safety of 
products or services. 
2.  Marketing/Contracting 
Controversy:  recent major 
controversies over contracting or 
marketing or substantial penalties / 
fines relating to consumer fraud, 
advertising practices or government 
contracting. 
3.  Antitrust:  recent major antitrust 
allegation controversies or regulatory 
actions, substantial penalties or fines 
paid for antitrust violations (i.e. 
collusion, price fixing, predatory 
pricing). 







1.  Beneficial Products & Services: 
substantial revenues from innovative 
remediation products, products that 
promote energy efficiency, 
environmental services or innovative 
products that it has developed that 
provide environmental benefits.  (KLD 
notes that "environmental service" 
excludes those services with 
questionable environmental effects (i.e. 
landfills, waste-to-energy plants, 
incinerators and deep injection wells). 
2.  Pollution prevention:  notably 
strong pollution prevention programs 
(includes toxic-use reduction & 
emissions reductions programs). 
3.  Recycling:  either a substantial 
user of recycled materials in its 
manufacturing processes as raw 
materials or a major player in the 
recycling industry. 
4.  Alternative Fuels:  substantial 
revenues are derived from alternative 
fuels (includes natural gas, solar energy 
and wind power).  Exceptional 
commitment to energy efficiency 
programs (or the promotion of energy 
efficiency) has been demonstrated. 
5.  Communications:  signatory to 
the CERES Principles, has a notably 
effective internal communications 
systems to communicate its best 
practices related to the environment or 
publishes a notably substantive 
environmental report.  
6.  Other:  demonstrates a strong 
environmental attribute that is not 
covered by KLD ratings criteria. 
 
 
1.  Hazardous Waste:  liabilities for 
hazardous waste sites exceeds $50 
million or substantial fines/penalties 
have been paid for waste management 
violations. 
2.  Regulatory Problems:  recent 
substantial fines/penalties have been 
paid for violations of water, air or other 
environmental regulations, or regular 
controversies under the Clean Water 
Act, Clean Air Act or other major 
environmental regulations have been 
noted. 
3.  Ozone Depleting Chemicals:  
among top manufacturers of ozone 
depleting chemicals (i.e. HCFC, 
methylene chloride, methyl chloroform 
or bromines.  
4.  Substantial Emissions:  toxic 
chemicals (as defined by and reported 
to the Environmental Protection 
Agency) legal emissions into the water 
and air from individual plants are 
among the highest of the KLD followed 
companies. 
5.  Agricultural Chemicals:  
substantial producer of agricultural 
chemicals (i.e. chemical fertilizers or 
pesticides). 
6.  Climate Change:  substantial 
revenues are derived from the sale of 
oil or coal, including derivative 
products, or substantial revenues are 
indirectly derived from the combustion 
or oil or coal and derivative fuel 
products.  Included are such companies 
as transportation firms with fleets, 
truck and automobile manufacturers 
and other transportation equipment 
companies. 
7.  Other:  environmental problems 
not otherwise covered in KLD ratings 






1.  CEO:  a minority group member or 
a woman. 
2.  Promotion:  notable progress in 
promoting women and minorities, 
particularly to those line positions that 
have responsibilities for profit and loss. 
3.  Board of Directors:  Minorities, 
women and/or the disabled hold 4 or 
more of the board seats (without any 
double counting), or at least one-third 
of the total board seats when there are 
less than 12 members of the board. 
4.  Family Benefits:  outstanding 
employee benefits or other programs 
oriented to family/work concerns (i.e. 
elder care, childcare or flextime). 
5.  Women/Minority Contracting:  
at least 5% of subcontracting is with 
women/minorities, or demonstrated 
significant purchasing/subcontracting 
with women/minority owned 
businesses. 
6.  Employment of the Disabled:   
innovative hiring or other human 
resource programs for the disabled, or 
otherwise has maintained a superior 
reputation for being an employer of the 
disabled. 
7.  Progressive Gay/Lesbian 
Policies:  notably progressive 
gay/lesbian policies, particularly in 
providing benefits to domestic partners 
of employees.  
8.  Other:  noteworthy diversity 
achievements that are not covered 




1.  Controversies:  affirmative action 
controversies that have resulted in 
substantial fines or civil penalties, or 
other major controversies due to 
affirmative action issues. 
2.  Non-Representation:  no women 
in senior management nor on the board 
of directors. 
3.  Other:  notable diversity problems 















1.  Strong Union Relations:  
notably strong union relations over the 
long-term 
2.  Cash Profit Sharing:  recent 
distributions from a cash profit-sharing 
program have been made to a majority 
of the workforce. 
3.  Employee Involvement:  strong 
encouragement of worker involvement 
and/or ownership via stock options for 
a majority of employees, stock 
ownership, gain sharing, participation 
in management decision-making or 
sharing of financial information. 
4.  Strong Retirement Benefits:  
notably strong program of retirement 
benefits. 
5.  Health and Safety:  U.S. 
Occupational Health and Safety 
Administration has noted firm for its 
safety programs (criteria first 
introduced in 2003). 
6.  Labour Rights:  outstanding 
transparency on monitoring and 
disclosing overseas sourcing, or outside 
the U.S., particularly good union 
relations. 
7.  Other:  good employee safety 
record or other noteworthy 




1.  Poor Union Relations:  history of 
poor union relations. 
2.  Workforce Reductions:  
reduction or announcement of a 
reduced workforce of 15% in the most 
recent year or 25% over the past two 
years. 
3.  Pension/Benefits:  substantially 
underfunded defined benefit pension 
plan, or a retirement benefits plan that 
is inadequate. 
4.  Health and Safety:  recent 
substantial fines/penalties for wilful 
violations of employee health and 
safety standards, or other involvement 
in major controversies over health and 
safety. 
5.  International Labour:  major 
recent controversies over non-U.S. 
operations related to labour standards 
and employee relations. 
6.  Other:  notable employee problems 
















The final coding examined each of the above categories to regroup international 
human rights related to employment relationships with employees, etc., and  
regrouped to the following number of categories: 
 
Community Strengths 7   Community Concerns 6 
Diversity Strengths  8   Diversity Concerns  3 
Environmental Strengths   6   Environmental Concerns   7 
Employee Strengths  7   Employee Concerns  6 
Product Strengths  4   Product Concerns  4 






















* These questions are taken from the KLD Research & Analytics, Inc. 2003 "KLD 
Ratings Data:  Inclusive Social Rating Criteria" and 2008 “Getting Started with 







Fortune's Most Admired Companies Data Collection Methodology** 
 
 
 Fortune started rating 200 U.S. companies in 1982 based on a September 
1981 survey of industry experts (analysts) and industry executives with a 
response rate of 51% of those polled (Makin, 1982:  34), to become an annual 
survey based on the Fortune 1000, of which the more recent data is utilized in 
this research.  While the respondents have changed over time, and the industries 
have evolved, an essentially stable methodology has been employed, although 
since 2001 Fortune has partnered with the Hay Group to conduct this annual 
survey. 
 Based on Fortune's information on the 2008 survey (Fortune, 2008), over 
600 companies in some 70 industries were included in a fourth quarter 2007 
survey of over 3,300 executives, board directors and securities analysts. 
Fortune determines the industry groupings by using the Fortune 1000 listing and 
based on revenues selects the ten largest companies in each industry, at the time 
the required revenue level to be included on the list was $1.2 billion (Fortune, 
2008).   
 The 2009 survey merged the former World’s Most Admired Company with 
the former America’s Most Admired Company, to cover some 40 primarily US 
industries, along with 25 international industries, increasing the minimum 
required revenue level to $10 billion (Fortune, 2009).  Given the significance of 
the change in methodology, for the purposes of this longitudinal research the 
2008 survey based on the fourth quarter 2007 reputation ratings are the last 
206 
 
usable reputation measures.  These rating represent a one year lag from the last 
2006 CSR measures, two years from 2005 and three years from 2004. 
 Fortune does not provide detailed response statistics, but indicates that 
they receive a satisfactory response rate.  Up to ten firm executives and board 
directors from each eligible company were surveyed as to their own company and 
the nine largest competitors.  For financial analysts, they were asked to assess the 
ten largest industry competitors they monitor.   Each respondent rated each of 
the following categories (equally weighted) from zero (poor) to 10 (excellent), to 
yield an overall estimation of firm reputation: 
 Quality of management 
 Quality of products and services 
 Innovation  
 Long-term investment value  
 Financial soundness 
 People Management: Ability to attract, develop and keep talented people 
 Social responsibility  





** Description of Fortune methodology was obtained from sample industry 
reports (no longer available on their web site) and from their web site (last 









Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
  Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic 
2 Dig Industry SIC 10 87 43.737 17.638 
 
2002 
        
Institutional Strength 2002 0 8 1.702 1.973 
Technical Strength 2002 0 5 0.856 1.099 
Institutional Concern 2002 4 12 6.479 1.325 
Technical Concern 2002 0 8 2.168 1.748 
Size 2002 21.810 33.246 26.767 2.161 
Profitability 2002 -208.045 431.860 13.580 36.927 









    Institutional Strength 2003 0 9 2.021 2.126 
Technical Strength 2003 0 5 0.821 1.097 
Institutional Concern 2003 4 12 6.473 1.231 
Technical Concern 2003 0 9 2.596 1.901 
Size 2003 22.041 33.399 26.853 2.148 
Profitability 2003 -87.555 147.655 13.236 19.300 
Slack 2003 0.040 7.720 1.605 1.079 
Risk 2003 13.870 103.857 65.005 19.807 
 
2004 
    Institutional Strength 2004 0 10 2.123 2.197 
Technical Strength 2004 0 7 0.853 1.159 
Institutional Concern 2004 3 13 6.575 1.258 
Technical Concern 2004 0 9 2.782 1.796 
Size 2004 22.193 33.685 26.974 2.131 
Profitability 2004 -146.975 219.250 14.809 21.482 
Slack 2004 0.040 8.080 1.605 1.059 









Institutional Strength 2005 0 9 2.323 2.150 
Technical Strength 2005 0 6 1.032 1.301 
Institutional Concern 2005 2 13 6.575 1.434 
Technical Concern 2005 0 9 2.890 1.848 
Size 2005 22.175 33.733 27.070 2.139 
Profitability 2005 -60.605 245.665 16.863 20.327 
Slack 2005 0.011 7.280 1.577 0.981 
Risk 2005 10.900 115.752 63.515 20.009 
 
2006 
    
Institutional Strength 2006 0 10 2.453 2.263 
Technical Strength 2006 0 6 1.049 1.323 
Institutional Concern 2006 2 14 6.520 1.510 
Technical Concern 2006 0 11 3.175 2.029 
Size 2006 22.121 34.055 27.163 2.162 
Profitability 2006 -210.280 81.895 15.444 22.717 
Slack 2006 0.014 5.820 1.548 0.915 
Risk 2006 11.850 108.683 63.854 19.330 
 
Dependent Variable: 
    
Reputation     
Reputation 2002 2.33 8.41 6.171 1.064 
Reputation 2003 2.63 9.04 6.468 1.032 
Reputation 2004 3.50 8.52 6.503 0.934 
Reputation 2005 3.20 8.60 6.407 0.968 
Reputation 2006 3.09 8.53 6.362 0.936 


















Descriptive Statistics - 5 Year Panel 
 
 
n=1425 Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic 
2 Digit Industry SIC 10 87 43.737 17.613 
Institutional Strength 0 10 2.124 2.157 
Technical Strength 0 7 0.922 1.202 
Institutional Concern 2 14 6.400 1.435 
Technical Concern 0 11 2.723 1.894 
Size 21.810 34.055 26.965 2.150 
Profitability -210.280 431.860 14.786 25.007 
Slack 0.011 8.110 1.581 1.027 
Risk 10.680 121.166 64.442 19.692 
Reputation at T 2.33 9.04 6.382 0.994 
Reputation at  T+1 2.63 9.04 6.426 0.967 
Reputation at T+2 (n=1140) 3.09 8.60 6.416 0.950 
Reputation at T+3 (n=855) 3.09 8.60 6.386 0.955 
 
 
Frequencies for 5 year panel 
Frequencies  









None (i.e. 0) 392 728 0 128 
1 329 397 0 294 
2 210 190 14 312 
Cumulative 2 or 
less 931 
 
1315 14 734 
 
% represented 
    None (i.e. 0) 27.5% 51.1% 0% 9.0% 
1 23.1 27.9 0 20.6 
2 14.7 13.3 0.98 21.9 















Illustrative industry groupings for 5 year panel    
Manufacturing (SIC 20-39) 
(n=620)  
Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Institutional Strength 0 10 2.274 2.243 
Technical Strength 0 7 1.290 1.359 
Institutional Concern 2 13 6.434 1.536 
Technical Concern 0 9 2.777 1.835 
Size 22.121 33.071 26.666 1.924 
Profitability -174.073 431.860 16.758 31.749 
Slack 0.060 8.080 1.722 0.925 
Risk 10.680 121.166 62.731 19.402 
Reputation T+1 3.09 8.83 6.429 0.966 
 
 
 Services (SIC 60-87) 
 
(n=345)  
Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Institutional Strength 0 10 2.519 2.386 
Technical Strength 0 6 .652 .937 
Institutional Concern 4 9 6.149 1.152 
Technical Concern 0 9 2.620 1.756 
Size 22.591 34.055 27.873 2.259 
Profitability -210.280 38.330 11.579 14.718 
Slack .014 8.110 1.356 1.293 
Risk 19.950 101.590 75.259 20.201 





Retail & Transportation (SIC 40-47 & 50-59) 
(n=315)  
Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Institutional Strength 0 7 1.641 1.566 
Technical Strength 0 6 0.549 0.961 
Institutional Concern 3 10 6.203 0.887 
Technical Concern 0 11 2.549 2.038 
Size 21.810 33.294 26.516 2.100 
Profitability -208.045 80.165 14.145 20.819 
Slack 0.120 5.940 1.555 0.763 
Risk 15.660 104.848 57.737 16.595 
Reputation T+1 3.890 9.040 6.518 1.007 
 
 
All Other Industries (SIC 10-19 & 48-49) 
(n=145)  
Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Institutional Strength 0 8 1.593 2.036 
Technical Strength 0 3 0.634 0.873 
Institutional Concern 4 14 7.607 2.161 
Technical Concern 0 8 3.110 2.082 
Size 22.171 32.042 27.062 2.277 
Profitability -57.871 110.070 15.383 18.588 
Slack 0.280 7.440 1.571 1.131 
Risk 26.910 114.965 60.592 15.330 




Correlations by Year  
(Spearman’s rho)        
2002 
(N=285) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1.  Institutional Strength 2002 
 
1        
2.  Technical Strength 2002 .368*** 
 
1       




1      






1     
5.  Reputation 2002 (t) .823 .176** -.094 -.038 1    
6.  Reputation 2003 (t+1) .151** .204*** -.102 .014 .823*** 1   
7.  Reputation 2004 (t+2) .194*** .261*** -.057 .047 .704*** .796*** 1  
8.  Reputation 2005 (t+3) .258*** .241*** -.076 .058 .609*** .660*** .791*** 1 
*p<.05  **p<.01  ***p<.001  (two-tailed) 
 
2003 
(N=285) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1.  Institutional Strength 2003 1 
       
2.  Technical Strength 2003 
.369*** 
1 
      
3.  Institutional Concern 2003 
.048 .150* 
1 
     
4.  Technical Concern 2003 
.366*** .226*** .226*** 
1 
    
5.  Reputation 2003 (t) 
.144* .281*** -.095 -.001 
1 
   
6.  Reputation 2004 (t+1) 
.177** .303*** -.043 .017 .796*** 
1 
  
7.  Reputation 2005 (t+2) 
.229*** .273*** -.059 .025 .660*** .808*** 
1 
 
8.  Reputation 2006 (t+3) 
.173* .264*** -.087 .054 .611*** .684*** 0.755*** 
1 




(N=285) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1.  Institutional Strength 2004 1 
       
2.  Technical Strength 2004 
.407*** 
1 
      
3.  Institutional Concern 2004 
-.038 .153* 
1 
     
4.  Technical Concern 2004 
.312*** .180** .230*** 
1 
    
5.  Reputation 2004 (t) 
.168** .264*** -.011 -.055 
1 
   
6.  Reputation 2005 (t+1) 
.233*** .262*** -.078 -.060 .791*** 
1 
  
7.  Reputation 2006 (t+2) 
.184** .278*** -.105 -.038 .697*** .808*** 
1 
 
8.  Reputation 2007 (t+3) 
.173*** .205*** -.029 -.008 .547*** .684*** .755*** 
1 




(N=285) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1.  Institutional Strength 2005 1 
      
2.  Technical Strength 2005 
.387*** 
1 
     
3.  Institutional Concern 2005 
-.009 .1548* 
1 
    
4.  Technical Concern 2005 
.339*** .138* .258*** 
1 
   
5.  Reputation 2005 (t) 
.239*** .273*** -.067 -.010 
1 
  
6.  Reputation 2006 (t+1) 
.187** .305*** -.068 -.032 .808*** 
1 
 
7.  Reputation 2007 (t+2) 
.180** .218*** .017 .054 .684*** .755*** 
1 
*p<.05  **p<.01  ***p<.001 (two-tailed) 
 
2006 
(N=285) 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1.  Institutional Strength 2006 1 
     
2.  Technical Strength 2006 
.384*** 
1 
    
3.  Institutional Concern 2006 
-.132* .073 
1 
   
4.  Technical Concern 2006 
.331*** .142* .222*** 
1 
  
5.  Reputation 2006 (t) 
.181** .276*** -.086 .000 
1 
 
6.  Reputation 2007 (t+1) 
.174** .233*** -.020 .056 .755*** 
1 
*p<.05  **p<.01  ***p<.001 (two-tailed) 
 
5 year Panel  
Institutional and Technical strengths, concerns & Reputation from T to T+3 
 
(N=1425 for 1-6) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1.  Institutional Strength  1 
       
2.  Technical Strength  
.344*** 
1 
      
3.  Institutional Concern  
-.010*** .043 
1 
     
4.  Technical Concern  
.351*** .162*** .197*** 
1 
    
5.  Reputation T 
.171*** .250*** -.077** -.005 
1 
   
6.  Reputation T+1 
.179*** .255*** -.076** -.007 .788*** 
1 
  
7.  Reputation T+2 (n=1140) 
.189*** .251*** -.070* .016 .673*** .787*** 
1 
 
8.  Reputation T+3 (n=855) 
.201*** .231*** -.070* .031 .582*** .681*** .784*** 
1 
 






























Configural and measurement invariance model factors 
 
Configural invariance model factors 
n= 285 
 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Standardized Solution      
Institutional Strength .781 .402 .378 1.0 .997 
Technical Strength .487 .896 1.0 .340 .326 
Institutional Concern .103 .242 .204 .278 .389 
Technical Concern .484 1.0 1.0 .396 .409 
R-sq.       
Institutional Strength .609 .162 .143 1.0 .994 
Technical Strength .237 .804 1.0 .116 .106 
Institutional Concern .011 .058 .042 .077 .151 
Technical Concern .235 1.0 1.0 .157 .167 
 
Measurement invariance model factors 
n= 285 
 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Standardized Solution      
Institutional Strength .730 .695 .684 .724 .741 
Technical Strength .474 .513 .504 .469 .497 
Institutional Concern .201 .231 .229 .202 .207 
Technical Concern .545 .557 .573 .543 .537 
R-sq.       
Institutional Strength .533 .483 .468 .524 .549 
Technical Strength .225 .263 .254 .220 .247 
Institutional Concern .041 .054 .052 .041 .043 
Technical Concern .297 .310 .328 .294 .289 
 
 
 
 
 
 
